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ABSTRACT
SYNTHETIC REDUCTIONISM IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
MAY 2014
SCOTT HILL, B.S. KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman
My dissertation consists of five independent papers linked by their connection to a
larger meta-ethical story to which I am sympathetic. Each chapter contributes in some
way to exploring that story. To begin with, I will briefly sketch the story and say
something about where my sympathies lie. Then I will discuss each of the chapters of
my dissertation and how they fit into that story. To finish things, I will identify some
aspects of the story that are not explored in my dissertation but stand in need of further
defense.
The story contains a metaphysical thesis and an epistemological thesis. The
metaphysical thesis is synthetic ethical reductionism. According to this view, moral
properties are identical to properties that can be expressed without using moral terms;
however, no moral term has the same meaning as any non-moral term. The
epistemological thesis is theistic intuitionism. According to this view, God knows which
moral properties are identical to which properties expressible in non-moral vocabulary
and He created humans with moral intuitions that reliably indicate which things have
those properties in which cases.
In Chapter 1, I contribute to this story by exploring the details of how a
theological version of the metaphysical thesis might go. I start by describing Robert
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Adams’ theory of intrinsic value. According to Adams, intrinsic value and similarity to
God are identical properties. I discuss some of the ways in which Adams’ conception of
intrinsic value differs from the more traditional conception of Mill, Moore, Sidgwick,
Chisholm, and others. I then consider a series of problems for Adams’ theory and
identify solutions to those problems.
In Chapter 2, I contribute to the story by exploring the details of how a naturalist
version of the metaphysical thesis might go. I consider some objections to naturalist
synthetic ethical reductionism due to Robert Adams, Alvin Plantinga, and Michael Rea. I
then offer responses to those objections on behalf of the naturalist.
In Chapter 3, I contribute to the story by pressing it on one of its problems. G. E.
Moore’s famous open question argument is widely seen as refuting analytic forms of
ethical reductionism. Synthetic reductionists like me, however, often claim that the open
question argument poses no threat to our variant of reductionism. Against this, Horgan
and Timmons have offered the moral twin earth argument. A natural way of interpreting
their argument is as an extension and modification of Moore’s open question argument.
While the original open question argument is often seen as inapplicable to synthetic
reductionism, the moral twin earth argument is taken to be a serious threat to synthetic
reductionism. I consider responses to the moral twin earth argument by various authors
sympathetic to synthetic reductionism. I then show that these responses are unsuccessful
and that the moral twin earth argument remains a threat to my story.
In the last two chapters, I contribute to the story by pressing an alternative story
on one of its problems. The competing story is Mooreanism. A common allegation
against Mooreanism is that it cannot accommodate moral knowledge while synthetic
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reductionism allegedly can. The worry is that, according to Mooreanism, moral
properties are causally inefficacious. Given this assumption, it is difficult to see how our
moral beliefs could be anything other than, at best, accidentally true. And so moral
knowledge, if Mooreanism is true, is impossible.
In Chapter 4, I consider Michael Huemer’s discussion of this problem. Huemer
argues that, first, Mooreanism and synthetic reductionism are epistemologically on a par.
So if Mooreanism is epistemologically problematic, then synthetic reductionism is as
well. Second, Huemer sketches a theory of a priori knowledge that is supposed to show
that Mooreanism can account for moral knowledge. I argue that Huemer is mistaken on
both counts. Mooreanism and synthetic reductionism really are not epistemologically on
a par. And Huemer’s theory of a priori knowledge is problematic.
In Chapter 5, I contribute to the story by considering George Bealer’s theory of a
priori knowledge. Bealer’s theory is supposed to explain how a priori intuitions,
including moral intuitions, are reliable. I argue that Bealer’s theory is problematic. First,
it is impossible for anyone, other than God, to satisfy the conditions Bealer’s theory
places on a priori knowledge. Second, Bealer’s theory is supposed to show that intuition
is a basic source of evidence. But instead, his theory implies that intuition is not a basic
source of evidence.
Some features of the story I am interested in are left undefended or unexplored in
my dissertation. A full statement and defense of my view would require picking up on
some unfinished business. One thing that is still needed is further discussion of the moral
twin earth argument. In Chapter 2, I defend the moral twin earth argument from a series
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of objections. However, I do not offer my own objections to the argument. A full
defense of my view would include such objections.
Another area needing further development is the philosophy of language on which
synthetic reductionism rests. In Chapters 2 and 4 I say a few, very sketchy, things about
this. But much more needs to be said to successfully defend synthetic reductionism.
A third area needing further discussion is an explanation of how God knows
which moral properties are identical to which properties expressible without moral
vocabulary. Chapter 4 includes a partial sketch of how this might go. But much more
needs to be said.
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CHAPTER 1
AN ADAMSIAN THEORY OF INTRINSIC VALUE
In this paper I develop a theological account of intrinsic value drawn from some
passages in Robert Merrihew Adams’ book Finite and Infinite Goods. First I situate his
theory within the broader literature on intrinsic value, and draw attention to some of its
revisionist features. Next I state the theory, raise some problems for it, and refine it in
light of those problems. Then I illustrate how the refined theory works by showing that it
has the resources to deal with some seemingly formidable objections.
1.1 What Sort of Intrinsic Value?
The concept of intrinsic value Adams is interested in is very different than that of
authors such as Mill, Moore, Sidgwick, Chisholm, and others. For this reason, it is
important to say something about what Adams takes the bearers of intrinsic value to be,
in virtue of what those objects are bearers of intrinsic value, and what sorts of slogans he
uses to express the target of his inquiry.
Persons: For Adams, intrinsic value is first and foremost a property of persons.
God (1999, p. 14, 113) is intrinsically valuable to the highest degree. He is “the supreme
standard of value.” All persons (1999, p. 115-21) are intrinsically valuable to a very large
degree merely in virtue of their being persons. In addition to personhood, there are many
other properties which, when had by a person, increase the degree to which that person is
intrinsically valuable: loving goodness (1999, p. 131-2), being allied with and being for
goodness (1999, p. 28), being creative (1999, p. 31), being healthy (1999, p. 116), being
sexual (1999, p. 116), being rational (1999, p. 117), having various emotional and social
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capacities (1999, p. 116), being able to tell a good joke (1999, p. 116), having friendships
(1999, p. 119), being able to cook well (1999, p. 30), being athletic (1999, p. 83), being
philosophical (1999, p. 83), caring about the right things and the effectiveness of that
caring (31), perceiving a situation accurately (1999, p. 31), being beautiful (1999, p. 31),
being virtuous (1999, p. 14).
Adams sometimes worries (1999, p. 117-8) that his concept of intrinsic value is
unacceptably inegalitarian. He worries that since different persons have these properties
to very different degrees and since some persons have many more of these properties than
others, he will be forced to hold that some persons are more intrinsically valuable than
others. It is unclear what Adams’ final response to this worry is. In some cases he
suggests (1999, p. 117) that there are differences in intrinsic value between human
persons, but the degree to which each such person is valuable in virtue of being a person
is much greater than the differences in degree of value between them. In other cases he
suggests (1999, p.) that a very morally corrupt person is of much less intrinsic value than
other persons. In still other cases he suggests (1999, p. 117-8) that there is no way to
compare the value of one person to another or that there may be a way but we shouldn’t
or that there is no such comparison to be made. Again, it is unclear what Adams’ final
position on this is.
Living Organisms: While persons, for Adams, are the primary bearers of intrinsic
value, they are not the only objects that have it. All living organisms have intrinsic value1
merely in virtue of being living organisms. Examples of non-human organisms to which
1

Adams (pp. 116-7) says that “I think the excellence that all of us possess… begins with the simplest
functions of animal and vegetative life…. [I]t is particularly important for me to ascribe excellence to these
unglamorous natural functions.... Surely it is a good for me (and not just an instrumental good) to enjoy
good health, or simply to enjoy my physical, animal being, or living. I must therefore avoid a snobbish
sense of ‘excellent’ in which that would not be enjoying something excellent.”
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Adams attributes intrinsic value include flowers (1999, pp. 28, 117), dogs (1999, p. 117),
and sheep (1999, p. 117). As in the case of persons, there are further properties, such as
being healthy (1999, p. 117), that when had by a living organism contribute to the degree
to which it is intrinsically valuable.
Artifacts: The products of creative work are capable of having intrinsic value as
well. For Adams, gourmet meals (1999, p. 30), paintings (1999, p. 83), poems (1999, p.
17) mathematical proofs (1999, pp. 17, 83)2, novels (1999, p. 83), and performances
(1999, p. 83) are among the creative achievements that are capable of having intrinsic
value.
Nature: Natural phenomena, such as beautiful sunsets (1999, p. 83), are capable
of having intrinsic value as well.
Worlds: Adams discusses (1999, pp. 17, 118-21) the application of his concept of
intrinsic value to worlds. There are hints3 that he does not think worlds are capable of
having intrinsic value. But he seems to think the issue is debatable. Insofar as worlds are
bearers of intrinsic value, Adams holds that the intrinsic value of a world is determined
by the intrinsic values of the objects in that world. However, he does not think the value
of a world is the simple sum of the intrinsic values of the objects in that world. For
example, he thinks that a world with some people is better than a world with no people.
But, even other things being equal, a world with more people is not always better than a
world with fewer people. “Beyond a certain point” he says (1999, p. 119) “there is no
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Adams (p. 17) identifies poems and proofs as abstractions. Perhaps he thinks that some abstract objects
can be bearers of intrinsic value.
3
For example, he says (p. 118) “Though skeptical, myself, of global evaluations of worlds, I shall… argue
that even if… worlds do have definite values, the most plausible assignments of value do not support the
view that the value of persons… [implies] that the existence of each of them makes the world as a whole
better.”
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advantage at all in sheer growth in numbers. Personhood is excellent, but it does not
follow that more of it is better, in any way.” These considerations extend to other, nonperson, objects. To put it in the form of a slogan, Adams seems to endorse the following
ideas about the contributions intrinsically valuable objects in a world make to the
intrinsic value of that world: some is better than none, more variety is better than less
variety, more of the same is not better than less of the same when there is already a lot of
the same. Beyond these considerations, Adams says very little about the intrinsic value
of worlds.
Properties: Adams also discusses the application of his theory of intrinsic value
to properties. Like worlds, the intrinsic value of properties is not determined in the same
way as the intrinsic value of objects. An intrinsically valuable property, for Adams
(1999, p. 40), is a property in virtue of which an object that has that property has intrinsic
value.
Adams uses (1999, p. 14) ‘intrinsic value’, ‘goodness’, and ‘excellence’ to refer to
the property he is interested in. He attempts to express this concept in the following
passages:
What sort of good is at issue here? It is not usefulness, or merely instrumental goodness. It is not
well-being, or what is good for a person. It is rather the goodness of that which is worthy of love
or admiration. We have no word that in common usage signifies precisely and uniquely this kind
of goodness; I shall refer to it often (though not always happily) as “excellence,” and sometimes,
(where I see on the horizon no confusion with other sorts of goodness) simply as “goodness” or
the “good.” Moral virtues are excellences in this sense, but Platonic excellence is not exclusively
moral; beauty is a prime example of it…. These features of a Platonic structure for the realm of
value are also features of the framework for ethics that I will present here (1999, pp. 13-4).
There is usefulness, or merely instrumental goodness…. [There is] well-being or welfare…. The
theory developed here, however, gives primary place to excellence…. It is the goodness of that
which is worthy of love or admiration, honor or worship, rather than the good (for herself) that is
possessed by one who is fortunate or happy, as such (though happiness may also be excellent, and
worthy of admiration) (1999, p. 83).
Like Plato’s, mine will be a theory of nonmoral as well as moral value. The divine greatness
adored in the Bible, by the mystics, and in the traditions of theistic worship is by no means
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exclusively moral. God is the exemplar or standard of a goodness that includes much more than
moral virtue. Among the Platonic roles inherited by God, so to speak, is that of Beauty itself
(1999, p. 14).
The healthy functioning of living things is an integral part of much of the beauty of nature, and
beauty of any sort is a prime example of what I mean by ‘excellence’ (1999, p. 116).
Worship, after all, is the acknowledgement, not just of God’s benefits to us, but of the supreme
degree of intrinsic excellence (1999, p. 14).

In addition to what has been said already, there are three important respects in
which the target of Adams’ inquiry seems to differ from more traditional conceptions of
intrinsic value:
Intrinsic Value is Not Intrinsic: Tradition holds that intrinsic value is an intrinsic
property. Adams (1999, p. 14) holds that it is a relational property.
Intrinsic Badness is Derivative: Tradition holds that intrinsic goodness and
intrinsic badness are both fundamental. Adams (1999, pp. 102-4) holds that only intrinsic
goodness is fundamental. All sorts of badness, including intrinsic badness, are derivative
and are to be analyzed in terms of fundamental intrinsic goodness.
Extrinsic Value Alters Intrinsic Value: Tradition holds that the extrinsic value of
an object cannot alter that object’s intrinsic value. Adams’ theory (1999, p. ) allows that
the extrinsic value of an object can alter that object’s intrinsic value.
1.2 Adams’ Theory of Intrinsic Value
Adams (1999, p. 37) analyzes intrinsic value in terms of similarity to God. The
simplest formulation of his theory is this:
GOOD: An object, o, is intrinsically good to degree, n, if and only if o is similar to God
to degree n.
Adams (1999, p. 33) does not accept this simple formulation of the theory. There
are examples that he thinks it gets wrong. Consider Hitler. Hitler was powerful. God is
powerful. Hitler’s power, therefore, contributed to the degree to which he was similar to
5

God. So if GOOD is true, then Hitler’s power contributed to the degree to which he was
intrinsically good. But Hitler’s power did not contribute to the degree to which he was
intrinsically good. So, GOOD is false.
In light of examples such as these Adams modifies the simple formulation of his
theory. It is not just any sort of similarity to God that contributes to the degree to which
an object is intrinsically good. It is only faithful resemblance that counts. Faithful
resemblance, moreover, is “holistic.” It requires more than the sharing of a single
property. Adams’ (1999, pp. 32-3) dense discussion of faithful resemblance is worth
quoting at length:
Probably the best reply we could give to these counterexamples [such as the Hitler example] if we
want to defend the theory that excellence consists simply in resembling God is that not every
sharing of a property constitutes a resemblance. Judgments of resemblance are more holistic than
that…. The way or context in which a property is shared affects whether the sharing constitutes a
resemblance or makes things more similar than they would otherwise have been…. There is a
more pressing difficulty, however, for the thesis that Godlikeness is sufficient for excellence.
More decisive counterexamples to it are possible involving holistic resemblance rather than mere
sharing of properties. Consider the phenomenon of parody or caricature. Parodies and caricatures
do resemble, but do not in general share the excellences of their original or object…. It is natural
enough to say that Hitler’s power is “a caricature of the divine power”—more natural, I suspect,
than to deny flatly that his power resembles God’s in any way. This suggests a modification of the
analysis of excellence in terms of resembling or imaging God. We can suppose that the difference
between resemblances to God that do and do not constitute virtues or excellences is analogous to
the difference between good portraits (by which I mean faithful portraits) and caricatures. The
excellence of other things besides God will consist, then, in the faithfulness of their imaging of
God. This cannot be more than an analogy, of course, due to the radical imperfection of any
resemblance of creatures to God. I will not offer here a full account of what the faithfulness of a
portrait amounts to, and I am not sure that I could give one. It would surely include the
observation that caricatures are distorted in a way that faithful portraits are not. The caricature
exaggerates one or more features of the original, whereas the faithful portrait represents features in
a balanced way and in relation to those other features to which they are most importantly related in
the original. How much, and what, must be included in a faithful image depends on what is most
important about the way in which the original has the features shared or represented.

Here Adams makes two revisions to GOOD. First, GOOD employs an account of
similarity according to which any property that an object shares with God contributes to
the degree to which that object is similar to God. But, in the present passage, Adams
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claims that similarity is “holistic.” Merely sharing a single property, he says, is
insufficient for similarity.
Second, Adams (1999, pp. 34-6) says that among the ways of being similar to
God in this more holistic sense, only faithful resemblance to God is what counts. An
object that faithfully resembles God is like a portrait. An object that is similar to God,
but does not faithfully resemble Him, is like a caricature. Although caricatures share
properties with their original, they do so in a way that is “distorted” and “exaggerated”
and “unbalanced”. The same is true of objects that do not faithfully resemble God.
Furthermore, whether shared properties are distorted or exaggerated or unbalanced
depends on what is “important” about the way in which God has those properties. As the
degree to which an object has the relevant properties in an undistorted, unexaggerated,
and balanced way increases, the degree to which that object faithfully resembles God also
increases. The modified formulation of Adams’ theory, then, is this:
GOOD*: An object, o, is intrinsically good to degree, n, if and only if o faithfully
resembles God to degree n.
Adams introduces the requirement about faithfulness in order to deal with the
Hitler Objection. Perhaps this is the response he has in mind: Hitler was powerful. God
is powerful. But merely sharing properties with God does not contribute to similarity to
Him. Perhaps, in the relevant holistic sense, Hitler was similar to God. But Hitler was a
caricature of God. He shared some properties with God, such as powerfulness; but the
way in which Hitler had those properties was distorted, exaggerated, and unbalanced. So,
GOOD* delivers the judgment that Adams wants—in spite of his great power, Hitler was
not intrinsically good to a very large degree.
Adams’ reply to the Hitler Objection seems plausible when the judgment GOOD*
7

delivers about Hitler is contrasted with the judgments it delivers about other subjects.
Jones: Jones is a very loving person. He is dedicated to the poor and spends a lot
of time and effort trying to help them. Unfortunately, though, Jones is almost completely
powerless. In spite of this, Jones’ wealth of love motivates him to go out of his way to
help people at great expense to himself. For example, he is not a competent speaker and
he suffers from intense social anxiety. But, hoping to convince at least one person, Jones
spends many sleepless and miserable nights working on speeches so that at public forums
he can argue on behalf starving children. He hopes that they will be given food and
shelter and aid in becoming more similar to God. He hardly ever succeeds. There are
other examples of this: Jones barely makes enough money to get by. But he often goes
without eating because he has given the change that he would have used for lunch to
Religious Charity. Unbeknownst to him, however, the money is often misused. It rarely
gets to the starving children for whom Jones intended it. While his lack of power
prevents his efforts from being very effective, Jones helps people in whatever little ways
that he can.
Smith: Smith is enormously powerful and a little loving. While Smith does a lot
of good things for people, he would not bother if doing so were any more difficult for
him. For example, Smith is a talented speaker. If he is at a coffee shop and people are
having a discussion about whether or not it is important to help starving children, Smith
will often step in and, in a matter of seconds, effortlessly convince them to give
generously. He is always successful and people are changed forever after these brief
coffee shop encounters. If it were any harder to do, however, Smith would have no
hesitation about stopping. There are other examples of this: Smith makes a lot of money.
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If a Religious Charity representative comes to Smith’s door asking for a donation, Smith
writes them a big check just to get them out of his hair so that he can get back to his main
passion—listening to electronic music and drinking beer. As it so happens, Smith is by
far Religious Charity’s biggest donor. The money is always used effectively—securing
for starving children food and shelter and aid in becoming more similar to God. While he
is slightly pleased by this, Smith is mostly just happy that he can continue to wallow in
his electronic music and beer drinking.
Max: Max is very loving and very powerful. He makes a lot of money. He gives
most of it to the poor. Although he very much enjoys drinking beer and listening to
electronic music, he would never think of spending his money or time on those things.
He always devotes his time and money to the poor.
Min: Min is only a little loving and only a little powerful. He makes hardly any
money. He never gives any of it away. He squanders what little he has on beer and
electronic music.
GOOD*, when supplemented with the right way of construing distortion,
exaggeration, and unbalance, seems to deliver correct, or at least acceptable, judgments
about the comparative intrinsic values of Hitler, Jones, Smith, Max, and Min. Consider
Jones and Smith. They are both similar to God in the relevant “holistic” sense. To
varying extents they are both powerful and loving and so on. But their power and love
are distorted and exaggerated and unbalanced. Of course, the way in which Hitler has the
relevant properties is much more distorted and exaggerated and unbalanced than the ways
in which Jones and Smith have the relevant properties. So Jones and Smith both
faithfully resemble God to a greater degree than Hitler and are therefore intrinsically
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valuable to a greater degree than Hitler. Now contrast Jones and Smith with Max. Max
has the relevant properties in a way that is not distorted or exaggerated or unbalanced at
all. What is more, he has the relevant properties in greater proportions than Jones and
Smith. So Max faithfully resembles God to a greater degree than Jones and Smith. So he
is intrinsically valuable to a greater degree than Jones and Smith. Now contrast Jones
and Smith with Min. Min has the relevant properties in a way that is much more balanced
than Jones and Smith. But Jones and Smith have at least one of the relevant properties to
a much greater degree than Min. The increase that each has in resemblance outweighs
the decrease in lack of balance. So Jones and Smith each faithfully resembles God to a
greater degree than Min. So Jones and Smith are intrinsically valuable to a greater degree
than Min. Finally contrast Jones and Smith. Depending on which account of distortion
and exaggeration and unbalance it is combined with, GOOD* will deliver a different
judgment about the comparative intrinsic values of Jones and Smith.
1.3 Against Faithfulness
One odd feature of Finite and Infinite Goods is that Adams never offers an
account of overall intrinsic value. He (1999, p. 37) offers an account of intrinsic
goodness. He offers (1999, p. 103-4) an account of various sorts of badness and makes
some suggestive comments about intrinsic badness. But he never unifies them in a way
that generates an account of overall intrinsic value. Furthermore, it seems to me that the
intuitions motivating Adams’ revisions to GOOD are really intuitions about Hitler’s
overall intrinsic value rather than Hitler’s intrinsic goodness. As I see it, the intuition is
not that Hitler’s power did not contribute to the degree to which he was intrinsically
good. Rather, the intuition is that Hitler was so intrinsically bad that whatever intrinsic
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goodness he had is vastly outweighed by his intrinsic badness. To bring this intuition out,
note that GOOD* says nothing about overall intrinsic value. Depending on just how
much Hitler’s power, together with his other properties, being distorted and exaggerated
and unbalanced is taken to detract from his faithful resemblance to God, GOOD* either
delivers the judgment that Hitler was intrinsically good to some positive degree or it
delivers the judgment that Hitler was intrinsically good to degree zero. So unless the
theory is unified with an account of intrinsic badness, Hitler was either overall
intrinsically valuable to some positive degree or he was overall intrinsically valuable to
degree zero or the theory delivers no judgment about Hitler’s overall intrinsic value at all.
To get Adams’ theory to deliver the judgment that Hitler was overall intrinsically bad,
therefore, an account that unifies Adams’ discussion of intrinsic goodness and intrinsic
badness is still needed. As I will argue below, there is a simple way to combine GOOD
with Adams’ theory of badness that delivers the judgment that Hitler was overall
intrinsically bad. Since the unified account of overall intrinsic value is needed anyway
and since the unified account, when combined with GOOD, can deliver the desired
judgment, the move to GOOD* and to faithful resemblance is unmotivated.
Another worry I have about the move to GOOD* is that the crucial notions of
distortion and exaggeration and unbalance seem to be very obscure. Adams says that
what counts as distortion or exaggeration or unbalance depends on which properties are
important and what is most important about the way in which God has those properties.
But without further elaboration, importance is just as obscure as the notions it is used to
explain. Fortunately, Adams (1999, pp. 33-4) does elaborate on importance. But I do not
think the way in which he develops his account of importance is very promising. He says
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this:
Our discussion has turned up important problems about resemblance—problems in determining
whether the relationship between two things constitutes a resemblance and whether an
acknowledged resemblance images God “faithfully” enough to constitute an excellence. It
appears that both questions may turn on how important the shared properties in the case are….
For a theistic theory it is natural to appeal to God’s view of things or God’s attitude toward things.
The theist can appeal to God’s view of things as the definitive standard of importance, and hence
of resemblance and of faithfulness, at least where the question is about images of God—saying
that considerations in these matters have the importance God sees them as having, and that they
resemble, and faithfully image God, insofar as God sees them as doing so.

A number of concerns spring up at this point. One might worry that such an appeal is
circular. Indeed, Adams (1999, p. 34-8) spends a lot of effort arguing that it is not. Or,
one might worry that which properties God sees as important, and which ways in which
God has his properties are seen by Him as important, could have been very different than
they actually are. So although, given what God actually sees as important, Hitler’s power
and other properties are had in a way that is distorted and exaggerated and unbalanced, if
God had seen importance differently, Hitler’s power and other properties would not be
distorted or exaggerated or unbalanced in the relevant sense. So GOOD*’s judgment
about Hitler would match GOOD’s judgment about Hitler. So, if Adams’ reasons for
disapproving of GOOD are sound, then GOOD* is hardly an improvement. Of course,
there are maneuvers Adams can make to try to avoid this problem. Maybe it is an
essential property of God to see importance in the way that He does. Maybe Adams can
show that positing this essential property does not lead to circularity. My only point is
that all of these complications can be avoided by modifying Adams’ theory in the way
that I suggest below. My version of Adams’ theory is compatible with, but does not need
to posit, such an essential property. That is a reason to prefer my version of Adams’
theory over GOOD*.
1.4 The Refined Theory
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Distinguish between fundamental intrinsic goodness and overall intrinsic value.
Rather than analyzing intrinsic goodness in terms of faithful resemblance to God, the
refined theory returns to the original account of intrinsic goodness offered by Adams. I
will call this sort of goodness “fundamental intrinsic goodness”:
GOOD: An object, o, is fundamentally intrinsically good to degree, n, if and only if o is
similar to God to degree n.
In Finite and Infinite Goods, Adams (1999, p. 103-4) discusses several kinds of
badness and analyzes each in terms of similarity to God4. It is possible to analyze overall
intrinsic value in terms of both fundamental intrinsic goodness and these kinds of
badness.
The refined theory includes an account of instrumental badness (Adams 1999, p.
103). Consider some object. There may be objects that the object in question has caused
to be less fundamentally intrinsically good than they once were. If there are, then for
each of these objects, consider the degree to which its fundamental intrinsic goodness
was decreased due to the pernicious influence of the relevant object. Then consider the
sum of all such numbers. The resulting number is the degree to which the object in
question is instrumentally bad:
BADI: An object, o, is instrumentally bad to degree, n, if and only if n is the number that
is obtained by taking every object that is such that o causes a decrease in the degree to
which that object is fundamentally intrinsically good and then adding each of those
objects’ decreases.
The refined theory includes an account of motivational badness (Adams 1999, p.
104). Motivational badness is to be analyzed in terms of a primitive againstness relation
and fundamental intrinsic goodness. A person can be against an object. A person can be
4

The accounts of instrumental badness and motivational badness are not necessarily meant to be accounts
of our ordinary concepts of instrumental and motivational badness or anything like that. They are instead
technical terms introduced to enable the theory to avoid the three objections that concern me in this paper.
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against a property. The againstness relation can be both explicit and conscious or implicit
and unconscious. If a person is against fundamental intrinsic goodness, then that person
is motivationally bad. One way to be against fundamental intrinsic goodness is to be
against some fundamentally intrinsically good object in virtue of that object’s
fundamental intrinsic goodness. Another way is to simply be against the property of
being fundamentally intrinsically good:
BADM: A subject, s, is motivationally bad if and only if s is against fundamental intrinsic
goodness.
The refined theory includes an account of intrinsic badness. Intrinsic badness is
analyzed in terms of instrumental badness and motivational badness:
BAD: A subject, s, is intrinsically bad to degree, n, if and only if (i) s is motivationally
bad and (ii) s is instrumentally bad to degree n.
The refined theory includes an account of overall intrinsic value. Consider the
degree to which some object is fundamentally intrinsically good. Consider the degree to
which that object is intrinsically bad. Subtract the later number from the former number.
The resulting number is the degree to which that object is overall intrinsically valuable:
GOODO: An object, o, is overall intrinsically valuable to degree, n, if and only if n is the
number that is obtained by subtracting the degree to which o is intrinsically bad from the
degree to which o is fundamentally intrinsically good.
1.5 Return to the Hitler Objection
The theory will require further refinements. But, for expository purposes, it is
useful to note that the theory, presently refined, delivers the correct judgment about the
Hitler objection.
1.5.1 The “Hitler was Bad Overall” Reply
The first thing to do, in giving a proper response to the Hitler objection, is to
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change the desideratum. Adams seems to want the judgment that Hitler’s power did not
contribute to the degree to which he was fundamentally intrinsically good. But neither
Adams’ theory nor the refined theory can deliver that judgment. As I argued earlier,
however, that is not the interesting issue. It is more important to make sure that GOODO
delivers the judgment that Hitler was overall intrinsically bad to a very large degree. This
can be done without denying that Hitler’s power contributed to the degree to which he
was fundamentally intrinsically good.
Here is a way that one might try to show that Hitler was overall intrinsically bad
to a large degree: There were many people that Hitler hated who were fundamentally
intrinsically good in various respects. So, by BADM, he was motivationally bad.
Furthermore, Hitler killed a lot of these people and caused a decrease in the degree to
which many of them were similar to God5. So, by BADI, Hitler was instrumentally bad
to a very large degree. So, by BAD, Hitler was intrinsically bad to a very large degree.
Now, Hitler was similar to God with respect to some properties. He was very powerful,
he was smart, and he was a person. So, by GOOD, powerfulness, smartness, and
personhood contributed to the degree to which he was fundamentally intrinsically
valuable. But however much these properties contributed to the degree to which he was
fundamentally intrinsically valuable, surely, whatever that turns out to be, it will be much
smaller than the degree to which Hitler was intrinsically bad. Consider, therefore, the
number that is obtained by subtracting the degree to which Hitler was intrinsically bad
5

I should illustrate this point with some examples: Hitler subjected some Jews to experiments and
withheld from them proper nutrition. These practices damaged their cognitive faculties and abilities. That
is a decrease in the degree to which they are similar to God. Before the Holocaust there were many Jews
who were members of communities. Hitler broke many of these communities up. Since God is a member
of a communities (the Trinity and His people) that is a decrease in the degree to which they were similar to
God. Hitler caused many Germans to hate Jews. Since God loves Jews that is a decrease in the degree to
which those Germans were similar to God.
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from the degree to which Hitler was fundamentally intrinsically good. It is a large
negative number. So GOODO correctly judges that Hitler was overall intrinsically bad to
a large degree.
Although the refined theory is able to deal with this formulation of the Hitler
objection, the present refinements are still not adequate. The problem reemerges given a
slightly modified statement of the relevant example: There is some number that is the
degree to which Hitler was intrinsically bad. Let it be any large number. Now, suppose
there is someone, call him Hitler1, who is like Hitler in the following respect: He does
only and exactly the bad things that Hitler did. So he is instrumentally bad to the same
degree as Hitler. What is more, there are a lot of people that Hitler1 desires to kill and to
make less similar to God. So he is motivationally bad as well. So, given BAD, Hitler1 is
intrinsically bad to the same degree as Hitler. Next, suppose that Hitler1 is different from
Hitler in the following respect: He is much more powerful. Since God is omnipotent, as
a person’s power increases, the degree to which that person is similar to God increases
along with it6. So no matter how intrinsically bad Hitler1 is, if he is stipulated to be
powerful enough, he will resemble God and, hence, be fundamentally intrinsically good
to a much greater degree. So suppose that Hitler1 is powerful enough for this to be the
case. Then consider the number that is obtained by subtracting the degree to which
Hitler1 is fundamentally intrinsically good from the degree to which he is intrinsically
bad. The result is some large positive number. So, if GOODO is true, then Hitler1 is
overall intrinsically good. But Hitler1 is not overall intrinsically good. So GOODO is
false.
Here is another problem for the refined theory: Consider Hitler2. Hitler2 is
6

This premise is questionable. But grant it for the sake of argument.
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identical to Hitler with the exception that Hitler2 is much less powerful than Hitler and
any differences entailed by this exception. However, Hitler2 caught many more lucky
breaks than Hitler. So, in spite of his comparatively little power, Hitler2 is instrumentally
bad to the same degree as Hitler. Now contrast the overall intrinsic value of Hitler with
the overall intrinsic value of Hitler2. Other than the difference in power, they are
identical in all respects relevant to the determination of their fundamental intrinsic
goodness. So Hitler is fundamentally intrinsically good to a significantly greater degree
than Hitler2. Furthermore, Hitler and Hitler2 are both motivationally bad and they are
instrumentally bad to the same degree. So, by BAD, they are intrinsically bad to the
same degree. Now subtract the degree to which Hitler is intrinsically bad from the degree
to which he is fundamentally intrinsically good. Do the same for Hitler2. Then contrast
the two numbers. The number associated with Hitler will be significantly greater than the
number associated with Hitler2. So, if GOODO is true, then Hitler is overall significantly
less intrinsically bad than Hitler2. But Hitler is not overall significantly less intrinsically
bad than Hitler2. So GOODO is false. The refinements I have made to Adams’ theory are
not yet adequate.
1.5.2 The Fallen Properties Reply
In light of the above arguments, further modifications are needed. Fortunately,
such refinements are available. The further modified theory includes an account of fallen
properties:
FALLEN: A property, p, is fallen with respect to a subject, s, if and only if (i) s is
motivationally bad, (ii) s is instrumentally bad to degree n, (iii) p is instantiated in s, (iv)
p contributes to the degree to which s is similar to God and (v) s’s instrumental badness
depends, in the relevant sense, on s’s instantiating p.
Contingent upon which dependence relation is taken to be relevant, condition (v) will be
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equivalent to one of these:
(v1) if s had not instantiated p, then the degree to which s is instrumentally bad would
have been less than n.
(v2) s’s instantiating p is causally relevant to s’s being instrumentally bad.
(v3) p is one of the properties on which s’s instrumental badness supervenes7.
(v4) s’s instantiating p grounds s’s being instrumentally bad8.
There is no need, at present, to decide which of these dependence relations between the
subject’s instrumental badness and the relevant properties is the right one to employ. For
present purposes I will interpret (v) as (v1) and take the relevant sense of dependence to
be counterfactual. Roughly and loosely put, I want to add the following idea to Adams’
account of badness: it is bad to do bad things with a property that is good9. More

7

Thanks to Fred Feldman for suggesting (v3).
Grounding is the relation discussed in Rosen (forthcoming) and Schaffer (2009).
9
I have heard two complaints about modifying Adams’ theory in this way. First, I have been told that the
modification I introduce is “ad hoc” and that I am “gerrymandering” Adams’ theory. Perhaps what
someone who offers this objection means is that I introduce the fallen properties revision without any
motivation other than the fact that it makes Adams’ theory produce the correct judgment about Hitler and
Hitler1 and Hitler2. But, such people seem to be claiming, modifications to a theory need independent
motivation. So the fallen properties reply is defective.
Second, I have been told that I rely on a confusion about the relation between intrinsic and
extrinsic value. My account of fallen properties implies that the intrinsic value of an object is sometimes
altered by the extrinsic value of that object. But, as Moore has taught us, such a suggestion is incoherent
and unintelligible. So my modification of Adams’ theory is defective.
It is important to see that these objections are mistaken. Concerning the complaint about ad-hocness and gerrymandering: The objector is holding me to an unreasonably high standard. Consider Feldman
(1983). In some passages he introduces modifications to utilitarianism with no other motivation than the
fact that those modifications make utilitarianism deliver the correct judgment about a class of cases. Sider
(1991) and (1993) does the same thing. This is a common strategy. So the way in which I develop Adams’
theory is in accordance with tradition.
I will, however, leave all of this to the side. I can meet the objector’s unreasonably high standards.
There is a precedent, in the literature, for the sort of move I have made. Shelly Kagan (1998, p.281) has
argued, on the basis of several examples, that the extrinsic value of an object can alter its intrinsic value.
He says this: “I want to leave open the possibility that the intrinsic value of an object may be based (in
part) on its instrumental value.” Much more recently, while commenting on Adams’ theory, Kagan (2009a,
p. 390) repeats this line. Josh Parsons (manuscript, p. 1) takes a similar line. He says this: “Suffice it to
say that… objects can sometimes be instrumentally intrinsically valuable, and sometimes be finally
extrinsically valuable… and let it be taken that people sometimes use “intrinsically valuable” when they
clearly mean “valuable as-an-end”, and use that misleading phrase to conflate the two.” So there is a
precedent in the literature, based on counterexamples to orthodoxy, for the sort of move I have made.
8
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precisely, the modification I want to make is this: Consider some person who is both
motivationally and instrumentally bad. That person may have some fallen properties. If
that person does, then add the contributions that all of those properties make to the degree
to which that person is similar to God. Then add the number just obtained to the degree
to which the person in question is instrumentally bad. The resulting number is the degree
to which that person is intrinsically bad. The modified account of badness, then, is this:
BAD2: A subject, s, is intrinsically bad to degree, n, if and only if (i) s is motivationally
bad and (ii) n is the number that is obtained by adding the degree to which s is
instrumentally bad to the contributions made to the degree to which s is similar to God by
all of s’s fallen properties.
The theory, when refined in this way, is able to deal with the variant Hitler objections.
Consider all of Hitler1’s fallen properties. Prominent among these is being powerful. For
if Hitler1 were not powerful, then he would not have been so instrumentally bad. Not
included among Hitler1’s fallen properties is having a weird moustache. So however
much being powerful contributes to the degree to which Hitler1 is fundamentally
intrinsically good, by BAD2, the same amount is added to the degree to which he is
intrinsically bad. So no matter how powerful he is, that power, when all is said and done,
Therefore, although I do not need it, there is independent motivation for my introduction of fallen
properties.
Concerning the second, Moorean, complaint: Bradley (2002) has argued persuasively that
Kagan’s examples can be accommodated by the Moorean. Bradley deals with the examples by saying that
it is not objects but states of affairs that are the bearers of intrinsic value. With respect to my purposes,
however, Bradley’s response to Kagan is concessive. He allows that a state of affairs ascribing extrinsic
value to an object can have intrinsic value. Here is what Bradley (2002, p. 26) says:
Mooreans do indeed deny that for any x, the uniqueness or usefulness of x is relevant to x’s intrinsic value.
But I know of no evidence that Mooreans would deny that for any x, states of affairs ascribing uniqueness
or usefulness to x could have intrinsic value. In fact, it must be pointed out that many philosophers within
the Moorean tradition have thought that states of affairs ascribing non-intrinsic properties have intrinsic
value.
In light of Bradley’s work on this topic, the fallen properties reply, could easily be translated into terms that
a Moorean would find unobjectionable. Following Bradley’s strategy, one could recast Adams’ theory in
terms of states of affairs rather than objects. So a state of affairs ascribing fallen properties to an object
would have less intrinsic value than one that did not. The relevant issue, therefore, is whether objects or
states of affairs are the primary bearers of intrinsic value. Adams’ theory can be formulated so as to
accommodate either outcome.
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does not make a positive contribution to Hitler1’s overall intrinsic value. What is left to
do is to subtract Hitler1’s instrumental badness from the contributions made to the degree
to which he is similar to God by his non-fallen properties. The result is some big
negative number. Modifying the account of intrinsic badness in this way, therefore,
enables GOODO to generate the correct result—Hitler1 is overall intrinsically bad to a
very large degree.
Now contrast once more Hitler and Hitler2. By the reasoning given in the
previous case, neither Hitler’s power nor Hitler2’s power makes a positive contribution to
their respective degrees of overall intrinsic value. Furthermore, the difference in power is
the only difference between Hitler and Hitler2 that is relevant to determining their
intrinsic values. So the refined theory enables GOODO to deliver the correct judgment—
Hitler is not significantly less intrinsically bad overall than Hitler2. Neither the Hitler
objection nor any of its variants pose a threat to the refined theory.
1.6 The “What if God Were Different?” Objection
Suppose that God is very different than He actually is with respect to His desires
and His behavior10. Suppose that God hates academics. Suppose that He kills some of
them and makes others of them stupid. Suppose that I also hate academics. Suppose that
I also kill some academics and make others stupid. These properties contribute to the
degree to which I am similar to God. So, by GOOD, they contribute to the degree to
which I am fundamentally intrinsically good. So, given GOODO, these properties make a
positive contribution to my overall intrinsic value. But killing academics and making
them stupid does not contribute to my overall intrinsic value. So GOODO is false.
This formulation of the objection is not persuasive. The premise ‘If GOODO is
10

Adams (1999, p. 46) discusses this objection.
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true, then these properties make a positive contribution to my overall intrinsic value’ is
false. To see this reason as follows: Academics are persons and they are smart. Even
though God hates them, they are similar to Him with respect to these properties. So these
properties contribute to the degree to which they are fundamentally intrinsically good.
So, by BADM, I am motivationally bad. Note also that by destroying some academics
and making the others stupid, I am causing a decrease in the degree to which they are
similar to God. So given, GOOD, I am causing a decrease in the degree to which they
are fundamentally intrinsically good. So, by BADI, these properties contribute to the
degree to which I am instrumentally bad.
Now, note that my hatred of academics and my being such that I kill and render
stupid academics are each fallen properties. After all, if I had not killed some of them
and caused others of them to be stupid, then I would not have been so instrumentally bad.
Furthermore, if I had not hated academics, then I would not have killed them and caused
them to be stupid. So I would not have been so instrumentally bad. Given FALLEN,
then, the relevant properties are fallen properties. So, since they are fallen, by BAD2, the
contribution the relevant properties make to the degree to which I am similar to God
entails no corresponding contribution to the degree to which I am intrinsically bad.
Furthermore, by BAD2, the contribution that the relevant properties make to the degree to
which I am instrumentally bad is added to the degree to which I am intrinsically bad. So
the increase in similarity to God contributes nothing to my overall intrinsic value and the
instrumental and motivational badness make a negative contribution to my overall
intrinsic value. So, GOODO delivers the correct judgment: if God hated and killed and
stupidified academics and if I were to do those things, then such things would result in a
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decrease in the degree to which I am overall intrinsically valuable.
So far only one class of the relevant “What if God Were Different?” cases has
been considered. What is common to each member of this class is this: There is some
property that contributes to the degree to which various subjects are similar to God. God
hates those subjects. God causes a decrease in the degree to which those subjects are
similar to Him with respect to those properties. I am similar to God with respect to
hating those subjects and causing a decrease in the degree to which they are similar to
Him. In cases like these, the refined theory delivers the correct result. However, there is
another relevant class of cases that cannot be handled so easily. There are “What if God
were Different?” cases in which God tortures some subject but does not in any way cause
a decrease in the degree to which they are similar to Him. The refined theory, one might
reasonably think, delivers the wrong judgment about such cases.
Suppose that God hates academics. Suppose that once a week, just for fun, God
causes academics to experience intense, horrific pain. Suppose, in addition, that God
never causes a decrease in the degree to which these academics are similar to Him. If
memories of such pain would cause the academics to neglect their studies and become
less intelligent, then after each episode of pain God erases the memory. For any way in
which such episodes of torture might result in a decrease in similarity to God, He takes
steps to ensure that no such decrease occurs. So after each episode of pain, the
academics’ degrees of similarity to God are left constant. Before each episode of pain,
the academics are smart. After the episodes, they are just as smart. Before, each episode
each academic is a member of a community. After, they are still members of the same
communities.
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Now, suppose that I am very different than I actually am. Suppose that I share
God’s hatred of academics. Suppose that I find ways to cause them intense pain without
producing any decrease in the degree to which they are similar to God. Maybe I build a
machine that will allow me to do this. Maybe I am granted powers that will enable me to
do this.
The refined theory, it would seem, delivers the wrong judgment about this case.
It judges that, not only do the relevant properties contribute to the degree to which I am
fundamentally intrinsically good, but they also make a positive contribution to my overall
intrinsic value. To see this, reason as follows: My hatred of academics and my acts of
causing them intense pain contribute to the degree to which I am similar to God. So, the
relevant properties contribute to the degree to which I am fundamentally intrinsically
good. Given BADI, and given that I never cause a decrease in the degree to which any
academic is fundamentally intrinsically good, my being such that I perform these actions
does not contribute to the degree to which I am instrumentally bad. Since the relevant
properties do not contribute to the degree to which I am instrumentally bad, condition
(v1) of FALLEN is unsatisfied. So my hatred and acts of torture are not fallen properties.
So, by BAD2, such properties do not contribute in any way to the degree to which I am
intrinsically bad. So, given GOODO, the relevant properties make a positive contribution
to my overall intrinsic value. This is the wrong judgment.
Two replies are available on behalf of the refined theory. First, the premise of the
above argument that reads ‘my being such that I hate academics and torture them does
not contribute to the degree to which I am instrumentally bad’ is false. Consider again
the motivation for this premise. The motivation was that any acts of torture would be
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erased from the memories of those who were tortured. So no psychological harm that
could constitute or counterfactually determine a decrease in the academic’s degree of
similarity to God would obtain.
This motivation is inadequate. The academics in question do become less similar
to God. Consider one of the academics the day after he was tortured. He reflects on the
day before. He considers the proposition ‘I was not tortured yesterday’. He believes that
proposition. But his belief is false. So whereas before the academic had n false beliefs,
now he has (at least) n + 1 false beliefs. So the academic is further away from having
zero false beliefs than he was before. So since God has zero false beliefs and the
academic has at least one more false belief than he did a few days ago, the academic is
less similar to God than he used to be. And, of course, one does not have to actively
consider a proposition in order to believe it. This result generalizes, therefore, to the
other tortured academics who never actively consider the relevant proposition. So if I
had not hated those academics, then I would not have tortured them. And if I had not
tortured them, then they would not have the extra false beliefs. So if I had been without
these properties, then I would not have been as instrumentally bad. So, by FALLEN, my
being such that I hate and torture academics are fallen properties. Given GOODO,
therefore, the relevant properties do not make a positive contribution to my overall
intrinsic value. Indeed, the relevant properties make a negative contribution to my
overall intrinsic value. So the refined theory can overcome even the present, seemingly
formidable, variant of the “What if God Were Different?” objection.
But leave that to the side. Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that there is
some way for God and me to torture academics without causing any decrease in the
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degree to which they are similar to Him and, hence, without causing a decrease in the
degree to which they are fundamentally intrinsically good. This leads to the second
reply: In order to obtain the desired result, BADI may be revised to include other sorts of
badness besides decreases in fundamental intrinsic value. In Finite and Infinite Goods,
Adams (1999, p. 93-101) offers an account of welfare. He analyzes welfare in terms of
pleasure, pain, and (what I am calling) fundamental intrinsic goodness11. A natural
revision of the theory, then, would incorporate Adams’ discussion of welfare into the
account of instrumental badness. This could be done by reformulating BADI so that it
includes not just decreases in a subject’s fundamental intrinsic goodness but also
decreases in a subject’s welfare. Then my being such that I hate and torture academics
would contribute to the degree to which I am instrumentally bad. So condition (v1) of
FALLEN would be satisfied. So, by BAD2, those properties would make a negative
contribution to the degree to which I am overall intrinsically valuable12.
1.7 The “What if Adams Believed he was God?” Objection
Suppose that Adams believed he was God13. If he were to believe this, then the
11

Adams’ discussion of welfare appears in Chapter Three of Finite and Infinite Goods. For similar theories
see Feldman (2002) and (2004) as well as Kagan (2009b).
12
Keep in mind here that fundamental intrinsic value and overall intrinsic value are distinct.
13
Several people have presented me with one variant or another of the following objection: “God is
infinite and everything else is finite. So nothing is more similar to Him than anything else. Consider the
case of beliefs. Suppose that I have 5 true beliefs and you have a billion. In that case we are both equally
far from God's omniscience. So, neither of us is more similar to God than the other with respect to being
omniscient.” It is important to see that this objection is mistaken. Consider similarity to God with respect
to the avoidance of false beliefs. God has 0 false beliefs. Suppose that I have 40 billion false beliefs and
that you have 13 false beliefs. 13 is much closer to 0 than 40 billion. So you are much more similar to God
with respect to the avoidance of false beliefs than I am. Consider similarity to God with respect to the
probability that one’s beliefs are true. The probability that God’s beliefs are true is always 1. The
probability that our beliefs are true varies. But suppose that on this occasion the probability that my beliefs
are true is .2 and yours is .75. A probability of .75 is much closer to 1 than a probability of .2. So you are
much more similar to God with respect to the probability that one’s beliefs are true than I am. Consider
being similar to God with respect to, not the number of beliefs He has, but instead each particular belief
that He has. Suppose I believe the proposition ‘2 + 2 = 4’. I am not more similar to God than my
counterpart who does not believe this proposition with respect to having the same number of beliefs that He
does. This is for the very reason that the objector points out. But I am more similar to God, than my
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degree to which he is similar to God would be increased. So, given GOOD, the degree to
which Adams is fundamentally intrinsically good would be increased. And, given
GOODO and BAD2, if Adams were to believe he is God, then the degree to which he is
overall intrinsically valuable would be increased. But the degree to which Adams is
overall intrinsically valuable would not be increased if he were to believe that he is God.
So, GOODO is false14.
This formulation of the objection is not persuasive. The premise ‘If Adams were
to believe he is God, then the degree to which he is similar to God would be increased’ is
false. To see this, consider David Lewis’ (1973, 1979) analysis of counterfactuals15. Let
@ be the actual world. Then contrast two possible worlds W1 and W2.
W1: Adams believes ‘I am God’ at W1. The behavior of Adams at W1 does not
differ in any way from the behavior of Adams at @. At both worlds he is a philosopher,
he is the author of Finite and Infinite Goods, he goes to church and receives the
Eucharist, he has exactly the same conversations and friends, and so on. The beliefs of
Adams at W1 are almost identical to the beliefs of Adams at @. The only difference
counterpart, in this sense: God and I share the property of having the belief ‘2 + 2 = 4’. Aside from beliefs:
Consider the property of being a person. God has the property of being a person. You and I have the
property of being a person. You and I sharing this property with God makes us more similar to Him than,
say a rock or a book, is. Consider being actualized or existing. God exists and is actual. You and I exist
and are actualized. So in this respect we are more similar to Him than some merely possible or nonexistent object.
14
Adams (1999, p. 32) very briefly discusses this objection.
15
Lewis’ analysis is this:
A counterfactual ‘If it were the case that A, then it would be the case that C’ is (non-vacuously) true at a
possible world, W, if and only if there exists some (accessible) possible world at which A and C are true
that is closer to W than any possible world at which A is true and C is false.
Closeness, for Lewis, is a similarity relation between possible worlds governed by the following system of
weights and priorities:
(1) It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law.
(2) It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region throughout which perfect match
of particular fact prevails.
(3) It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of law.
(4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact, even in matters that
concern us greatly.
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between the two is that Adams at W1 has the extra belief that ‘I am God’. There is no
belief that Adams at W1 has that Adams at @ does not have. For every belief that Adams
at @ has, including ‘Adams is not God’, Adams at W1 also has it.
W2: Adams believes ‘I am God’ at W2. The behavior of Adams at W2 is very
different from the behavior of Adams at @. Instead of going into philosophy, Adams at
W2 joined a cult. That is how he came to believe he is God. His personality is very
different. He has long hair and he frequently enjoys marijuana cigarettes. He does not
have very many of the same friends that he has at @. He does not do any serious
philosophy or go to church. The beliefs of Adams at W2 are very different from the
beliefs of Adams at @. Adams at W2 has a lot of crazy and cultish false beliefs. He tries
to fit together his belief that he is God with his other beliefs. Adams at W2 has many
more false beliefs, such as ‘Adams is God’ and far fewer true beliefs, such as ‘Adams is
not God’, than Adams at @.
Given Lewis’ criteria for determining closeness between possible worlds, W2 is
closer to @ than W116. So the relevant counterfactual must be evaluated at a W2-like
world rather than a W1-like world. But Adams is less similar to God at W2-like worlds

16

To see this reason as follows: According to Lewis, avoidance of a big widespread and diverse violation
of @’s laws has more weight in determining closeness to @ than matching @ with respect to particular
matter of fact. Furthermore, Adams’ belief that ‘I am God’ at W1 requires such a violation of the
psychological laws governing beliefs with respect to @. Here is why: No one at @ has beliefs that are so
dramatically causally isolated from each other and from behavior in the way that Adams’ belief at W1 is.
Adams’ belief at W1 was not caused by anything. For each instant of time at which Adams believes ‘I am
God’ at W1, he is held back from forming closely related beliefs such as ‘Adams is God’ and from
dropping beliefs that are obviously inconsistent with ‘I am God’ such as ‘Adams is not God’. Adams’
belief never shows up in his behavior. Not even his psychotherapist can tell that Adams believes ‘I am
God’. Not even Adams believes ‘Adams believes he is God.’ At W2, on the other hand, Adams’ belief
conforms to the psychological laws of @. His belief is caused by a thorough brainwashing combined with
a series of ecstatic marijuana induced rituals at the cult compound. His belief causally interacts with his
other beliefs producing and being reinforced by them. His belief has a causal influence on his behavior.
Though the result is much less of a match with @ with respect to particular matter of fact, it avoids a
violation of the psychological laws of @. So W2 is closer to @ than W1.
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than he is at @17. So the relevant counterfactual is false. So this formulation of the
objection is unpersuasive.
1.8 A Different Formulation of the “What if Adams Believed he was God?”
Objection
There is another, more plausible, way of formulating the objection. The real
worry is not about whether the counterfactual in question is true or false. The worry is
instead that there is some W1-like possible world, no matter how remote from @ with
respect to psychological laws, at which Adams believes ‘I am God’ and everything else is
left the same as it is at @. At W1 the degree to which Adams is similar to God is greater
than it is at @. So if GOODO is true, then the degree to which Adams is overall
intrinsically valuable at W1 is greater than the degree to which Adams is overall
intrinsically valuable at @. But the degree to which Adams is overall intrinsically
valuable at W1 is not greater than the degree to which Adams is overall intrinsically
valuable at @. So GOODO is false.
While this formulation of the objection is more persuasive than the first, it is
unsound. By believing ‘I am God’, Adams at W1 gains a belief in common with God.
But its truth-value is relative to the person who believes it. The belief is false with
respect to Adams and it is true with respect to God. So, while Adams at W1 shares a
belief with God that Adams at @ does not, Adams at @ is more similar to God than
Adams at W1 with respect to the avoidance of false beliefs. This property that Adams at
@ keeps and Adams at W1 loses has more weight in determining similarity to God than
17

To see this, reason as follows: Adams at W2 shares one new belief with God, namely ‘I am God’, that
Adams at @ does not have. But Adams at W2 gains many crazy and false beliefs that God does not have
such as ‘Adams is God’ and ‘God should leave the compound sometime today and head over to the grocery
store to get some stuff for the fridge’ and he loses many sane and true beliefs that he has in common with
God at @ such as ‘Adams is not God’ and ‘God was not born in the 20 th Century’. So at W2 Adams is less
similar to God than he is at @.
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the belief that Adams at W1 gains in common with God does. So Adams at W1 is not
more similar to God than Adams at @.
The controversial premise in the argument above is this: ‘Increasing match to
God with respect to the avoidance of false beliefs has more weight than believing ‘I am
God’ in determining similarity to God’. To support this premise, consider something
David Lewis (1986, p. 43) says about the role that similarity plays in his analysis of
counterfactuals:
The thing to do is not to start by deciding, once and for all, what we think about similarity of
worlds, so that we can afterwards use these decisions to test [my analysis]. What that would test
would be the combination of [my analysis] with a foolish denial of the shiftiness of similarity.
Rather, we must use what we know about the truth and falsity of counterfactuals to see if we can
find some sort of similarity relation—not necessarily the first one that springs to mind—that
combines with [my analysis] to yield the proper truth conditions. It is this combination that can be
tested against our knowledge of counterfactuals, not [my analysis] by itself. In looking for a
combination that will stand up to the test, we must use what we know about counterfactuals to find
out about the appropriate similarity relation—not the other way around.

Given how influential Lewis’ analysis is, I think that I can help myself to the same
strategy when testing Adams’ theory of intrinsic value. Let us use what we know about
intrinsic value to discover the appropriate similarity relation to God. What we find, if we
do that, is the similarity relation that assigns great importance to increasing one’s match
to God with respect to the avoidance of false beliefs and assigns little or no importance to
increasing one’s match to Him with respect to His de se beliefs such as ‘I am God’.
Combined with Adams’ theory this similarity relation delivers the correct judgment:
Adams at W1, that is Adams at a world at which he believes ‘I am God’ but everything
else, other than the psychological laws, is left the same as it is at @, is not more similar to
God than Adams at @. So the “What if Adams believed he was God?” objection is
unsound.
1.9 Conclusion
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When modified in appropriate ways, Adams’ theory is able to deal with a number
of natural, seemingly formidable, objections. Adams’ Finite and Infinite Goods, I
conclude, is suggestive of an interesting theory of intrinsic value that is worthy of critical
attention.
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CHAPTER 2
NATURALISM AND MORAL REALISM
Robert Adams, Alvin Plantinga, and Michael Rea have defended some objections
to Naturalist Moral Realism (NMR). In this paper I describe a form of NMR and argue
that it evades each of their objections. Some of the objections are simply unpersuasive.
Others can be reformulated into interesting objections. These more interesting
reformulations, however, are all dependent on objections to NMR already widely
discussed in the literature. A consequence of this dependence is that Adams, Plantinga,
and Rea’s objections contribute nothing to the debate about whether naturalism can
accommodate moral realism.
2.1 The Causal Theory of Reference
Proponents of NMR often appeal to the Causal Theory of Reference (CTR). CTR
includes an account of reference grounding. In the case of names, CTR holds that:
A name, ‘N’, is grounded in an object, N, only if a subject points to N and utters some
sentence like ‘That is N’.
In the case of natural kind terms, CTR holds that:
A natural kind term, ‘K’, is grounded in a natural kind, K , only if a subject points to a
sample of K and utters some sentence like ‘That is K’.
Of course, these necessary conditions are not, by themselves, sufficient. More needs to
be said about further conditions that must be met by the speaker and by the speaker’s
environment to ensure the successful grounding of ‘N’ in N and of ‘K’ in K. While more
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has been said18, and progress has been made, it is still very difficult to specify exactly
what else must be added.
In addition to an account of reference grounding, CTR also includes accounts of
reference borrowing and reference change. Concerning the account of reference
borrowing, proponents of CTR hold that a subject need not be present at a successful
grounding of a term in an object or property in order for that subject to use that term to
refer to that object or property. All that is required is that, first, the subject has witnessed
someone else successfully use that term to refer to the relevant object or natural kind and,
second, the subject uses that term with the intention of referring to whatever that other
person referred to when he or she used that term.
Concerning the account of reference change, consider Evans’ famous
‘Madagascar’ example. At one time ‘Madagascar’ referred to mainland Africa. Now it
refers to an island off the coast of mainland Africa. If one act of reference grounding
determines the referent of a term once and for all, then ‘Madagascar’ would still refer to
mainland Africa. But ‘Madagascar refers to an island and not to mainland Africa. So an
account of reference change is needed. Of course, we are here talking about natural kind
terms in addition to names. But Evan’s lesson about Madagascar applies to natural kind

18

What more has been said? This will become important later. But for now here, in slogan form, is a
sample of some of the further conditions have been added to the simple account of grounding: Devitt and
Sterelny (1999) have added the condition that the speaker who grounds the term associates that term with a
description that determines one and only one of the natural kinds to which the relevant sample object
belongs. Stanford and Kitcher (2000), have added among others the condition that the speaker who
grounds that term associates that term with a range of samples, a range of foils, and a conjunctive sentence
that is such that each sample satisfies each of the conjuncts and each foil fails to satisfy at least one of the
conjuncts. Boyd (2003) holds that a term refers to a natural kind with respect to a disciplinary matrix only
if that natural kind, together with the use of that term, explains the achievements of the practitioners within
that disciplinary matrix. Soames (2002) adds the condition that the speaker has various dispositions that
together with the speaker’s act of dubbing help fix reference. Brown (1998) and Jylkka (2008) have added
the condition that a speaker that grounds that term has a recognitional capacity, or a recognitional
component, that will eventually be discovered by psychologists.
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terms and moral terms as well. The reference of a name or natural kind term changes
when a weighted most of that term’s groundings are in a new object or natural kind19.
2.1.1 Extending CTR from Scientific Terms to Moral Terms
Many proponents of NMR propose extending CTR from names and natural kind
terms to moral terms. Two motivations for this extension are often cited. First, it is
sometimes alleged that CTR allows the naturalist to deal with objections to scientific
realism20. Some naturalists interpret Putnam and Kuhn as having argued that, given a
descriptivist theory of reference for natural kind terms, naturalism cannot accommodate
scientific realism. CTR, on the other hand, is alleged to overcome these Putnamian and
Kuhnian objections. Since the authors Adams, Plantinga and Rea target see scientific
inquiry as the only legitimate form of inquiry, and since they hope to include moral
realism under the umbrella of scientific realism, they are motivated to extend CTR to
moral terms.
Second, it is sometimes alleged that extending CTR to moral terms allows the
naturalist to escape Moore’s Open Question Argument. Proponents of NMR sometimes

19

The account of reference change, though widely adopted, is not present in Kripke and Putnam’s initial
formulation of CTR. It is due to Devitt. See, for example, Devitt and Sterleny () and Reimer ().
20
Kornblith (2006, 16) makes the point this way:
Putnam’s account of the reference of natural kind terms was part of an attempt to offer a realist philosophy
of science…. The traditional descriptions theory of reference made it impossible to understand the
possibility of disagreement between individuals committed to different theories…. Putnam’s argument
against a descriptions-based theory of reference for natural kind terms was designed to show that such a
theory fails to explain a certain real phenomenon, namely, progress in science….
Laurence and Margolis (2003, 271-2) also take this line:
Ironically, Putnam’s main contribution to the development of causal theories isn’t Twin Earth but rather his
observations concerning purported a priori analyses and how they don’t mesh with… the history of
science…. One of the advantages of causal/anti-descriptivist theories is that they do.
The same thought is expressed by Kuhn (2000):
To avoid [objections to scientific realism] and related problems from other sources, many philosophers
have in recent years emphasized… the so-called causal theory of reference developed by Kripke and
Putnam. It is rooted firmly in possible world semantics, and its expositors resort repeatedly to examples
drawn from scientific development.
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interpret Moore as showing that, given a descriptivist theory of reference, moral
properties cannot be identical to natural properties. They go on to claim that, unlike
descriptivist theories of reference, CTR allows moral properties to be identical to natural
properties21. Since moral realism is sometimes formulated in terms of properties and
since natural properties are the only properties acceptable within naturalism’s austere
ontology, they are motivated to extend CTR to moral terms.
Proposing such an extension might seem puzzling. There are important respects
in which moral terms are disanalogous with names and disanalagous with natural kind
terms. First, names are referring terms. Many moral terms, however, are used primarily
as adjectives. Consider sentences such as ‘That man is good’ and ‘The oil spill is not
good’. In these sentences ‘good’ is used as an adjective. In such cases ‘good’ does not
refer to anything. Since moral terms like ‘good’ are not primarily referring terms, it is
unclear how CTR is supposed to be extended to such terms. So when authors say that
CTR extends to moral terms, they must not be suggesting that it is extended to moral
terms that are used as adjectives22.
Second, many natural kind terms refer to concrete stuff. And, in some cases, a
natural kind term refers to the property of being certain concrete stuff. So, for example,
‘water’ refers to H2O and ‘waterocity’ refers to the property of being H2O. Consider,
however, referring moral terms such as ‘goodness’. ‘Goodness’ refers to a property and
21

Although, as Feldman (2005) points out, people who talk this way often simply misunderstand Moore’s
Open Question Argument. Feldman (2005), for example, says this:
In recent discussions of OQA [the open question argument], commentators sometimes suggest that
discoveries concerning rigid designators, natural kind terms, the causal theory of reference, etc., have
shown us that OQA is little more than a quaint relic. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam are often mentioned.
Putnam himself seems to endorse this line of thinking…. Putnam starts out by saying that Kripke’s ideas
have a devastating impact on Moore’s argument. He then mentions in passing that the most Moore’s
argument establishes is that ‘good’ is not synonymous with ‘we desire to desire’. But what is astonishing
here is that this is precisely the conclusion that Moore was concerned to establish!
22
Soames (2000) makes a similar point about natural kind terms.
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not to stuff. And there is no concrete stuff that can be identified with all and only things
that instantiate goodness. So ‘goodness’ cannot refer to the property of being certain
concrete stuff. So when authors say that moral terms are analogous to natural kind terms,
they must not mean that moral terms and moral properties are analogous to natural kind
terms and natural kinds in the respects just specified.
In light of these disanalogies, perhaps authors who suggest extending CTR to
moral terms have the following extension in mind: First, CTR applies only to moral
terms that are referring terms such as ‘goodness’ and not to moral terms that are
adjectives such as ‘good’. Second, moral terms are analogous to natural kind terms, not
in the sense that they refer to concrete stuff or the property of being certain concrete stuff,
but in the sense that the referents of moral terms are fixed by ostension. Extended in this
way, CTR holds that:
A (referring) moral term, ‘M’, is grounded in a moral property, M, only if a subject points
to a sample of, M, and utters some sentence like ‘That is M’.
Even more so than in the case of names and natural kind terms, more needs to be said
about what, in addition to pointing and uttering, is sufficient for grounding ‘M’ in M. As
we will see, this is a difficult problem to address. But perhaps authors who promote
extending CTR to moral terms have the following sketch in mind: Suppose ancient moral
theorists find that Nature has disposed them to classify a number of very different items
together. They have a list of samples that belong in this class. They see two people in
deep conversation, that the harvest was plentiful this year, and the pattern of the stars in
the sky. These, along with many other items, are samples. The ancient moral theorists
have a list of foils that do not belong to this class. They see a young man being eaten by
a wild beast and that a pile of refuse is now an object of worship to many. These, along
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with many other items, are foils. Now, suppose that one of the moral theorists points to
one of the samples with the intention of identifying whatever it is that the samples have in
common and the foils lack. Suppose the moral theorist then utters some sentence like
‘That is goodness’. Somehow the ancient moral theorist’s mental states and the ancient
moral theorist’s environment combine with the act of pointing and uttering to
successfully ground ‘goodness’ in a unique property.
2.1.2 Reference, Truth, and Identity
Proponents of NMR sometimes supplement CTR with a claim about truth and a
claim about identity. Consider the natural kind term ‘water’. CTR, combined with
various causal and historical assumptions, is said to deliver the judgment that ‘water’
refers to H2O. Establishing that the referent of ‘water’ is H2O is supposed to be because
proponents of NMR often supplement CTR with the following claims:
TRUTH: The truth-value of a sentence depends on the referents of the reference bearing
terms in that sentence and on the structure of that sentence.23
IDENTITY: If a term, ‘s1’, refers to some stuff, s2, then the property of being s1 is
identical to the property of being s2.24 25
23

Kuhn (2000) attributes TRUTH to Kripke and Putnam. He says this:
[M]any philosophers have in recent years emphasized that truth values depend only on reference, and that
an adequate theory of reference need not call upon the way in which the referents of individual terms are in
fact picked out.
Devitt and Sterelny (1999, p. 21-2) endorse TRUTH as well. They say this:
What is it about a word that affects the truth conditions of sentences containing it…? The obvious answer
is: its referent…. [T]he truth condition of a sentence depends on its syntactic structure and the referents of
its words…. Given reference and structure, truth conditions are determined.
24
Scott Soames (2008, p. 16) embraces IDENTITY. He says this:
[B]eing water must be the property being H2O, which, in turn, must be the meaning of the predicate ‘is
water’ (but not of the predicate ‘is H2O’).
LaPorte (1996, pp. 1, ) who himself rejects IDENTITY notes that it is “widely popular”. He says this:
I am inclined to say that this identity statement and others like it are false. It is an empirical fact, perhaps,
that all water is H20 and all H20 is water. But the claim that the one is identical to the other needs more
than empirical support. Essentialists have looked for the needed support in thought experiments alleged to
illustrate that speakers would call all and only H20 'water' in any possible world, provided only that 'water'
and 'H20' are in fact coextensive.
Adams (197?) and (1999) endorses IDENTITY in the following passages:
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I take it that TRUTH is supposed to work as it does in the following example:
Consider the sentence ‘There is water in my cup’. Whether this sentence is true depends
on whether the stuff in my cup is H2O. If that stuff is H2O, then the sentence in question
is true. If not, then the relevant sentence is false.
To be made plausible, however, TRUTH will require elaboration, clarification,
and refinement. In particular, the dependence relation discussed in TRUTH will need to
be spelled out in detail. The relevant sort of dependence cannot, for instance, yield an
interpretation of TRUTH that implies this:
DEP: For any reference bearing term in a sentence, if the reference of the term is
changed, then the truth-value of that sentence is changed.
DEP is clearly false. Consider a sentence26 like ‘Water is a liquid and 2+2 = 5.’
This sentence is false no matter what ‘water’ refers to. So if the reference of ‘water’ is
changed, then contrary to DEP, the truth-value of the relevant sentence stays the same.
Or, consider the sentence ‘Water is a liquid’. This sentence is true. Suppose the
reference of ‘water’ is not to H2O but to some other liquid stuff. Then the relevant
sentence is still true. Reference has changed, but truth-value has not changed. So DEP is
false. TRUTH will, therefore, require further refinement. And, in fact, it requires more
refinement than I can offer here. Ultimately, my goal is neither to defend nor to attack
NMR. I only hope to advance discussion of this topic by clarifying NMR and by

25

Amie Thomasson seems to endorse TRUTH and IDENTITY like claims. She says this:
[I]t is a platitude about reference that (for most general terms *K*, assuming the term exists), *K* refers if
and only if Ks exist. This link between the fundamental rules of use for ‘refers’ and ‘exists’ enables us to
move up and down the semantic slide from talking (in the metalanguage) about whether a term refers to
speaking (in the object-language) about whether or not the relevant things exist…. [We can] shift between
using terms in talking about whether or not entities of a given sort exist and mentioning those terms in
discussing whether they refer. This shift is crucial to enabling us to assess the truth-value of existence
claims.
26
Thanks to Fred Feldman for suggesting this example.
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demonstrating that it can evade the objections raised by Adams, Plantinga, and Rea.
Furthermore, none of the objections offered by Adams or Plantinga or Rea target
TRUTH. So I will leave it to proponents of NMR to hammer out the precise details of
TRUTH. For the purpose of this paper, assume that they have.
IDENTITY, although very popular, is certainly not uncontroversial. I will discuss
this more in the section on Rea’s objection. For now, I will just explain how IDENTITY
is supposed to work and why, together with CTR, IDENTITY delivers interesting results.
Given IDENTITY and given CTR’s judgment about ‘water’ and H2O, the property of
being water and the property of being H2O are identical properties. English speakers may
associate a different description with ‘water’ than they do with ‘H2O’. People may think
that being water and being H2O are distinct properties. But, it is claimed, they are not.
The property of being water and the property of being H2O are one and the same
property.
As we have seen, when supplemented with TRUTH and IDENTITY, CTR
generates interesting results. Suppose, in addition, that the sketch given above is correct.
CTR, combined with causal and historical assumptions, delivers the judgment that a
moral term like ‘goodness’ refers to some property P. Then the following two claims are
alleged to be true:
TRUTH: The truth-values of sentences that include ‘goodness’ depend on P and on the
structure of those sentences.
IDENTITY: Goodness is identical to P.
Consider, then, a sample event or object or any other sort of stuff that we take to
instantiate goodness. Now consider sentences such as ‘The oil spill does not instantiate
goodness’ or ‘That person instantiates goodness’. These sentences depend on whether
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the relevant sample instantiates P and on the structure of those sentences. Furthermore,
goodness and P are identical properties. People may associate a different description
with ‘goodness’ than they do with ‘P’. They may think that goodness and P are distinct.
But these properties are not distinct.
It will be important to evaluate the truth-values of sentences containing moral
terms that are not referring terms. Suppose we want to find the truth-value of a sentence
containing non-referring moral terms such as ‘That is a good man.’ Such sentences will
have a paraphrase in which the non-referring moral term is replaced with a referring
moral term. For example, ‘That is a good man’ has as a paraphrase ‘That man
instantiates goodness’. The truth-value of ‘That is a good man’ is identical to the truth
value of its paraphrase.
2.2 Moral Realism
There are different formulations of moral realism in the metaethical literature.
Some formulations are in terms of which sentences are true and which sentences are
false. Others are in terms of which properties exist or are instantiated. Others are a
combination. I will discuss each and then settle on a combined account of moral realism.
The Sentence Formulation: Many authors understand Ethical Nihilism as a claim
about which moral sentences are true and which moral sentences are false27. If reference,
together with structure, determines the truth-values of sentences, as TRUTH indicates,

27

Maitzen (1998, p. 357) says that Ethical Nihilism is the claim “that no ethical sentence, standardly
construed, is true. Pigden (2007, p. 451) says that “meta-ethical nihilism needs to be reformulated. I
suggest the following: All nonnegative atomic moral judgments are false. This requires elucidation… an
atomic moral judgment [is] a proposition….” Schaffer-Landau (2004, pp. 8-) sometimes formulates
Ethical Nihilism in this way. He says “Moral nihilism denies that there are any moral truths…. This is an
error theory... According to such a view, moral terms have descriptive meaning and we have moral beliefs,
but they are uniformly false.”
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then determining the referents of moral terms will allow us to determine which moral
sentences are true and which are false. If at least some moral sentences (of a certain sort)
are true, then Ethical Nihilism is false. If no moral sentences (of a certain sort) are true,
then Ethical Nihilism is true28. Perhaps we will not go too far astray if we suppose that
those who understand Ethical Nihilism in terms of the truth-values of sentences will also
understand other metaethical positions, such as moral realism, in terms of the truth-values
of sentences. Indeed, some authors explicitly understand moral realism in this way.
According to Sayre McCord29, for example, “Moral realism is not a particular substantive
moral view nor does it carry a distinctive metaphysical commitment over and above the
commitment that comes with thinking moral claims can be true or false and some are
true.” Other authors may want to add the condition that the truth-values of moral
sentences are objective. Sayre-McCord, himself, seems to endorse this extra condition
elsewhere. Combining these two conditions we are in a position to consider what we
may call “the Sentence formulation of MR” or “SMR”:
SMR: Some moral sentences (of the relevant sort) are true and the truth-values of those
sentences are objective.
Suppose that authors such as Sayre-McCord are correct in formulating Moral Realism as
SMR. Then determining the referents of moral terms will allow us to determine the truthvalues of moral sentences and whether those truth-values are objective. If it turns out that
some moral sentences are true and that the relevant truth-values are objective, then moral
realism is true. If not, then moral realism is false.
28

I say “of a certain sort” because one might think that both ‘Torturing babies is wrong’ and ‘It is not the
case that torturing babies is wrong’ are moral sentences. One or the other sentences has got to be true. So,
Ethical Nihilism, on this reading, would be too easily refuted. Some authors (e.g. Maitzen (1998)) deal
with this problem by saying that one or the other sentences is not really moral. Other authors (e.g. Pigden
(2007)) deal with this problem by saying that both sentences are moral but Ethical Nihilism is true if every
moral sentence of a certain sort is false.
29
See Sayre McCord (2009).
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The Property Formulation: Other authors understand MR as the claim that there
are objective moral properties30. Call this “the Property formulation of Moral Realism”
or “PMR”:
PMR: There are moral properties and they are objective.
Suppose that Moral Realism is best formulated as PMR. Then CTR, together with causal
and historical assumptions about speakers and their environments, will determine
whether and to what moral terms refer. Consider, for example, the moral term ‘wrong’.
Suppose that CTR delivers the judgment that ‘wrong’ fails to refer. Then, by
IDENTITY, wrongness doesn’t exist. So wrongness is not an objective moral property.
So Moral Realism, with respect to wrongness, is false. Suppose instead that CTR
delivers the judgment that ‘wrong’ successfully refers to some property but that the
relevant property is not objective. Then, by IDENTITY, wrongness is identical to some
property that is not objective. Assume the same is true of other moral terms and the
properties to which they refer, then there are moral properties but they are not objective.
Then PMR is not true. If, however, ‘wrong’ successfully refers to some property and that
property is objective, then PMR is true with respect to wrongness and, given that other
moral terms successfully refer to objective properties, PMR is true in general.
A Combined Formulation: Some authors offer an account of Moral Realism that
combines SMR and PMR. Plantinga, for example, offers such an account. I think this is
the right line to take. It seems to me that the spirit of Moral Realism is not fully captured
by either SMR or PMR. Both seem necessary for the truth of Moral Realism. But
neither seems sufficient. In addition, a more full account of Moral Realism should add a
dependence relation between SMR and PMR along with the requirement that the moral
30

Rea Plantinga Boyd Adams
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judgments of ordinary speakers cannot deviate too far from which moral sentences are
actually true and which are false. I will take ‘Moral Realism’ to apply only to theories
that satisfies all of these conditions:
Moral Realism: PMR is true, SMR is true, the truth of SMR depends on the truth of
PMR, and a large body of ordinary judgments about the truth-values of moral sentences
match the actual truth-values of moral sentences.
I have already discussed naturalist strategies for accommodating PMR and SMR. If CTR
delivers the judgment that moral terms refer to objective natural properties, then the
proponent of NMR can satisfy the additional conditions that I have said must be satisfied
by any version of Moral Realism. Since the truth-values of moral sentences depend on
the structure of those sentences and the properties referred to by moral terms and since,
given PMR, those properties are moral terms, the truth of SMR depends on the truth of
NMR. Suppose in addition that the truth-values of moral sentences match the truthvalues that we ordinarily assign to moral sentences. Then the proponent of NMR can
accommodate Moral Realism.
2.3 Adams’ First Objection
Robert Adams’ important book Finite and Infinite Goods contains some
interesting critical discussions of NMR. One chapter is devoted entirely to NMR. NMR
is discussed critically in other substantial chapters as well. Here I want to consider two
passages in which Adams raises some problems for NMR. One alleged problem
concerns the proponent of NMR’s use of CTR. Adams argues that CTR cannot
accommodate the standard line that ‘water’ determinately refers to H2O rather than other
stuff. Adams further argues that any modification to CTR that would enable it to deliver
the relevant judgment would yield widespread non-objectivity about “claims that link
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metaphysics and semantics on any topic” including ethics. But Moral Realism requires
that moral properties be objective. So if this objection is sound, it would be a serious
problem for the proponent of NMR. Here is the passage in which Adams discusses this
objection:
Suppose we find on another planet a substance that shares the observable common properties of
water (colorless, odorless, tasteless, it quenches thirst, forms solid, liquid, and gaseous states at the
same temperatures as water, etc.), but is not H2O; instead it is constituted in an analogous way of
two elements unknown on Earth, so that we may call it, for present purposes,  Is  water?
The received answer is that it is (necessarily) not, and I am prepared to agree; but what makes it
the right answer? Our seventeenth-century ancestors, who knew nothing of the periodic table, let
alone H2O or , used the word ‘water’, very competently, in the same sense as we do. What is
determined about the nature of water by the sense of ‘water’, as we share it with them, can hardly
be more than that it accounts causally for the observable properties of water. In my example H 2O
and  may be assumed to have analogous structures which are causally relevant in analogous
ways to their shared observable properties. Why not say, then, that it is not being H 2O, but a
structural property common to H2O or , that accounts causally for the observed properties of
31
water, even on planet Earth ?

What exactly is the objection Adams means to be suggesting here? As I see it,
there are two possibilities. First, Adams might be arguing that CTR is unable to judge
that the actual English term ‘water’ refers to H2O rather than the structure common to
H2O and  If this is his objection, then perhaps his reasoning can be reconstructed as
follows: A sample of H2O is also a sample of the structure common to H2O and 
According to CTR, an act of reference grounding is successful if and only if a subject
points to a sample of some natural kind, K, and utter some sentence like ‘That is K.’ But
there is nothing about the subject’s pointing and uttering that determines that ‘water’
refers to H2O rather than the structure common to H2O and So if CTR were true,
then ‘water’ would not refer to H2O rather than the structure common to H2O and .
This is a very interesting objection. But this is a specific instance of an objection
already widely discussed in the literature on CTR—the Qua Problem. One need not point
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to a fanciful thought experiment about or any “shared common structure causally
relevant in an analogous way to the observed properties of water” to generate the
problem. One need only note that a sample of H2O is also a sample of many other things.
It is a particular sample of H2O. It is, at the time of pointing, a sample of a particular
temporal slice of that particular sample of H2O. It is a liquid. It is an instance of the
disjunctive property being either H2O or an electronic musician. Nothing about an act of
pointing and uttering, by itself, determines that the subject is pointing to the sample qua
sample of H2O rather than the sample qua sample of any of the other things it is a sample
of. So CTR will require some tinkering if it is to deliver the judgment that ‘water’ refers
to H2O rather than any of the other things the relevant sample is a sample of.
Over the years, proponents of CTR have introduced modifications and additions
to deal with this problem and the proponents of the Qua Problem (often the proponents
and critics are the same authors) have criticisms of those modifications32. Here I am only
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The dialectic has gone this way: Proponents of CTR attempt to avoid the Qua Problem by positing
features of the mental states of speakers that single out one of the natural kinds instantiated by the relevant
sample when those speakers perform an act of grounding. The problem with this move is that proponents
of CTR end up attributing to such speakers mental states that no human has. These variants of CTR then
become subject to the same sorts of objections that CTR’s traditional rival-the Descriptivist Theory-suffers
from—namely, the so called “Problem of Ignorance and Error.” The resulting theories, then, suffer from
both the Qua Problem and the Problem of Ignorance and Error. This point is made in many places but
perhaps most notably in Devitt and Sterelny (1999) and Jylkka (2008).
One might think that prioritizing naturalness in reference grounding and appealing to the
naturalness of natural kinds would help the proponent of NMR. In addition to the mental states of
speakers, it is the “naturalness” of the properties instantiated by a sample that help to determine reference.
And natural kinds are more natural than other candidate referents.
This is an interesting line to take in the case of natural kind terms. The appeal to naturalness
certainly helps explain why CTR delivers the judgment that ‘water’ is grounded in H2O rather than in being
H2O or an electronic musician. But I don’t think this move will help the proponent of NMR. The problem
is that the properties proponents of NMR allege to be identical to moral properties are very different than
the standard examples of natural kinds offered by naturalists.
Consider, for example, Richard Boyd’s homeostatic property cluster theory. As Rubin (2008)
points out, the property cluster that Boyd identifies with goodness does not have the kind of metaphysical
structure that is characteristic of all of the other homeostatic property clusters that Boyd takes to be natural
kinds. So if one adopts Boyd’s theory of natural kinds and one privileges naturalness in one’s account of
reference grounding, then, since the property Boyd identifies with goodness is, by his own standards, not a
natural kind, such privileging does not alleviate the Qua Problem.
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making two points: First, if this is the objection Adams means to be suggesting, then his
objection is unoriginal. It was widely discussed in the literature on CTR decades before
the publication of Finite and Infinite Goods. Moreover, Adams does not cite or engage
with any of those proposed modifications of CTR. Second, whatever else Adams’
objection may be, it cannot turn out that its success depends in some implicit way on the
success of the Qua Problem. If it does, then the real debate is about whether the Qua
Problem is successful and not about Adams’ own objection. And that debate had been
raging long before Finite and Infinite Goods first appeared.
So what is the other objection Adams might be suggesting in the relevant
passage? Perhaps the idea is that CTR judges that before Adams’ planet is discovered the
referent of ‘water’ is H2O and after the planet is discovered the referent of ‘water’ is the
structure common to H2O and  But the discovery of the new planet, the objection
might proceed, should not carry with it a change in the reference of ‘water’. If this is
what Adams has in mind, then I can see two ways that this sort of objection might go.
Here is the first way: Suppose that an English speaker lands on Adams’ planet.
She points to the watery stuff on that planet and says something like ‘Look! They have
In addition, some proponents of NMR identify goodness with a complex disjunctive property.
Brink (1989, p. 156-60), for example, does this. However, disjunctive properties, even very simple ones,
are paradigm examples of properties that fail to count as natural kinds. So the move to naturalness is not
going to help.
Other proponents of NMR, such as Railton (1986) identify goodness with bizarre counterfactual
properties such as being what would satisfy what our desires would be if we had “unqualified cognitive and
imaginative powers, and full factual and nomological information about [our] physical and psychological
constitution, capacities, circumstances, history, and so on.” These farfetched counterfactual properties are
very different than the sorts of properties that naturalists usually take to be natural kinds such as being H2O,
being a tiger, and being an electron.
So, given the properties that advocates of NMR actually identify with moral properties,
prioritizing naturalness in CTR’s account of reference grounding is going to hurt the prospects for a
plausible account of NMR rather than help. Or, at the very least, the proponent of NMR owes us a
plausible theory of natural kinds that includes the sorts of properties that they take to be identical to moral
properties and that gives us an error theory that explains why the properties in question seem so different
than the standard examples of natural kinds and yet still turn out to be natural kinds in spite of those
differences.
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water here too. That is water.’ She will have grounded the term ‘water’ in a sample of
 So there will have been groundings of ‘water’ in both samples of H2O and a
sample of . ‘Water’, therefore, must refer to something both sorts of samples have in
common. What they have in common is not that they are all samples of H2O. Instead, it
is the structure common to H2O and  that they have in common. So that common
structure, rather than H2O, is what ‘water’ refers to.
It is certainly counterintuitive to say that ‘water’, on the present interpretation of
Adams’ objection, refers to the structure common to H2O and . Surely the proponent
of CTR will want to say that the English word ‘water’ in such a case continues to refer to
H2O. Indeed, it seems clear to me that the proponent of CTR has the resources to
maintain just this claim. According to the received formulation of CTR, a natural kind
term refers to whatever natural kind is such that a weighted most of the groundings of
that term are in that natural kind. So just one act of grounding ‘water’ in a sample of
, or the structure common to H2O and ,would not change its reference. But if
the vast majority of the groundings of ‘water’ came to be in samples of , or the
structure common to H2O and , then, the reference of ‘water’ would change from
H2O to , or the structure common to H2O and . So, ‘water’ will continue to refer
to whatever it has referred to in the past. A few groundings in a new natural kind will not
change the reference of ‘water.’ One might wonder in the first place why groundings of
‘water’ in samples of H2O secure reference to H2O rather than the structure common to
H2O and . But as we have already seen, if this is the worry, it is just a special
instance of the much discussed Qua Problem.
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Here is the second way that this objection might go: Perhaps Adams is suggesting
that once the planet has been explored thoroughly and people have traveled back and
forth many times and there have been numerous groundings of ‘water’ in samples of
 that CTR would deliver the judgment that ‘water’ refers to the structure common to
H2O and  rather than to H2O. If this is his complaint, then I doubt that the proponent
of CTR would be worried about this result. Note that proponents of CTR typically hold
that there is a graded distinction between superficial properties of a sample and deeper
properties of a sample. The watery-ness of a sample of water is more superficial than the
structure common to H2O and  which is itself more superficial than being H2O. In
cases where the same superficial properties are shared by samples with different deeper
properties and where speakers frequently ground the same term in samples that share the
superficial properties but vary with respect to the deeper properties, proponents of CTR
want the theory to deliver the judgment that the relevant term refers to the more shallow
property. Putnam (p. 241) says it this way:
Some diseases, for example, have turned out to have no hidden structure (the only thing the
paradigm cases have in common is a cluster of symptoms)…. An interesting case is the case of
jade. Although the Chinese do not recognize a difference, the term ‘jade’ applies to two minerals:
jadeite and nephrite. Chemically, there is a marked difference. Jadeite is a combination of sodium
and aluminum. Nephrite is made of calcium, magnesium, and iron. These two quite different
microstructures produce the same unique textual qualities! Coming back to the Twin Earth
example, for a moment; if H2O and XYZ had both been plentiful on Earth, then we would have
been correct to say that there were two kinds of ‘water’. And instead of saying that ‘the stuff on
Twin Earth turned out not to really be water’, we would have to say ‘it turned out to be the XYZ
kind of water’. To sum up… the local water, or whatever, may have two or more hidden
structures—or so many that ‘hidden structure’ becomes irrelevant and the superficial
characteristics become the decisive ones.

My ability to summon within myself definitive NMRish intuitions about these cases is
starting to get shaky. But if the case Adams means to be suggesting is one in which there
are numerous groundings of ‘water’ in both samples of H2O and  then I think the
proponent of CTR would be happy to accept that water does not refer to H2O, that maybe
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there are two types of water and ‘water’ refers to both. Or perhaps instead the proponent
of CTR would want to hold that the structure shared by H2O and is the referent of
‘water’. So I don’t think the proponent of CTR, and hence the proponent of NMR under
consideration, would be too troubled with this result
Another concern I have about Adams’ objection to NMR is that I’m not sure what
Adams means by “the structure common to H2O and .” One might think he means to
be talking about the property of being composed of two atoms of one kind and one atom
of another kind. But that can’t be it since there are other actual molecules with that
structure that do not have the watery properties shared by samples of H2O and samples of
. Again, one might wonder why an act of grounding in a sample of H2O is an act of
grounding in H2O rather than an act of grounding in molecules that are composed of two
atoms of one kind and one atom of another kind since a sample of H2O is a sample of
both. But if that is the concern, then it is just the Qua Problem. And if it isn’t the Qua
Problem that Adams is pressing, then the proponent of NMR, I think, has an easy story to
tell about why ‘water’ refers to H2O rather than to the structure common to H2O and
. The reason is that plenty of other samples of molecules are composed of two
atoms of one kind and one atom of another kind, just like H2O and , but they don’t
have the relevant “superficial” watery properties had by samples of H2O and samples of
. So the Qua Problem notwithstanding, the extension of ‘water’ certainly doesn’t
include those other samples of molecules. So it doesn’t refer to that common structure.
That is why ‘water’ refers to H2O rather than the structure common to H2O and .
Now, I am no chemist. Maybe there is something more to the structure of molecules than
just how many atoms they have and what the comparative amounts of each of those
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atoms are. But there is certainly nothing in the passage in which Adams discusses this
objection that points us to what that deeper structure might be. So without some story
about molecular structure that will yield a structure common to H2O and  that is not
also had by some non-watery sample of molecules, I doubt that the proponent of NMR
has anything to worry about.
2.4 Adams’ Second Objection
Adams presents another objection to NMR. He describes a case in which two
subjects disagree. But the proponent of NMR, Adams claims, cannot give a “realist”
account of that disagreement. So NMR must be false. Here is what Adams says:
Suppose Boyd’s hopes for the progress of science to have been vindicated, in some future
decade…. Scientific understanding of human behavior and other relevant phenomena has reached
a point at which experts have identified homeostatic clusters of natural properties and mechanisms
satisfying Boyd’s criterion for identifying human nonmoral and moral goodness as natural kinds.
Suppose also that the consequentialist part of Boyd’s hunches and hopes regarding ethical theory
has been vindicated.… In that case he faces the question what he should say about me (for
example) if, in the face of such progress and with full knowledge of the theoretical situation, I
would stubbornly refuse to assent to act-consequentialism…. What account can Boyd then give of
this disagreement between us? To be precise, can Boyd give a realistic account of this
disagreement…? Is there some procedure of empirical discovery that Boyd and I would agree
would settle the issue if we could carry it out? If so, Boyd might interpret us, realistically, as
debating what result that procedure would have. But I don’t see what procedure Boyd could think
that would be, since we are considering a situation in which all the empirical procedures Boyd
believes in for deciding such matters would have settled the issue in favor of actconsequentialism…. The dispute I envisage, after all, is about act-consequentialism, and Boyd
gives not the slightest reason to suppose that that could not be one of the issues in empirically
irresoluble dispute between conflicting ethical systems…. A view that is forced to be nonrealist
about a fundamental dispute between consequentialists and nonconsequentialists is forced to be
nonrealist on an important topic, and hence in an important way, I should think. This will be an
objection to virtually any naturalistic identification of ethical properties.

Boyd has written a paper in response to this argument. If the reader wishes to know what
Boyd’s response to this objection is, I refer the reader to that paper. What I want to focus
on here is whether Adams’ objection poses any problem for the version of NMR that I
have been discussing. I do not think that it does. Notice that Adams says “This will be
an objection to virtually any naturalistic identification of ethical properties.”
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I take Adams to be suggesting some case like this: On their death beds, Adams
and Boyd’s heads are severed and cryogenically frozen. In the distant future, their heads
are thawed and placed into life supporting vats. Scientists of the distant future then
inform Adams and Boyd’s heads that all the empirical results predicted by Boyd’s
metaethical theory have come to pass. CTR, combined with empirical results, delivers
the judgment that ‘wrong’ refers to the natural kind Boyd says it does. Boyd’s head
accepts CTR together with TRUTH and IDENTITY. Together these claims imply that
some form of consequentialism is true. Adams’ head agrees that CTR, combined with
empirical results, delivers the judgment that ‘wrong’ refers to the property of failing to
maximize utility. Adams’ head accepts the relevant empirical claims. But he doesn’t
accept the speculative philosophical claims about CTR, TRUTH, and IDENTITY that
Boyd’s head does. Maybe Adams’ head accepts CTR so that he thinks ‘wrong’ really
does refer to the relevant natural kinds. But he doesn’t buy into TRUTH or IDENTITY.
Maybe he thinks that CTR is nothing more than a boring semantic theory and that
questions about reference do not have the incredibly interesting and important
consequences that proponents of TRUTH and IDENTITY attach to them. Maybe instead
Adams’ head does not accept CTR. Maybe Adams’ head accepts some other theory of
reference—perhaps some form of descriptivism—and he thinks that form of
descriptivism plus TRUTH and IDENTITY together deliver the judgment that
consequentialism is false. Or, finally, maybe Adams’ head just doesn’t buy into any of
the theories or theses I have associated with NMR. Maybe he accepts all the relevant
empirical claims but he thinks that CTR, TRUTH and IDENTITY are all false. So I think
that the proponent of NMR can easily give a realistic interpretation of Adams’ head’s
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disagreement with Boyd’s head. Adams’ head accepts all of the relevant empirical
claims. That isn’t what the disagreement is about. The disagreement is instead located in
Adams’ head’s rejection of some or all of the speculative philosophical and semantic
theories and theses that proponents of NMR add to the relevant empirical hypotheses to
construct their metaethical theories. Granted, sometimes proponents of NMR write as
though they think that philosophy departments should close down and all the relevant
philosophical work should be done by scientists working in labs and looking through
microscopes. So insofar as Adams’ objection is an expression of puzzlement about that
claim, then I share his puzzlement. But when proponents of NMR write that way they are
exaggerating. They don’t really mean it. They employ substantive philosophical theories
and theses such as CTR, TRUTH, and IDENTITY to get their metaethical theories out of
their empirical claims. As a result, proponents of NMR, Boyd included, can easily give
an account of the disagreement between Adams’ head and Boyd’s head.
It is possible that Adams is suggesting a different sort of case. Maybe the idea is
this: Adams and Boyd’s heads are frozen and then thawed in the distant future just as
before. Again the scientists come in and tell Adams and Boyd’s heads that all of the
empirical predictions made by Boyd’s metaethical theory are true. But then the
philosophers of the distant future come in and inform Adams and Boyd’s heads that all
philosophers now accept CTR, TRUTH, and IDENTITY and they all agree that together
with the empirical data these theories and theses deliver the result that Boyd’s
homeostatic consequentialism is true. The philosophers share with Adams and Boyd’s
heads all the relevant arguments that have persuaded future philosophers of these things.
Adams’ head then assents to all of this. He agrees that CTR, TRUTH, and IDENTITY
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are all true, he agrees that the empirical predictions made by Boyd have come true, and
he agrees that together these things imply that Boyd’s homeostatic consequentialism is
true. But Adams’ head still denies that homeostatic consequentialism is true. If this is
the case Adams means to be suggesting, I think Boyd can still give a realistic account of
the disagreement. Adams’ head believes a bunch of philosophical and scientific things
that leave no space for any metaethical theory other than Boyd’s homeostatic
consequentialism. But Adams’ head strangely rejects homeostatic consequentialism
anyway. His belief is somehow isolated from all his other philosophical and empirical
beliefs. So there is disagreement here. Adams and Boyd’s heads clearly believe different
things.
Maybe Adams’ claim is not that NMR can’t give an account of Adams’ and
Boyd’s heads disagreement with respect to belief in the proposition that NMR is true.
Maybe instead his complaint is that NMR can’t give an account of rational disagreement.
The proponent of NMR must say that Adams’ head is being irrational. If that is Adams’
complaint, then I don’t think it is very persuasive. Going against my usual anti-naturalist
inclinations I’d have to side with the proponents of NMR on this one. Adams’ head, if he
adopts all the relevant philosophical theories and theses together with the relevant
empirical claims and he continues to think that these things imply Boyd’s
consequentialism but he still doesn’t believe it, is pretty clearly irrational.
There is in fact a very interesting argument from disagreement against NMR that,
like Adams objection, seeks inspiration from Moore’s Open Question Argument. It is the
Moral Twin Earth objection due to Horgan and Timmons. There are some similarities
between Adams’ objection and the Moral Twin Earth objection. So one might reasonably
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think that Adams is gesturing towards a Moral Twin Earth type of objection. In that case
he would certainly be onto an interesting problem for the theory. But if that is what
Adams is gesturing towards, then once again the objection is unoriginal. The widely
discussed Moral Twin Earth objection to NMR appeared in the literature at least a decade
before Finite and Infinite Goods and, as with the Qua Problem, there are many responses
by proponents of NMR and counter responses by those skeptical of NMR. So there
might be a problem here for NMR. But Adams’ objection doesn’t give the proponents of
NMR anything new to worry about.
2.5 Rea’s Objection
Another interesting objection to NMR due to Michael Rea. It seems to me that
Rea’s paper is naturally interpreted as arguing against a variety of different formulations
of NMR. I think that many of these arguments are very interesting and persuasive. But
what I want to focus on here is the section of Rea’s paper that argues against the sort of
NMR that I have been discussing. As far as I can tell, Rea argues against the version of
NMR that interests me in just one short passage:
One might think that we could go some distance toward showing that a particular reduction is true
if we could show that the reduction in question has correctly identified nonmoral properties (or
clusters of properties) that are tracked by our actual use of the terms ‘morally good’ and ‘morally
right’. But even if we could show this, we would still not have enough to show how belief in
objective moral properties is justified. Consider the following two premises:
(1) If there are objective moral properties, and if theory T of the nature of morality, rationality, and
related notions is correct, then moral properties are identical with or composed of natural
properties N1 – Nn.
(2) Our uses of words that allegedly refer to moral properties reliably track N1 – Nn.
Perhaps some interesting conclusions follow from these premises. But clearly the conclusion that
there are objective moral properties does not follow from the premises. Thus,… even if it can be
shown that a particular reduction has correctly identified natural properties tracked by our moral
terms, there is still work for a naturalist to do in showing how belief in objective moral properties
could be justified by the methods of science.

As I see it, there are two ways to interpret Rea’s objection. One way emphasizes his talk
of “alleged reference” and of a “tracking relation.” This interpretation can be stated as
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follows: Distinguish between the reference relation and the tracking relation. Naturalists
have defended the claim that moral terms in some sense “track” natural properties.
Suppose they are right. Even granting this supposition, the tracking relation, whatever it
may be, is no substitute for a genuine reference relation. Showing that moral terms
“track” natural properties does not entail that moral terms refer to natural properties and it
certainly does not entail the very ambitious claim that moral realism is true. So if the
goal is to show that naturalism can accommodate moral realism (or more carefully if the
goal is to show that, if empirical considerations turn out as naturalists hope, then
naturalism can accommodate moral realism), then naturalists have not done anything to
make that result plausible.
In assessing Rea’s argument, it is important to get clear about who his target is.
In one of the footnotes to this passage, Rea makes clear that his target is Richard Boyd.
Rea says that “Boyd (1988) presses this point [i.e. the point that moral terms “track”
natural properties] in his own attempt to show that moral properties are reducible to
natural properties.” Rea seems to be attributing (1) and (2) to Boyd. If naturalists like
Boyd only appealed to a vague “tracking” relation in the way that (1) and (2) suggest,
then they could be dismissed as easily as Rea dismisses them in the present passage. But
many proponents of NMR, Boyd included among them, explicitly appeal to CTR. Boyd
(1988), for example, says that “a naturalistic account is provided by recent causal theories
of reference.” Rather than (1) and (2), the version of NMR that I am discussing, and that
I think is most charitably attributable to the proponents of NMR, employs the following
claims:
(1*): TRUTH and IDENTITY are true.
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(2*): CTR is true and CTR delivers the judgment that moral terms refer to objective
natural properties.
And as we have already seen, if causal and historical factors turn out the way naturalists
hope, it is possible to employ CTR, (1*), and (2*) in defense of NMR. So it is not as
though Boyd and the other naturalists under discussion here only appeal to some vague
“tracking” relation between moral terms and natural properties and then mysteriously
extrapolate from that the truth of NMR (though, admittedly, they sometimes write that
way; so there is certainly some textual support for Rea’s attribution). Proponents of
NMR instead appeal to a well known theory of reference, CTR, and they supplement
CTR with the (admittedly controversial) semantic and metaphysical principles mentioned
in (1*). So if Boyd’s hope that CTR, combined with empirical considerations about
humans speakers and their environments, delivers the judgment that moral terms refer to
objective natural properties is correct, then this variant of NMR cannot be dismissed as
easily as Rea dismisses it. If we grant that moral terms bear the relations to natural
properties that authors like Boyd say they do, then to challenge NMR, we must challenge
CTR, TRUTH, IDENTITY or the defense of NMR constructed from them that I outlined
above. On the present interpretation, Rea has challenged none of these things. So NMR,
or at least the version of NMR I discuss here, is able to evade Rea’s objection.
There is another way to interpret Rea. This way downplays his talk of “alleged
reference” and of a “tracking relation.” Despite his use of language like “alleged
reference” maybe he really means to grant the naturalist the claim that moral terms refer
to natural stuff such that being that stuff is an objective natural kind property. Maybe he
is instead puzzled about IDENTITY’s move from claims about reference relations
between words and stuff to claims about one property being identical to another.
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If this is really what Rea is worried about, then the force of his objection is
significantly blunted. For one thing, Rea says in a footnote33 that the objection to NMR
in the quoted passage is “somewhat related” to one raised by Robert Merrihew Adams in
Finite and Infinite Goods. However, as Adams himself emphasizes34, his own theistic
version of moral realism35, like the version of NMR I have been discussing, relies on
IDENTITY:
I freely grant, for example, that ‘good’ does not mean the same as ‘resembles God’, though I do
favor the view that the goodness of finite things consists in a sort of resemblance to God…. This
approach has been developed most famously with respect to natural kinds…. [T]he property of
being water is, necessarily, identical with the property of being H2O…. The causal relations
between concrete samples of water, on the one hand, and users and uses of the word ‘water’, on
the other hand, serve to “fix the reference” of the word—that is, to determine which stuff the word
names. These ideas are commonly treated as if they were only about natural kinds…. I am
proposing that we do use ethical terms in an analogous way….

So if Rea is really pressing the proponent of NMR on this move, then it is not a problem
for NMR only, but also for Adams’ theistic moral realism. In fact it is not proponents of
NMR like Boyd but instead Adams, in his early work on the Divine Command Theory,
who was the first metaethicist to take this sort of line. Given that Rea’s overall project is
not just to argue against naturalism but also to recommend theism over naturalism, this is
a disappointing result for those of us who are fans of Rea’s work. In any case, since
Adams clearly embraces IDENTITY and since Rea likens his objection to one due to
Adams (and given that we have to downplay things Rea explicitly says), it seems
doubtful that this is the right way to interpret Rea.
But suppose one does interpret Rea’s objection this way. If Rea really is just
worried about IDENTITY, then it is not a specific problem for NMR or even for
naturalism or even for proponents of CTR. It is a problem for a fashionable metaphysical
33
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In two other papers I defend Adams’ theistic version of moral realism.
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and semantic picture that many contemporary philosophers embrace. Perhaps the
motivation for IDENTITY is often left unexplained and it is treated simply as a platitude
or an assumption. Perhaps the move in question deserves much more scrutiny and
suspicion than it is usually accorded. But IDENTITY is widely embraced. So if Rea is,
as I am interpreting him, suspicious of IDENTITY, then he needs to do more than just
highlight it and deny it. Given how (perhaps unjustifiably) fashionable IDENTITY is,
Rea needs to offer some arguments against it if his objection to NMR is going to have
any force. No such arguments have, insofar as I can tell, been offered by Rea.
2. 6 Plantinga’s Objection
Plantinga’s criticism of NMR is in broad outline very similar to Rea’s. Recall
that, according to Rea, naturalists attempt to show that NMR is true by showing that
moral terms “track” natural properties. As Rea points out, however, this vague tracking
relation between moral properties and natural properties is not enough to secure the truth
of NMR. Plantinga’s line is very similar. According to him, proponents of NMR claim
that moral properties are logically equivalent to natural properties. But, just as Rea’s
tracking relation isn’t enough to secure the truth of NMR, neither, Plantinga claims, is
logical equivalence. The proponent of NMR needs a “tighter” relation to secure the truth
of NMR. But, this tighter relation, it is alleged, is nowhere to be found.
Plantinga’s criticism of NMR, while similar in overall structure to Rea’s, is more
detailed and employs a few technical notions. Before discussing the precise details of
Plantinga’s argument, therefore, it is important to get clear about what some of these
technical terms are.
Abundantism: Any and only properties that are conceptually equivalent are identical.
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Sparsism: Any and only properties that are logically equivalent are identical.
Naturalistically Acceptable: A property is naturalistically acceptable if and only if that
property’s being instantiated does not entail the falsity of naturalism.
Equivalence: For every moral property, m, there is some natural property, n, that is such
that necessarily an object instantiates m if and only if that object instantiates n.
DCT: An action is obligatory if and only if that action has the property of being such that
it is an essential property of God to command all rational creatures to perform that action.
The DCT Property: The property of being such that it is an essential property of God to
command all rational creatures to perform.
2.6.1 The Abundantist Equivalence Argument
Plantinga attributes to proponents of NMR the following sort of argument:
Suppose, as EQUIVALENCE states, that each moral property is necessarily
coinstantiated with some natural property. If this is the case, then surely naturalism can
accommodate moral realism. We can say it this way:
(1) EQUIVALENCE is true.
(2) If EQUIVALENCE is true, then moral properties are naturalistically
acceptable.
(3) Therefore, moral properties are naturalistically acceptable.
Plantinga does not challenge (1). In fact, much of his paper is devoted to showing that
(1) is true. What Plantinga doubts is (2). He does not do much to motivate (2) on behalf
of the naturalist except to say that it is an “intuitively plausible way, perhaps the most
plausible way, to make a case for the thought that naturalism can accommodate
morality.” Despite the intuitive plausibility that he attaches to (2), however, Plantinga
believes it to be false. He does not think that EQUIVALENCE carries with it the
implication that moral properties are naturalistically acceptable. His reasoning is as
follows: Consider DCT. According to DCT, an action is obligatory if and only if it is an
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essential property of God to command all rational creatures to perform that action. So,
according to Plantinga, obligation is instantiated if and only if God exists. So if DCT
were true, moral properties would not be naturalistically acceptable. Now, in spite of all
of this EQUIVALENCE would still be true if DCT were true. Note that God is a
necessary being. It is an essential property of His to command rational creatures to
refrain from murder, theft, adultery, and covetousness. It is an essential property of His
to command rational creatures to treat others with love and respect. These properties are
natural. So there is a natural property that is necessarily coinstantiated with obligation.
So if DCT were true, EQUIVALENCE would still be true. Thus, if DCT were true, it
would be the case that both EQUIVALENCE is true and moral properties are not
naturalistically acceptable. But if EQUIVALENCE could be true even if moral
properties are naturalistically unacceptable, (2) is false. The truth of EQUIVALENCE,
therefore, does not imply that moral properties are naturalistically acceptable.
2.6.2 The Sparsist Equivalence Argument
So mere EQUIVALENCE is not a “tight” enough relation between natural
properties and moral properties to do the work that the proponent of NMR needs to be
done. What about identity? The proponent of NMR can say that moral properties are
identical to natural properties. Identity is the tightest relation available. So surely if the
proponent of NMR could show that moral properties are identical to natural properties,
that would be enough to show that moral properties are naturalistically acceptable.
Moreover, the proponent of NMR could argue for this identity claim by adopting
SPARSISM. Combing SPARSISM and EQIUVALENCE, we obtain the result that
moral properties are identical to natural properties. The argument can be stated this way:
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(1) Sparsism is true.
(2) Equivalence is true.
(3) If (1) and (2), then moral properties are identical to natural properties.
(4) If moral properties are identical to natural properties, then moral properties are
naturalistically acceptable.
(5) Therefore, moral properties are naturalistically acceptable.
Plantinga does not think that the Sparsist Equivalence Argument is any more persuasive
than the Abundantist Equivalence Argument. Premise (4), he claims, is false. Again,
consider DCT. By the reasoning given earlier, if DCT were true, EQUIVALENCE
would still be true. So some natural property would be logically equivalent to obligation.
Given SPARSISM, therefore, obligation would be identical to some natural property.
But, if DCT were true, the DCT property would be logically equivalent to obligation as
well. So, again given SPARSISM, obligation would be identical to the DCT property
which would itself be identical to the relevant natural property. But the DCT property is
not naturalistically acceptable. So even though obligation is identical to a natural
property, it is not naturalistically acceptable. Therefore, (4) is false.
2.6.3 Problems for Plantinga’s Objection
I think there are some problems with the way that certain portions of Plantinga’s
objections are formulated. First, Plantinga doesn’t do enough to show that if DCT were
true, then EQUIVALENCE would be true. He says very little about why we should think
EQUIVALENCE is true given DCT. All he says is this:
What makes an action prima facie obligatory, then, would be a property that obviously entails that
there is such a person as God [i.e. the DCT property]; moral obligation, therefore, would
presumably be naturalistically unacceptable in excelsis. Even so, however, it would still be the
case, by the above argument, that there is a descriptive property equivalent to obligation. And that
property might be naturalistic as well as descriptive. For suppose, as theists typically think, God is
a necessary being and it is an essential property of God to command persons to tell the truth, and
to refrain from murder, theft, adultery and covetousness; more generally, suppose it is essential to
God to command persons to treat others with love and respect. These properties and their
complements are naturalistic; hence under these conditions there will be a naturalistic property
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equivalent to moral obligation, despite the fact that what makes an action morally obligatory
obviously entails that there is such a person as God. Hence finding a naturalistic property that is
logically equivalent to obligation doesn’t show for a moment that obligation is itself naturalistic.

It seems to me that Plantinga’s reasoning here is mistaken. Note that God could
have actualized a world, W, inhabited only by immaterial souls. Since there are only
immaterial souls at W, there are no instantiated natural properties. And given what
Plantinga says about God’s essential properties, He will command the inhabitants of W to
love and respect one another and to refrain from murder, theft, adultery, and
covetousness. By DCT, therefore, the inhabitants of W incur obligations. So obligation
is instantiated at W. But there are no instantiated natural properties at W. So obligation
isn’t coinstantiated with any natural properties at W. So obligation isn’t necessarily
coinstantiated with a natural property. So if Plantinga’s version of DCT were true,
EQUIVALENCE would be false. Of course, Plantinga’s formulation of DCT delivers an
EQUIVALENCE like result—that moral properties are necessarily coinstantiated with
non-moral or factual or descriptive properties—in this case theological properties. But
theological properties are not natural. So Plantinga’s DCT does not get him
EQUIVALENCE which is what he needs to respond to the arguments from Equivalence.
It seems to me that focusing so myopically on the details of a particular version of
DCT makes Plantinga’s objection unnecessarily complicated. Just pick some nonnaturalist metaethical theory that is incompatible with naturalism, say some form of
Mooreanism. If Mooreanism is true, then naturalism is false. The naturalist’s austere
ontology does not allow Moorean non-natural moral properties or anything like that. So
a theory that posits such entities entails the falsity of naturalism. But, according to
Mooreanism, EQUIVALENCE is true. So the proponent of NMR can’t really claim to
advance the debate by showing that EQUIVALENCE is true. After all, EQUIVALENCE
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is entailed by Mooreanism. So how could the truth of EQUIVALENCE help show that
moral properties are naturalistically acceptable when EQUIVALENCE is assumed by
parties to the debate that reject naturalism? So I think my complaints above are mere
formulational quibbles about Plantinga’s use of DCT rather than substantive problems for
his overall point.
Second, although Plantinga uses phrases such as ‘If DCT were true, then ____’
he is not clear about whether such phrases are supposed to be understood as
counterfactuals or counter possibles. Furthermore, the text contains evidence that it is
neither. Note that Plantinga believes all counterpossibles are trivially true:
[I]t is an essential property of God not to command hate instead of love. There aren’t any possible
worlds in which God commands hate rather than love. True, at least on the usual semantics for
counterfactuals, if God had commanded hate, hate would have been right and love wrong. But this
is of no more interest than the fact that if there were no prime numbers, all numbers would be
prime.

Given what he says it is therefore doubtful that the relevant phrases are meant to be
counterpossibles. So are they counterfactuals meant to denote metaphysical possibility?
I doubt it. Consider the way that Plantinga sets up his investigation into whether
naturalism can accommodate moral realism. He starts by saying this:
What, exactly, or even approximately, is this ‘accommodating’? We might begin by returning to
the question I raised above: is
(1) If naturalism were true there would be no such thing as moral obligation— that is, no actions
would possess the property of being morally obligatory
true? Here we immediately run into serious problems having to do with the modal status of theism
and naturalism…. This way of thinking about our question—can naturalism accommodate moral
obligation?—runs into a thicket of difficulties, difficulties arising from the noncontingent nature
of theism, and perhaps also the noncontingent nature of propositions involving the existence of
moral obligation. Such difficulties are familiar, certainly; but that doesn’t make them any more
tractable. This isn’t the place to try to figure out how to reason about noncontingent propositions
of this sort; that would require more than a whole paper on its own account. What is clear,
however, is that addressing our question by way of asking after the truth of (1) does not
promise to be fruitful.

These issues are what motivate Plantinga to discuss the question of whether naturalism
can accommodate moral realism in terms of whether the arguments from Equivalence are
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sound rather than in terms of counterfactuals like (1). More than this, the same
difficulties Plantinga cites in his discussion of (1) spring up with respect to ‘If DCT were
true, then ____’ when construed as a counterfactual. Imagine that you are a naturalist
and you hear Plantinga say “If DCT were true, then ____”. You might reasonably
respond as follows: Is this statement a counterfactual or a counterpossible? It can’t be a
counterpossible because those have trivial and uninteresting truth-values and are not to be
used in evaluating theories. But how could it be a counterfactual? As a naturalist, you
will think that God doesn’t exist. And, as Plantinga points out, whether God exists is
non-contingent. If He exists He exists necessarily. If He doesn’t exist, then He doesn’t
exist at any possible world at all. So the antecedent of the phrase ‘If DCT were true, then
___’ is necessarily false. So if you are right about naturalism, then the relevant phrase is
a counterpossible rather than a counterfactual. But if Plantinga and I are right about
God’s existence, then the relevant phrase is a counterfactual. Since a counterfactual is
what Plantinga needs to make the argument work and since the relevant phrase is a
counterfactual only if God exists, then the success of Plantinga’s objection depends on
the existence of God. Why should you, the naturalist, be bothered by that?
I think this is a mere formulational quibble and that Plantinga has an interesting
point. For one thing, I am open to holding that counterpossibles have substantive nontrivial truth-values (although a robust naturalist may not be in which case we run into the
same problems, such a naturalist might not even think that farfetched counterfactuals
should be used in evaluating theories). For another thing, I think that Plantinga can make
his point without employing a counterfactual or a counterpossible. He could just say
something like this: Some people claim that moral properties are naturalistically
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acceptable. They try to show this by showing that EQUIVALENCE is true. But
according to other moral theories quite hostile to naturalism, EQUIVALENCE is true.
So how does just showing that EQUIVALENCE is true show that moral properties are
naturalistically acceptable? The naturalist has much more work to do to establish that. I
think this is a fair point to make and I take this to be the overall drift of Plantinga’s
argument. And perhaps, as Plantinga suggests, naturalists sometimes write as if they are
endorsing one of the arguments from Equivalence. So insofar as they write that way, I
am sympathetic to Plantinga’s point. But it is important to get clear about what Plantinga
thinks his arguments have accomplished and who his targets are. First, consider what
Plantinga suggests he has established:
It looks as if, if abundantism is true, there is no way to argue cogently that obligation is
naturalistically acceptable. On the other hand, if sparsism is true, then not even showing that
obligation is identical with some naturalistic property will suffice to show that obligation is
naturalistically acceptable; for obligation might well be identical with a naturalistic property, but
also identical with a property obviously entailing that there is such a person as God. It therefore
looks as if there is no way at all of cogently arguing that naturalism can accommodate moral
obligation…. By way of conclusion: [my objection] presents a real (I would say insoluble)
problem for one who wants to make a case for the idea that metaphysical naturalism can
accommodate morality.

Plantinga seems to be suggesting in the passage above that Sparsism and
Abundantism exhaust all possibilities for the proponent of NMR. If the naturalist wants
to show that NMR is true, then her last best hope is to employ one of the Arguments from
Equivalence Plantinga has criticized. If, therefore, Plantinga’s criticisms of these
arguments are sound, then the proponent of NMR is left without any way of arguing that
naturalism can accommodate moral realism. More specifically, note that one of
Plantinga’s targets is Cornell Realism. He says this:
“Cornell realists”… have maintained that naturalism can perfectly well accommodate the
existence and exemplification of specifically moral properties, including moral obligation. What I
want to investigate is this question: is it true that naturalism, taken as above, can accommodate
morality?
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Now the first question is whether [the proponent of NMR] takes [a natural property] to be
equivalent to rightness but distinct from it, or whether he takes it to be identical with rightness.
According to Jackson, “Cornell realists” take it that “ethical properties are identical with
descriptive properties”… if he’s right, perhaps [the proponent of NMR] holds that [the relevant
natural property] is identical with rightness…. Suppose, then, that sparsism is true. That means,
of course, that rightness is indeed identical with P. As we’ve seen, however, this, even if true,
doesn’t at all show that rightness is naturalistically acceptable.

In this passage Plantinga attributes SPARSISM to the Cornell Realists. His
reasoning seems to be that the Cornell Realists believe that moral properties are identical
to natural properties. SPARSISM explains that. So the Cornell Realists must accept
SPARSISM.
I think that Plantinga is mistaken about the scope of his criticism and mistaken in
his attribution of SPARSISM to the Cornell Realists. I believe that the version of NMR
that I have been discussing throughout this paper is true to the spirit of Cornell Realism.
So let us attribute to Cornell Realists CTR, IDENTITY, and TRUTH. It is possible, if
one accepts these theories and theses, to hold that moral properties are identical to natural
properties without endorsing SPARSISM. So the proponent of NMR might think that
obligation is identical to some natural property and at the same time avoid commitment to
the claim that all logically equivalent properties are identical properties. As I will show
below, CTR, together with IDENTITY and TRUTH, allow the naturalist maintain just
this claim. And, as we will see, without the attribution of SPARSISM, Plantinga’s
objection to the version of NMR that I have been discussing is unsuccessful.
So suppose the proponent of NMR adopts CTR, IDENTITY, and TRUTH. Then
whether NMR is true will depend on whether CTR delivers the judgment that moral
terms refer to objective natural properties. Whether CTR delivers this judgment, the
proponent of NMR will claim, is an empirical question. Suppose we grant that CTR does
deliver that judgment. Suppose in particular that ‘obligation’ refers to some natural
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property P. By IDENTITY, obligation and P are identical properties. So the proponent
of CTR might think that establishing that ‘obligation’ refers to a natural objective
property P will, combined with IDENTITY, yield the result that moral realism about
obligation is true. Suppose that some similar story can be told for the other moral terms.
They each refer to a natural objective property. Then NMR is true.
So how could Plantinga’s strategy for objecting to the Equivalence Arguments be
extended to the version of NMR presently under discussion? Well, recall that the
dialectic with respect to the Equivalence Arguments went as follows. The naturalist
identifies some relation, in particular EQUIVALENCE, between moral properties and
natural properties. The naturalist then claims that if the relevant relation holds, then
NMR is true. Plantinga replies by arguing that even if DCT were true, the relevant
relation would hold between moral and natural properties. But NMR would be false. So
moral properties would still be naturalistically unacceptable.
Perhaps, then, Plantinga’s response could be extended to the version of NMR I
am discussing in the following way: The naturalist identifies a relation, in this case the
reference relation between moral terms and natural properties rather than an equivalence
relation between moral properties and natural properties. CTR judges that moral terms
refer to natural properties. Combined with TRUTH and IDENTITY it is alleged that the
relevant reference relation establishes the truth of NMR. Now, Plantinga might claim
that if DCT were true, then moral terms still refer to natural properties and that TRUTH
and IDENTITY would still be true. So if DCT were true, moral terms would still refer to
natural properties. So just showing that moral properties refer to natural properties does
not show that they are naturalistically acceptable.
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But clearly this strategy will not work. If DCT were true and CTR, TRUTH, and
IDENTITY were all true, then some story like the following would have to be true: God
issues some commands and instructs Moses to tell people about those commands. Moses
sees someone acting in accordance with one of those commands. He points to the
relevant action and utters some sentence like ‘See what he did! That is obligatory. All of
us should do that too.’ Now, given CTR’s account of reference grounding, something
about Moses and his environment, together with his act of pointing and uttering
determine that ‘obligation’ refers to the DCT property. Of course, the relevant act will be
a sample of many other things besides the DCT property. It will be a sample of
maximizing the world’s hedonic index. It will be a sample of physically moving around
in some precise way. And it will be a sample of numerous other things. One therefore
might wonder why it is that CTR in this case delivers the judgment that ‘obligation’ here
refers to the DCT property rather than any of these other things. But if that is the worry
then it is just the Qua Problem. So if Plantinga’s objection is supposed to be independent
of the Qua Problem and something new for the proponent of NMR to worry about, then
we have to grant that the referent of ‘obligation’ in this case is fixed to accordance with
God’s commands rather than to anything else. But the DCT property is not a natural
property. So if DCT were true, it would not be the case that ‘obligation’ referred to some
natural property. And since, the Qua Problem notwithstanding, moral terms do not in the
present case refer to any natural properties, TRUTH and IDENTITY do not cause the
same trouble for the version of NMR I have been discussing that SPARSISM allegedly
caused for the proponent of the Sparsist Equivalence Argument. Thus, Plantinga’s
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objections to the Equivalence Arguments cannot be extended to the version of NMR that
I have been discussing without making them dependent upon the Qua Problem.
2.7 Conclusion
Robert Adams, Alvin Plantinga and Michael Rea have defended some objections
to NMR. I have argued that each of their objections is either unpersuasive or dependent
upon objections already widely discussed in the literature on NMR.
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CHAPTER 3
MUST EARTH AND TWIN EARTH DIVERGE?
David Brink, Neil Levy, and David Merli have defended Naturalist Moral
Realism (NMR) from Horgan and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth thought experiment.
Although they make their points in different ways, each of their defenses relies on the
same basic idea: On any consistent interpretation of the thought experiment, there is
some important respect in which Earth and Twin Earth will eventually diverge. Once this
respect of divergence is appreciated, it is alleged, the thought experiment no longer
threatens NMR. In this paper I argue that Brink, Levy, and Merli are mistaken. Earth
and Twin Earth need not diverge in the way that these authors suggest. And even if such
divergence were certain to occur, it would not in any way undermine the force of Horgan
and Timmons’ thought experiment.
3.1 Naturalist Moral Realism
To begin with, it will be useful to briefly review some of the terms of art, and
some of the assumptions, found in the literature on Moral Twin Earth:
Causal Regulation: Causal regulation36 is a relation that obtains between a set of
properties and a term. A set of properties causally regulates a term if and only if “there
exist causal mechanisms whose tendency is to bring it about, over time, that what is
predicated of the term… will be approximately true of” the set of properties.
Reference: A moral term refers to a set of properties if and only if that set of
properties uniquely causally regulates that moral term.
Tc and Td: Tc is a consequentialist theory. Td is a deontological theory.
36

Causal regulation is introduced in Boyd (1988).
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Tc and Td Properties: Tc-properties is a set of properties whose essence is
captured by Tc. Td-properties is a set of properties whose essence is captured by Td.
NMR: NMR is naturalist moral realism. NMR holds that ‘right’ on Earth is
uniquely causally regulated by Tc-properties, that Reference is the correct theory of
reference for moral terms, that these claims about causal regulation and reference provide
the resources to establish that there are objective moral properties, and that such
properties are natural and in some sense “scientifically respectable.”
Twin Earth: Twin Earth is a near duplicate of Earth somewhere in our galaxy. It
is only different from Earth in that on Twin Earth ‘right’ is uniquely causally regulated
by Td-properties rather than Tc-properties and any other differences entailed by this one
difference.
3.2 The Moral Twin Earth Argument
With these terms of art in hand, we are now in a position to state Horgan and
Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth thought experiment. Consider the following case: Some of
the inhabitants of Earth meet some of the inhabitants of Twin Earth. Together they
witness an organ harvest. Two people were dying. One needed a new heart. The other
needed a new pair of lungs. A third person, who was completely healthy, was killed so
that his organs could be used to save the lives of the other two. The organ harvest
maximized utility. So Tc dictates that it was right. However, the organ harvest required
killing one to save the lives of two. This is a violation of one of Td’s rules. So Td
dictates that it was not right. The inhabitants of Earth say ‘The organ harvest was right’.
The inhabitants of Twin Earth say ‘The organ harvest was not right’. The inhabitants of
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both planets believe that they are disagreeing with each other. Each side offers the other
reasons for why they should adopt their respective claims. Neither side changes its mind.
This case motivates an argument against NMR. If NMR is true, then the
inhabitants of Earth are not disagreeing with the inhabitants of Twin Earth. They are just
talking past each other. When the inhabitants of Earth use ‘right’ they do not refer to the
same set of properties that the inhabitants of Twin Earth refer to when they use ‘right’.
So they are not disagreeing with each other. But this is a crazy result. The inhabitants of
Earth are, in fact, disagreeing with the inhabitants of Twin Earth. They are not just
talking past each other. So NMR is not true.
3.3 Brink on Diverging Worlds
My goal in this paper is to close off one particular response to this argument. The
response that interests me here has its origins in a paper by David Brink. Brink grants, at
least for the sake of argument, that Horgan and Timmons’ thought experiment refutes its
intended target—extant formulations of NMR. Brink then proceeds to modify NMR by
changing the account of reference. It is his hope that this change will allow NMR to deal
with Horgan and Timmons’ objection. As far as I can tell, Brink’s modification of NMR
has not been widely adopted. However, a different response, briefly suggested by Brink
in a footnote, has made more of an impact. In the footnote, Brink says the following:
If people have the same commitments to morality on Earth and Moral Twin Earth, the differing
standards will cause each planet’s people to assess people, actions, and institutions differently;
over the long run, this should affect the course of individual and social histories on Earth and
Moral Twin Earth. Though the members of both planetary pairs—Earth and Twin Earth and Earth
and Moral Twin Earth—are…otherwise indistinguishable, this caveat includes many more
differences in the second pair than in the first. As it seemed important to Putnam’s original
arguments that differences between Earth and Twin Earth be minimized, the more extensive
differences between Earth and Moral Twin Earth may complicate Timmons and Horgan’s
argument (2001: 165, n21).
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This idea of Brink’s, that on any coherent interpretation of the thought experiment Earth
and Twin Earth will diverge in a way that might serve to undermine the intuition doing
the work in Horgan and Timmons’ objection, has been adopted and developed in detail
by Neil Levy and David Merli37. In what follows, I will consider those developments and
conclude that none of them is successful. Brink’s idea, I will argue, cannot be made to
work. The proponent of NMR must find some other way to respond to Horgan and
Timmons’ thought experiment.
3.4 The Argument from Twin Earth Psychology
Horgan and Timmons stipulate that ‘right’ on Earth is uniquely causally regulated
by Tc-properties while ‘right’ on Twin Earth is uniquely causally regulated by Tdproperties. They claim that this difference between Earth and Twin Earth can be
explained by psychological differences between the inhabitants of Earth and the
inhabitants of Twin Earth. The inhabitants of Earth are prone to sympathy and not to
guilt. The inhabitants of Twin Earth are prone to guilt and not to sympathy. This
difference, it is alleged, explains why ‘right’ is causally regulated by different properties
on different planets. Horgan and Timmons make the point this way:
The differences in causal regulation, we may suppose, are due to species-wide differences in
psychological temperament that distinguish Twin Earthlings from Earthlings. (For instance,
perhaps Twin Earthlings tend to experience the sentiment of guilt more readily and more
intensively, and tend to experience sympathy less readily and less intensively, than do Earthlings)

Perhaps the explanation Horgan and Timmons have in mind is this: If the inhabitants of
Twin Earth suffer a lot of guilt when they violate Td’s rules and only a little compassion,
then they will form the belief that adhering to Td’s rules is right when Td’s rules conflict
with maximizing utility. On the other hand, if the inhabitants of Earth feel a lot of
37

For another interpretation of Brink’s footnote, see Rubin (2008).
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compassion and only a little guilt when they violate one of Td’s rules, then they will form
the belief that adhering to Td’s rules is not right when Td’s rules conflict with
maximizing utility. In the former case, what is predicated of ‘right’ will more often be
true of Td-properties than Tc-properties. In the latter case, what is predicated of ‘right’
will more often be true of Tc-properties than Td-properties. So, other things being equal,
in the former case Td-properties will uniquely causally regulate ‘right’ and in the latter
case Tc-properties will uniquely causally regulate ‘right’.
One of the ways in which Neil Levy has developed Brink’s suggestion is by
arguing that this stipulation about the psychological differences between the inhabitants
of Earth and Twin Earth renders Horgan and Timmons’ thought experiment inconsistent.
Rather than explaining why ‘right’ on Twin Earth is causally regulated by Td-properties,
the stipulated psychological differences between the inhabitants of Earth and Twin Earth
instead imply that ‘right’ on Twin Earth is causally regulated by Tc-properties just as it is
on Earth. Levy (forthcoming, pp. 5-7) makes the point this way:
In assessing Horgan and Timmons’ claim that on [Twin Earth] moral terms are causally regulated
by a set of properties captured by some deontological theory, we need to focus on what makes this
stipulation true; why are moral terms regulated in this way? Horgan and Timmons provide us with
an answer in their thought experiment: moral terms are regulated by a deontological property on
[Twin Earth] because the inhabitants differ from us psychologically. It is because they are more
prone to guilt and less to sympathy that a deontological theory is true at their world. Now, how are
we to interpret this stipulation…? [T]he ways in which the inhabitants of [Twin Earth] differ from
us psychologically is relevant to the circumstances in which we and they act, and not to the moral
theory true at our worlds. On this view, it might be (for instance) that a deontological theory is
true only at a superficial level on [Twin Earth]—it is because adherence to strict rules maximizes
(say) happiness at their world that they are (superficially) deontologists…. [T]he inhabitants of
[Twin Earth] are only superficially deontologists. Perhaps their psychologies cause them to feel
anxiety at the absence or violation of rules governing their lives, on the one hand, and ensure that
they are less motivated by sympathy on the other (perhaps they feel less compassion for the
distress of others who are hurt by their rules or whose distress could be alleviated only at the cost
of violation of their rules). These differences from us explain why an apparently deontological
theory is true [on Twin Earth]: it is because such a theory maximizes the average happiness of its
inhabitants. Because they feel less sympathy, they do not feel dissatisfaction at departures from
what we regard as optimal states of affairs and are less unhappy at such departures; because they
are motivated to abide by rules and feel anxious at their violation, rule following is satisfying for
them. But if it is the case that guiding their behavior by reference to a deontological theory
maximizes their happiness, the deep justification for guiding their behaviour in that manner is, in

73

fact, consequentialist. They are, in fact, fundamentally consequentialists, not deontologists at all; it
is just that the ways in which they fetishize rules causes it to be true that they best achieve their
consequentialist ends by rule-following…. It is therefore not the case that the inhabitants of [Twin
Earth] disagree with us in their conflicting utterances, but nor is it the case that they fail to make
moral claims at all. They fail to disagree with us because, properly understood, they agree with
us.

As I interpret him, Levy’s argument runs as follows: There is only one possibility that is
consistent with Horgan and Timmons’ alleged explanation of why ‘right’ on Twin Earth
is causally regulated by Td-properties rather than Tc-properties. The inhabitants of Twin
Earth feel anxiety at the absence or violation of the rules dictated by Td. Furthermore,
the inhabitants of Twin Earth feel little compassion for the distress of those hurt by such
rules and those whose distress could be alleviated by violating such rules. Given these
features of Twin Earth psychology, adhering to Td’s rules always maximizes utility on
Twin Earth. The inhabitants of Twin Earth are so averse to violating Td’s rules and feel
so little compassion at the suffering of those who would benefit from a violation of Td’s
rules that the utility that might be achieved by violating Td’s rules on Twin Earth is
always outweighed by the disutility of violating Td’s rules. But if adhering to Td’s rules
always maximizes utility on Twin Earth, then ‘right’ on Twin Earth is causally regulated
by Tc-properties rather than Td-properties. But this contradicts Horgan and Timmons’
stipulation that ‘right’ on Twin Earth is causally regulated by Td-properties. So, this
interpretation of the thought experiment is inconsistent. The proponent of NMR need not
worry about it.
3.5 Two Problems for the Argument from Twin Earth Psychology
There are two problems for Levy’s argument. First, Levy claims that if Horgan
and Timmons stipulation about the psychologies of the inhabitants of Twin Earth is true,
then adhering to Td’s rules always maximizes utility on Twin Earth. But even if Levy is
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right about this, it does not follow that ‘right’ on Twin Earth is causally regulated by Tcproperties. Second, Levy never motivates the claim in question. He just asserts it. And
it seems easy to construct counterexamples to it.
3.5.1 ‘Right’ is not Causally Regulated by Tc-Properties Rather than Td-Properties
Concerning the first problem: There is nothing about the possibility Levy
highlights that determines that ‘right’ is causally regulated by Tc-properties rather than
Td-properties or both. Levy just assumes that if Tc and Td prescribe the same actions
over the course of the entire history of Twin Earth, then that is enough to get the result
that ‘right’ is causally regulated by Tc-properties and not Td-properties. But, for all Levy
has said, both Tc-properties and Td-properties causally regulate ‘right’ in the variant of
Twin Earth that Levy describes. Consider again the account of causal regulation
discussed in this literature: A set of properties causally regulates a term if and only if
“there exist causal mechanisms whose tendency is to bring it about, over time, that what
is predicated of the term… will be approximately true of” the set of properties. Given
this account, it is true that on Levy’s variant of Twin Earth Tc-properties causally
regulate ‘right’. But Td-properties also causally regulate ‘right’. The only feature of
Levy’s variant that is relevant to the account of causal regulation is this: Every action on
Twin Earth that is prescribed by Td is also prescribed by Tc. So the inhabitants of Twin
Earth witness an action. If that action adheres to what Td prescribes then they judge that
action to be right. If that action adheres to what Tc prescribes, then they judge that action
to be right. If that action departs from either what Td prescribes or what Tc prescribes,
then they judge that action to be wrong. So given the details of Levy’s variant on Twin
Earth supplied so far, what is predicated of ‘right’ is true of Td-properties to exactly the
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degree to which what is predicated of ‘right’ is true of Tc-properties. So if all we have to
go on are the details Levy supplies, then in every case what is predicated of ‘right’ is just
as true of Td-properties as it is of Tc-properties. It would therefore seem that ‘right’ on
Twin Earth is causally regulated by both Td-properties and Tc-properties. So there is no
set of properties that uniquely causally regulates ‘right’ on Twin Earth. So, given
Reference, ‘right’ on Twin Earth does not refer to anything. And if ‘right’ on Earth refers
to Tc-properties and ‘right’ on Twin Earth doesn’t refer to anything, then we get the
result that Horgan and Timmons want—moral disagreement between the inhabitants of
Earth and the inhabitants of Twin Earth is not genuine.
If this case is going to do the work Levy needs it to do, then, it is going to have to
be true that on any way of filling the out the details, ‘right’ on Twin Earth is causally
regulated by Tc-properties but not Td-properties. The problem is that there are ways of
filling out this case so that this is not true.
One thing missing from Levy’s variant on Twin Earth are the details concerning
the inhabitants of Twin Earth’s counterfactual judgments about cases in which it doesn’t
turn out that actions that adhere to Td’s rules maximize utility. Sure, as it so happens, on
Twin Earth following Td’s rules always maximizes utility. But one could ask the
inhabitants of Twin Earth what they think about cases, remote from their own, in which
following Td’s rules doesn’t maximize utility. One could ask them to consider creatures
psychologically different from them—like the inhabitants of Earth. Should the
inhabitants of Earth adhere to Td’s rules? Or, one could bring to their attention a
scenario, that has somehow never happened on Twin Earth, in which one of the
inhabitants of Twin Earth finds herself in a situation in which, as much disutility as is
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produced by all the guilt and anxiety that would stem from violating one of Td’s rules,
the consequences of adhering to Td’s rules would involve much more disutility38. What
should an inhabitant of Twin Earth do in a situation like that?
From here the range of possibilities Levy has highlighted can be divided into
three cases. In one case, the inhabitants of Twin Earth judge that Td’s rules should be
violated. In another case, the inhabitants of Twin Earth judge that Td’s rules should be
upheld and utility should not be maximized. In a third case, the inhabitants of Twin Earth
just remain agnostic and refrain from making any judgments about the rightness of the
relevant counterfactual actions. For exactly the reasons Levy discusses, the first of these
cases is not a problem for NMR. The second and third cases, however, are a problem for
NMR.
In the second case, the inhabitants of Twin Earth judge that it is right to adhere to
Td’s rules in the relevant counterfactual cases while sticking with Tc and maximizing
utility is wrong. So what is predicated of ‘right’ on Twin Earth is more often true of Tdproperties than Tc-properties. So if ‘right’ on Twin Earth is uniquely causally regulated
by anything it is Td-properties rather than Tc-properties. And we therefore have a variant
of Levy’s case on which Horgan and Timmons’ argument goes through. ‘Right’ on Earth
refers to Tc-properties, ‘right’ on Twin Earth refers to Td-properties, and moral
disagreement between the inhabitants of Earth and Twin Earth is not genuine.
Now consider the third case. Suppose one fills out Levy’s variant on Twin Earth
by stipulating that the inhabitants of Twin Earth would just be agnostic about what is
right in such counterfactual situations. Then we are back to the problem that motivated
dividing cases. On Twin Earth what is predicated of ‘right’ is true of Td-properties to
38

See below for a more detailed discussion of such a situation.
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exactly the degree to which it is true of Tc-properties. So if what is predicated of ‘right’
is approximately true of Tc-properties, then it is approximately true of Td-properties as
well. So both sets of properties causally regulate ‘right’ on Twin Earth. And if what is
predicated of ‘right’ is not approximately true of either set of properties, then nothing
causally regulates ‘right’ on Twin Earth. So, either way, the account of reference taken
for granted in this literature implies that ‘right’ on Twin Earth doesn’t refer to anything.
Again, we get the result that moral disagreement between the inhabitants of Earth and
Twin Earth is not genuine.
3.5.2 Following Td’s Rules Does not Always Maximize Utility on Twin Earth
Concerning the second problem: Levy’s argument relies on the following
premise: If the inhabitants of Twin Earth have the psychologies stipulated by Horgan and
Timmons, then following Td’s rules will always maximize utility on Twin Earth. But
Levy never says anything to motivate this premise. Why think that, since the anxiety and
lack of compassion are enough to cause the inhabitants of Twin Earth to judge that acting
in accordance with Td’s rules is always right, acting in accordance with Td’s rules always
maximizes utility on Twin Earth?
Consider the following case: Hank is hiding Jews in his attic. The Twin Earth
Nazis come to Hank’s door and ask “Are you hiding any Jews?” Hank has two
alternatives. He can say “No” or he can say “Yes.” If Hank says “No” he will be lying
and therefore violating one of Td’s rules. This will cause him to suffer great guilt and
anxiety. If Hank says “Yes” he will not violate any of Td’s rules. Given that Hank is
only a little compassionate, this will cause him only a little sadness. If Hank says “No”
the Twin Earth Nazis will leave and the Jews will be safe. If Hank says “Yes” the Twin
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Earth Nazis will send the Jews to a concentration camp. Saying “No” violates one of
Td’s rules but maximizes utility. Saying “Yes” doesn’t violate any of Td’s rules but fails
to maximize utility. Nothing about Horgan and Timmons’ stipulation precludes things
like this from happening on Twin Earth. Or, at the very least, Levy hasn’t said why he
thinks such things couldn’t happen on Twin Earth.
3.6 The Argument from Twin Earth Moral Institutions and Practices
Levy and Merli have offered another argument based on Brink’s suggestion. The
basic idea is that the moral institutions and practices of Earth and Twin Earth will, at least
in the future, be radically different. These differences are so radical that they undermine
the intuition that apparent disagreement between the inhabitants of Earth and Twin Earth
is genuine. And without this intuition, Horgan and Timmons’ argument against NMR
has no force. Levy (forthcoming, pp. 7-8) states the argument this way:
As David Brink (2001) has pointed out, the histories of these two planets ought to diverge over
time. The psychological differences alone between us and the inhabitants of [Twin Earth] would
be sufficient to force a divergence, which would set the planets off on quite different trajectories;
when we add to that the fact that these psychological differences entail differences in moral
institutions and practices, the divergence becomes quite radical. So were we to encounter [Twin
Earth] later in its (and our history), the differences would be so striking, I think it is fair to claim,
that there would be little temptation to think that our moral terms had the same reference…. I
hold, when we bear in mind the future state of affairs in which Earth and [Twin Earth] will have
diverged, we will lose the temptation to see ourselves as disagreeing with them about which
actions are right.

Merli (2002, pp. 214-216) offers essentially the same argument:
[S]uppose Horgan and Timmons want to force the realist to admit that, by his lights, twin-moral
terms do refer to different properties…. The way to do this is by making twin-moral practice
different from our own moralizing. It’s in virtue of these differences that ‘right’ can refer to
different properties in different places. Fleshing out the example in this way, though, weakens the
univocity intuition. We think that we share the term ‘right’ with Moral Twin Earth because we
imagine that twin-moralists use the term in roughly the same ways. Suppose we learn that this is
false, because there are significant differences between our uses of the term and theirs
(differences, say not just in the extensions of the terms but the kinds of reasons they give and
accept, and so on). Twin moralists apply ‘right’ to acts we’re sure are abhorrent, they offer
completely different kinds of justifications for their claims, they see our reasons as irrelevant, and
so on. It seems to me that then we’d either withdraw our initial judgment that we share terms with
the twin-moralists, or at least offer it with less conviction.
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I take Levy and Merli to be suggesting the following thought: The moral institutions and
practices recommended by Tc and Td are radically different. They are so different, that
if one were to compare them, one would deny that they were about the same thing.
Eventually, the inhabitants of Earth and Twin Earth will figure out which moral theory is
true at their respective worlds39. Then they will implement the recommendations of those
theories. So the moral institutions and practices of Earth and Twin Earth will eventually
diverge. And the intuition that apparent Earth and Twin Earth moral disagreement is
genuine is undermined.
We can add force to Levy and Merli’s point by filling it out with some concrete
examples: First, consider John Harris’ (1975) Survival Lottery. The basic idea behind
the Survival Lottery can be expressed as follows: First, give everyone a number. Second,
if there are two or more people who will die without a new organ, then randomly pick
one of the numbers. Third, if a person’s number is picked, and if that person is healthy,
then kill that person and give his or her organs to the two or more people who need them.
If the person is not healthy, then repeat the third step. A major selling point of Harris’
Survival Lottery is supposed to be that it would maximize utility. A lot of people die
from organ failure under the current system. They and their families suffer. If we adopt
the Survival Lottery, the number of people who die from organ failure will drop by at
least half. That means fewer deaths and fewer grieving families. So giving up the
current practice and adopting the Survival Lottery would maximize utility.
Now, Tc dictates that we maximize utility. So Tc dictates that we adopt the
Survival Lottery. Td, on the other hand, dictates that one should never kill even to save a
39

Why believe this? I don’t know.
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life. So Td dictates that we do not adopt the Survival Lottery. If this line of reasoning
about the Survival Lottery is correct, then we can add some support for Brink, Levy, and
Merli’s suggestion that the moral institutions and practices of Earth and Twin Earth will
radically diverge. On Earth we will eventually adopt the Survival Lottery. On Twin
Earth, they will never adopt the Survival Lottery. That is a radical difference.
Next, consider the practice of voting. One might think that utilitarianism suggests
that ordinary individuals have no obligation to vote. An election will never hinge on just
one vote. So there is no difference in utility between voting and not voting. Tc does not
require that an individual vote. One of Td’s rules, however, requires that individuals vote
regardless of its impact on utility. On Earth, everyone will eventually stop voting
because each will recognize that doing so makes no difference to utility. On Twin Earth,
everyone will continue to vote because they believe they have a duty to do so regardless
of whether failing to vote would also maximize utility. This is another radical difference
between Earth and Twin Earth.
In light of these considerations, one might think there is some basis for Brink,
Levy, and Merli’s suggestion that the moral institutions and practices of Earth and Twin
Earth will radically diverge.
3.7 Two Problems for the Argument from Twin Earth Moral Institutions and
Practices
It seems to me that there are two problems for this argument. First, the claim that
the disagreement intuition is undermined is mistaken. Second, even if the relevant claim
was not mistaken, Earth and Twin Earth need not diverge in the way that Levy and Merli
suggest.
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3.7.1 The Disagreement Intuition is Not Undermined
First, even if one agrees that Earth and Twin Earth must diverge in the way that
Levy and Merli suggest, the intuition that disagreement between Earth and Twin Earth is
genuine remains. When I think about the inhabitants of Earth and Twin Earth in the
distant future and I imagine the inhabitants of Earth saying ‘The Survival Lottery is
right!’ and ‘Failing to vote is not wrong!’ and the inhabitants of Twin Earth saying ‘The
Survival Lottery is not right!’ and ‘Failing to vote is wrong!, my intuitions remain
unchanged. It is only when no concrete details of the differences in practices between
Earth and Twin Earth are provided that I am even slightly tempted to think that the
disagreement might not be genuine. But when you actually specify such radical
differences, the intuition that the relevant disagreement is genuine remains just as strong
as before. Perhaps there are other radical differences in practices that would undermine
the relevant intuition. But Levy and Merli have done nothing to uncover such
differences.
To hammer the point home, suppose that in the distant future, the moral
institutions and practices of Earth and Twin Earth must be as radically different as one
could possibly imagine. Suppose, for instance, that on Earth 90% of all tax revenues go
to feeding the poor while on Twin Earth 90% of all tax revenues go towards killing the
poor and building, maintaining, and increasing a pile of corpses that reaches to the sky.
The inhabitants of Earth would be shocked and horrified by the use of tax revenue on
Twin Earth. The inhabitants of Twin Earth would be shocked and horrified by the use of
tax revenue on Earth. Suppose, in addition, that on Earth it is customary, when having
guests stay the night, to treat them as a member of one’s family while on Twin Earth it is
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customary to kick such guests in the neck 13 times and then to ignore them. Again the
inhabitants of each planet would be shocked at the customs of the other. Now, continue
this by multiplying similar divergences in practice. Finally, suppose that the inhabitants
of Earth and Twin Earth give radically different justification for the actions they perform.
On Earth the justification is that such actions maximize utility. On Twin Earth the
justification is that such actions adhere to the deontological code that Cthulhu Lord of the
Underworld has given to them.
I do not know how the moral institutions of Earth and Twin Earth could be more
different than this. And yet, my intuition that disagreement between the inhabitants of
the two planets is genuine remains. Suppose that the inhabitants of Earth and Twin Earth
meet. The inhabitants of Earth say things like ‘It is wrong for tax revenues to go to the
pile of corpses!’ and ‘It is wrong to kick one’s guests in the neck 13 times!’ while the
inhabitants of Twin Earth respond ‘It is not wrong for tax revenues to go to the pile of
corpses!’ and ‘It is not wrong to kick one’s guests in the neck 13 times!’. It seems
obvious to me that the disagreement is genuine. The inhabitants of the two planets are
not talking past one another. They just have radically different theories about what is
right and wrong.
My point is just this: Radical divergence in moral institutions and practices is not
by itself sufficient to undermine the disagreement intuition. Brink, Levy, and Merli need
to do more than just vaguely gesture towards radical differences between moral
institutions and practices on Earth and Twin Earth without actually specifying in detail
what those differences are. They owe us an explicit statement of the relevant differences
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and an explanation as to why those differences are necessitated by the differences in
which sets of properties regulate which moral terms on the two planets.
3.7.2 Earth and Twin Earth Need Not Diverge
This leads to my second point. It is difficult for me to see how the formulations
of Tc and Td discussed in this literature could possibly yield the degree of divergence in
moral institutions and practices present in the very radical example I just discussed. In
order to get Earth and Twin Earth to diverge so radically, we had to suppose that Td was
a crazy deontological theory that no one actually holds. But if we stipulate that Td is a
Kantian moral theory, like the idea that an action is right if and only if it is performed
without treating anyone as a mere means and if we stipulate that Tc is hedonic act
utilitarianism, and not some crazy theory that says we should maximize suffering, then
we will not get the judgment that the moral institutions and practices of Earth and Twin
Earth must be so divergent. Neither Tc nor Td will require, as a matter of general policy,
devoting 90% of tax revenues to killing the poor and building a pile of corpses that
reaches to the sky. Neither theory will require that everyone kick each of their guests in
the neck 13 times. Neither theory will be justified by its adherents by the fact that it
conforms to a code laid down by Cthulhu.
So here is the lesson from all this: the moral institutions and practices of Earth
and Twin Earth will diverge no more than what Tc and Td recommend. When
constructing the case, we are free to let Tc and Td be whatever consequentialist and
deontological theories respectively that we want. So let us stipulate that they are the most
regular and obvious and non-exotic versions of these theories. Then Tc and Td will
overlap in extension far more than they do in the very radical example just discussed.
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Furthermore, it is not hard to discover exactly how much the two theories fail to overlap
and the exact extent to which they will recommend different moral institutions and
practices. Fortunately, that hard work has already been done for us. We need only to
look at the terrain already explored by normative ethicists. When we do this, we will see
that, at the very most, Tc and Td diverge in what they recommend about things like the
Survival Lottery and voting and similar cases. This is the limit, therefore, on how
divergent Earth and Twin Earth can get. We can, therefore, rule out the idea that on Twin
Earth piles of corpses reach to the sky. So this brings us back to the case of more modest
divergence.
As I said above, my intuition about the more modest case is that the disagreement
is genuine. But leave that to the side. For it seems to me that Earth and Twin Earth need
not diverge as they do in even this more modest example. To see this, it will be helpful
to reflect on some of the literature produced by our most devout utilitarians—authors
such as Peter Singer (1977) and Fred Feldman (1995). Singer rejects the Survival
Lottery. He thinks that adopting it would fail to maximize utility because it would
remove the incentive to take care of one’s body. I do not think Singer is idiosyncratic in
this regard. Utilitarians and Deontologists disagree about what we should do in
uncommon, exotic, desert island type cases when we can save five people by killing one
and no one outside the island will ever find out about it. Maybe they even disagree about
whether in a case where an individual has the chance to perform an organ harvest he or
she should do so. But they can agree that erecting an institution in which the practice of
harvesting the organs of one to save the lives of many is standardized is wrong.
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Consider Fred Feldman. On one of his formulations of utilitarianism, it is not just
pleasure that must be maximized but desert adjusted pleasure. Harvesting the organs of a
few to save the lives of many might, in the case of the Survival Lottery, maximize
hedonic utility. But it would not maximize desert adjusted hedonic utility. And so this
formulation of utilitarianism delivers the judgment that the Survival Lottery should not be
adopted.
So Tc and Td disagree in this case about uncommon and exotic organ harvest
cases and perhaps what an individual should do. (And perhaps Feldman’s version of
utilitarianism does not even disagree with Td about those cases.) However, Tc and Td
agree in this case about what institutions and practices to promote. Neither theory
advises us to adopt the Survival Lottery. So the inhabitants of future Earth and future
Twin Earth can agree about rejecting the Survival Lottery. There need not be a
divergence in moral institutions and practices here.
Similarly, I do not think the following piece of utilitarian reasoning about voting
is idiosyncratic: Broyles, a utilitarian, is the President of Voting on Earth. He is in
charge of all policies and institutions related to voting and is preparing for an upcoming
election. Interestingly, Broyles does not believe that any average citizen is morally
obligated to vote. Broyles reasons as follows: Consider any average citizen. He or she
has two alternatives. One alternative is to vote. The other alternative is to not vote. It is
probabilistically impossible that the outcome of the upcoming election will depend on
just one vote. So either way, whether that individual citizen votes or not, the outcome of
the election will not be affected. So there is no difference in utility between voting and
not voting. So the potential voter is not morally obligated to vote.
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Even though Broyles doesn’t believe that average citizens are morally obligated
to vote, he believes that, as President of Voting, he is morally obligated to promote
institutions and practices that convince average citizens that they are morally obligated to
vote. His reasoning is that if he fails to do so, significantly fewer average citizens will
vote. And if that happens, that could affect the outcome of the election. Being a staunch
believer in the utility democracy, Broyles believes that if more significant numbers of
average citizens vote the more likely the outcome Thus, Broyles hires all the coolest hip
hop artists and pop stars and launches a “Get out the Vote!” campaign.
Here we have another case where the institutions and practices of Earth and Twin
Earth are very similar in spite of the fact that Tc-properties causally regulate ‘right’ on
Earth and Td-properties causally regulate ‘right’ on Twin Earth. Tc and Td both
recommend that authorities adopt policies that encourage individuals to vote. Td
recommends this because each individual has a duty to vote. Tc recommends this
because the promotion of such ideas maximizes utility even though no regular individual
actually is obligated to vote. Tc and Td require different things from individuals when it
comes to voting. But Tc and Td require the same institutions and practices be pursued by
those in power.
3.8 Conclusion
Brink, Levy, and Merli have suggested that the disagreement intuition in Horgan
and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth Argument will be undermined after reflection on the
ways in which Earth and Twin Earth must diverge. I have argued that this is mistaken.
The proponent of NMR must find some other way to respond to Horgan and Timmons’
thought experiment.
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CHAPTER 4
SYNTHETIC REDUCTIONISM AND HUEMERESQUE INTUITIONISM
Synthetic Reductionism holds that moral properties are identical to either natural
kinds or theological properties. Huemeresque Intuitionism holds that moral properties
are causally inefficacious and are fundamentally different from all other sorts of
properties. In his interesting, important, and impressive book Ethical Intuitionism,
Michael Huemer makes two critical points concerning Synthetic Reductionism. First, he
attempts to rebut the common allegation that Synthetic Reductionism enjoys
epistemological advantages that Humeresque Intuitionism lacks. Second, he claims that
reflection on certain examples, together with a principle about reference, yields a
powerful argument against Synthetic Reductionism. In this paper, I argue that Huemer is
mistaken about both points. First, Huemeresque Intuitionism suffers from a serious
epistemological problem—the Accidentalness Objection—that does not threaten
Synthetic Reductionism. Second, the examples Huemer uses to motivate his argument
against Synthetic Reductionism are misanalyzed and the principle about reference on
which his argument rests is too rigid and excludes numerous cases of successful
reference. I conclude by explaining how these considerations cast doubt upon the two
central premises of Ethical Intuitionism’s overall argument.
4.1 Synthetic Reductionism
Huemer identifies his target as Synthetic Reductionism (SR). SR’s proponents
motivate SR on the basis of alleged analogies between natural kinds and natural kind
terms, on the one hand, and moral properties and moral terms, on the other hand.
Consider water, ‘water’, and water. Water is concrete stuff, ‘water’ is a natural kind
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term, and water is the natural kind the property of being water. Water fills lakes, oceans,
cups, and bottles, ‘water’ is what English speakers use to refer to water, and water is the
natural kind40 that all and only concrete samples of water instantiate.
In recent years a certain story about water, ‘water’, and water has become
fashionable. It is said that ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ have distinct meanings, but that ‘water’

refers to H2O and that the reference relation between ‘water’ and H2O somehow entails
that water and H2O are identical properties.
Proponents of SR extend this fashionable story about natural kinds like water to
moral properties like goodness, badness, rightness, and wrongness. They hold that
‘good’ refers to a natural kind or theological property and that goodness is identical to
that natural kind or theological property. Furthermore, proponents of SR hold that
goodness is causally efficacious. In addition, proponents of SR typically hold that the
reference relation is to be analyzed in terms of causal relations between samples of moral
properties and speakers.
As Huemer rightly points out, proponents of SR rarely offer concrete examples of
these alleged identities between moral properties and natural kinds or theological
properties. But there are exceptions and some proponents of SR do offer concrete
theories. Richard Boyd, who holds that goodness is a consequentialist homeostaitic
property cluster41, is a naturalist example of such a proponent. Robert Adams, who holds
that goodness is the property of being similar to God in a certain way42, is a theological
example of such a proponent.
4.2 Huemeresque Intuitionism
40

Here I am attributing to proponents of SR the claim that natural kinds are properties (of a special sort).
What is a consequentialist homeostatic property cluster? See Boyd (1988) and Rubin (200x).
42
What way of being similar to God is that? See Adams (1999) and Hill (forthcoming).
41
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Huemeresque Intuitionism (HI) rejects the surprising property identities put
forward by proponents of SR. Moral properties are not identical to any natural kinds or
theological properties. They are irreducible, fundamentally different from all other sorts
of properties, and causally inefficacious.
4.2.1 Huemeresque Intuitions: What They Are and Their Role in Justification
HI includes an admirably clear and precise account of intuitions and their role in
justification. Intuitions are a certain sort of appearance (Huemer 2005, pp. 99-102;
Huemer 2007, pp. 30-1). When one utters a sentence like ‘It seems to me that p’ or ‘It
appears that p’ or ‘It is obvious that p’ one has reported an alleged appearance.
Appearances have propositional content. They can be perceptual, mnemonic,
introspective, or intellectual. Appearances are distinct from beliefs and dispositions to
form beliefs. However, they sometimes lead to the formation of beliefs and all judgments
that p are based in some way on appearances that p. Appearances sometimes conflict
with one another. Appearances vary in strength.
If an appearance is intellectual rather than perceptual or mnemonic or
introspective, then that appearance is an intuition (Huemer 2005, pp. 100-2). Examples
of intuitions are the intellectual appearance that time is one-dimensional and ordered, the
intellectual appearance that nothing can be both completely red and completely blue at
the same time, the intellectual appearance that 2 + 2 = 4 and the intellectual appearance
that a particular argument form is valid. An ethical intuition is an intuition that is such
that its propositional content is ethical. An example is the intuition that torturing babies
just for fun is wrong.
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Huemer (2005, p. 99; 2007, p. 30) combines the above account of intuitions and
appearances with the Principle of Phenomenal Conservativism (PC):
PC: If it appears to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some
degree of justification for believing that p.
Since ethical intuitions are special sorts of appearances, PC delivers the judgment that
they, in the absence of defeaters, confer some degree of justification for believing their
propositional content. For example, most people have the intuition that torturing babies
just for fun is wrong. So PC judges that, in the absence of defeaters, most people have
some degree of justification for believing that torturing babies just for fun is wrong. HI,
then, holds that ethical intuitions, combined with the absence of genuine defeaters, and
the truth of the propositional content of those intuitions, together with whatever needs to
be added to true belief and justification to produce knowledge, provides one with
knowledge of the sorts of moral properties discussed above. This is a priori knowledge.
It is obtained in the same way that mathematical and logical knowledge is.
4.2.2 Identifying Targets
Ethical Intuitionism is a rich and complex book. It contains numerous
metaethical theses and combines them in interesting ways. It seems to me, however, that
these theses are not entirely interdependent and it is not essential that they be put together
in the exact way that Huemer has done. For this reason it will be prudent to discuss some
of the most important claims made by Huemer and to identify the claims I hope to target
together with the claims for which I have no criticisms.
Intuition: Huemer claims that moral theorizing can proceed successfully only if
moral theorists rely on moral intuitions. I have no criticisms of this claim. I believe it to
be true.
91

Phenomenal Conservativism: Huemer advocates PC. He claims that, in the
absence of defeaters, if it appears to S that P, then S has some degree of justification for
believing that P. While I stop short of giving PC my full and whole hearted endorsement,
I find Huemer’s defense of PC to be compelling and plausible. I have no criticisms to
offer here.
Intuition Implies Epistemic Equivalence: Huemer claims that given that the use of
moral intuitions is required for successful moral theorizing, SR enjoys no epistemological
advantages over HI. I believe he is mistaken. This claim is a target of my criticisms.
Intuition and Reference Imply SR is False: Huemer claims that certain intuitions,
combined with reflection on certain examples and a principle about reference, show that
SR is false. I am not convinced. This claim is a target of my criticisms.
4.3 SR versus HI with respect to Moral Knowedge
Some authors claim that SR is better able to account for moral knowledge than
forms of Intuitionism such as HI. A common motivation for this claim, and the
motivation that Huemer targets, is that intuitions are “spooky” and “mysterious” and
somehow epistemologically suspicious. So a theory that does without appeals to
intuitions is to be preferred over a theory that requires such appeals. While HI holds that
moral claims are justified by way of intuitions, SR holds that moral claims are justified
only on the basis of empirical and scientific inquiry. So HI requires an appeal to
intuitions but SR does not. Thus, SR enjoys a considerable epistemological advantage
over HI.
Huemer attempts to show that this alleged advantage of SR is illusory. In short,
the argument is this: Proponents of SR tell a number of different stories about how moral
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claims are justified solely on the basis of empirical and scientific inquiry. Huemeresque
scrutiny, however, reveals that each of those stories, prominent though they may be,
either relies on some confusion or makes an implicit appeal to intuition. Proponents of
SR are free to help themselves to appeals to intuition. But then they cannot claim that SR
enjoys any epistemological advantage over HI. Both theories appeal to intuition. So they
are epistemologically equivalent. Huemer makes the point this way:
[T]he synthetic reductionists’ account of moral knowledge fails: no theory about the nature of
goodness can be known in any manner analogous to how the above theories of heat, water, and
sound are known. In the end, the synthetic reductionist will have to appeal to ethical intuition, just
as the intuitionists do. This deprives their position of one of its central alleged advantages.

In more detail, Huemer’s argument runs as follows: Proponents of SR can
accommodate moral knowledge only if the following claim is true:
INT: Moral theorists have intuitions concerning which particular things and kinds of
things instantiate moral properties and those intuitions provide moral theorists with
justification for believing the propositional content of those intuitions.
However, if INT is true, then SR is on the same epistemological footing as Intuitionist
theories such as HI. So SR does not enjoy any advantage over Intuitionism. Or, put
another way:
(1) SR accommodates knowledge that goodness is identical to G only if it is
combined with INT.
(2) If SR accommodates knowledge that goodness is identical to G only if it is
combined with INT, then SR enjoys no epistemological advantages over HI.
(3) Therefore, SR enjoys no epistemological advantages over HI.
Concerning premise (1), remember that SR is supposed to be an extension of the sort of
reasoning that motivates the adoption of natural kind property identities like water is
H2O. According to Huemer, an essential component of this reasoning is that, prior to
theorizing about water, people know which samples of stuff instantiate water and which
samples of stuff do not. Huemer makes the point this way:
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The reason why we believe, for example, that water = H2O is, roughly, that [among other things]
we have independent (that is, pre-theoretical), direct awareness of the presence of water….
[Likewise] we were able to discover that heat = molecular kinetic energy, only because we could
first identify which things were hot.

The relevant issue, then, is whether, prior to theorizing about moral properties like
goodness, people know which samples of stuff instantiate goodness and which samples of
stuff do not. In the case of water, pretheoretical knowledge of which things instantiate
water and which do not is obtained by way of observation. To observe a property,
instances of that property must effect one’s senses. But moral properties, Huemer says43,
“do not look like anything, sound like anything, feel (to the touch) like anything, smell
like anything, or taste like anything.” Huemer considers four attempts to account for the
relevant moral knowledge by prominent adherents of SR. He considers the idea that the
relevant moral knowledge is in fact obtainable by way of direct observation, inference to
the best explanation from other things that are observable, the testability of moral claims,
and the unifying power of moral explanation. Huemer argues convincingly that each of
these strategies, prominent as they are, cannot offer a plausible account of the sort of
moral knowledge in question. The accounts offered by proponents of SR concerning how
we know which samples of stuff instantiate goodness and which do not are all
implausible. And without such knowledge, the proponent of SR cannot make a case for
the alleged property identities SR holds to be true. So even if, as SR holds, goodness
were identical to a natural kind or theological property, we could never know it. Huemer
makes the point eloquently:
If we are to take the synthetic reductionist’s analogies seriously, then, we should say that we have
independent, direct awareness of the presence of goodness…. If we have no pre-theoretical
knowledge of which things are good, then we cannot discover that Good = N in any analogous
way. The situation would be like the following scenario: someone tells you that there is an
unobservable property called ‘torfness’. You are given no initial information about the nature of
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torfness or which things in the world, if any, are torf. You are told only that torfness is reducible to
some scientific property. Your assignment: figure out which scientific property torfness is
reducible to. It seems clear that you do not have enough information to carry out the assignment.
Likewise, with no initial information about the nature of goodness or which things have it, we
would have no basis for framing any hypotheses as to what natural property goodness might be
reducible to…. One might be tempted to appeal to common sense beliefs about which things are
good—but that would be to revert to a mistake we have earlier criticized. Since at this point the
reductionist has not yet successfully explained how people can access moral reality, he is not
entitled to assume that our common sense moral beliefs are reliable.

Now, since their own accounts of the relevant moral knowledge do not work, proponents
of SR might claim that such knowledge is obtained by way of intuitions. Prior to
theorizing, people have intuitions that particular objects or states of affairs instantiate
goodness. Combined with some intuitionist theory of justification such as Huemer’s PC,
and in the absence of defeaters, the relevant beliefs are justified. Given that the degree of
justification is strong enough, that they are true, and barring Gettier cases, people know
the propositional content of these intuitions. In other words, the proponent of SR can
account for moral knowledge by adopting INT.
To sum up, the defense of premise (1) is this: If SR is true, then knowledge that a
moral property like goodness is identical to a natural or theological property, G, is
obtained in the same way that knowledge about natural kind property identities, such as
water is identical to H2O, are allegedly obtained. But knowledge that water is H2O is
obtained only if moral theorists know, prior to theorizing, which things instantiate water
and which things do not. Similarly, knowledge that a moral property, like goodness, is
identical to some natural kind or theological property, G, is obtained only if moral
theorists know, prior to theorizing, which things instantiate goodness and which do not.
But, as Huemer convincingly argues, the accounts of such pretheoretical knowledge
offered by proponents of SR are all implausible. And any alternatives they have put
forward that do not rely on such pretheoretical knowledge are all equally implausible.
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The only option left is INT. So SR can accommodate knowledge that goodness is
identical to G only if SR is combined with INT.
The motivation for premise (2) is seemingly straightforward. SR is often alleged
to better accommodate moral knowledge than intuitionist views like HI. But if SR is
combined with INT, then SR’s epistemological fate rests with HI’s. Both rely on INT. If
INT is an unreasonable and “spooky” epistemological thesis, then both HI and SR are in
trouble. If INT is reasonable and can be sufficiently “unspookified” for the ontologically
uptight naturalistic versions of SR, then the proponent of HI should be able to help
herself to INT as well. So if SR can accommodate knowledge that goodness is identical
to G only if it is combined with INT, then SR enjoys no epistemological advantage over
Intuitionist views like HI.
4.4 A Reformulation of Huemer’s Argument
It seems to me that there is a much more interesting way to formulate Huemer’s
argument. Consider premise (1). The defense of this premise starts with the assumption
that SR is not combined with INT and then, given that assumption, derives the following
claim:
(A) SR cannot accommodate knowledge of which things instantiate goodness and which
do not.
(A) is then used to establish the claim below:
(B) SR cannot accommodate knowledge that goodness is identical to G.
and then (B), in light of the assumption made at the start of the defense, is used to
establish premise (1). What I find odd about this is that it seems to me that (A) is much
more threatening to SR than (B).
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To see this, contrast two theories, T1 and T2. Never mind all the precise details of
these theories. Just note that, first, T1 and T2 are both theories of goodness and they are
both forms of SR. So they are both committed to the claim that goodness is identical to
some natural kind or some theological property. Second, note that T1 and T2 have the
following consequences: T1 has the consequence that normal people and moral theorists
alike know which things instantiate goodness and which do not. But no normal person or
moral theorist could know which natural kind or theological property goodness is
identical to. T2, on the other hand, has the consequence that neither normal people nor
moral theorists know which things instantiate goodness and which do not. But they do
know which natural kind or theological property goodness is identical to. If, going only
on the information above, I had to choose between T1 and T2, I would, without hesitation,
pick T2. I think it is a huge defect in a theory of goodness if it has the result that no one
knows which things instantiate goodness and which do not. Leaving to the side nihilism
and skepticism, it is obvious that people know which things instantiate goodness and
which do not. An allegedly non-nihilistic and non-skeptical theory that cannot
accommodate this obvious fact has a serious problem. On the other hand, supposing SR
is true44, I think it is a much lesser defect in a theory of goodness if it has the result that
no one could ever know which natural kind or theological property is identical to
goodness. This is mainly because it seems clear to me that even if SR is true, no one yet
knows (and no one may ever know) which natural kind or theological property goodness
is identical to. Proponents of SR have made very few concrete proposals about which
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Note that if SR isn’t true and, say, HI is, then the fact that one could never know which natural kind or
theological property is identical to goodness isn’t a problem at all. After all, it isn’t identical to any such
property!
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natural kind or theological properties goodness is identical to. It is all just speculative
theorizing.
In sum, my point is this: It is a big defect in a theory if, like T2, it has the
consequence that we don’t know something that we obviously do know like which things
instantiate goodness and which do not. It is a much smaller defect in a theory if it, like
T1, has the consequence that we couldn’t know something that we don’t know and may
never know like which natural kind or theological property goodness is identical to. T2
accommodates actual knowledge of commonsense moral claims but not possible
knowledge of speculative philosophical claims. T1 accommodates possible knowledge of
speculative philosophical claims but not actual knowledge of commonsense moral
claims. Just going on this information, T2 is the better theory.
In light of all of this, it seems to me that a more interesting formulation of Huemer’s
argument would be this:
(1) SR accommodates knowledge about which things instantiate goodness and which
do not only if it is combined with INT.
(2) If SR accommodates knowledge about which things instantiate goodness and
which do not only if it is combined with INT, then SR enjoys no epistemological
advantages over HI.
(3) Therefore, SR enjoys no epistemological advantages over HI.
For this reason, in my reply to Huemer, I will target this formulation of the argument
rather than the one explicitly presented in the text. However, even if you disagree with
me and are more worried about the original argument, what I say about the reformulated
argument will, pretty straightforwardly I think, apply to the original formulation as well.
4.5 Problems for Huemer’s Argument
As I see it, Huemer’s argument suffers from one main problem. Premise (2) is
false. Huemer argues convincingly that SR can accommodate the relevant moral
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knowledge only if it is combined with INT. But it does not follow that SR is not
epistemologically superior to HI. Some SR and INT combinations avoid a defeater that
HI does not avoid. Such forms of SR enjoy an epistemological advantage over HI.
4.5.1 Premise (2) of Huemer’s Argument is False
In this section I will show that premise (2) of Huemer’s argument is false.
Suppose that one grants Huemer the antecedent of (2). So SR accommodates knowledge
about which things instantiate goodness and which do not only if it is combined with
INT. The consequent of (2) does not follow. To see this, suppose we combine SR with
INT. In fact let us not only combine SR with INT. Let us combine SR with Huemer’s
PC. What I will show below is that Huemer’s form of intuitionism suffers from a
defeater that certain forms of SR combined with INT and PC do not. So these
formulations of SR enjoy an epistemological advantage that HI lacks. Thus, premise (2)
of Huemer’s argument is false.
4.5.2 The Accidentalness Objection
As we have seen, one motivation for the claim that SR enjoys epistemological
advantages over HI is that SR need not appeal to “spooky” intuitions. I agree with
Huemer that this motivation is inadequate. For one thing, I am a big fan of spookiness.
Contrary to popular misconceptions, a theory’s being spooky in some respects is no strike
against it. For another thing, I find Huemer’s critique of SR’s alternatives to INT to be
decisive. I just don’t understand how we can know when we have hit our theoretical
targets unless we assume, with INT, that our intuitions about which things instantiate
moral properties and which things do not are reliable. Huemer’s torfness example
illustrates the point nicely. Even so, there are other ways of motivating the claim that SR

99

enjoys an epistemological advantage over HI. Perhaps the most powerful motivation is
what I will call the “Accidentalness Objection.” Huemer (2005) articulates the
Accidentalness Objection this way:
There is a… general condition on knowledge that everyone in epistemology accepts: I know p
only if it is not a mere accident (not a matter of chance) that I am right about whether p. The
challenge for the moral realist, then, is to explain how it would be anything more than chance if
my moral beliefs were true, given that I do not interact with moral properties.

We can state Huemer’s concern as follows: If HI is true, then moral properties are
causally inefficacious. If moral properties are causally inefficacious, then any true belief
about the truth-value of a moral proposition anyone has is accidentally true. However, if
a subject’s belief that p is accidentally true, then that subject does not know that p. So if
HI is true, then no one knows the truth-value of any moral proposition. But some people
do know the truth-values of some moral propositions. So HI is false.
Accidentally Adequately Grasping
It is sometimes claimed that Moral Non-Naturalism (MNN) cannot accommodate
moral knowledge. Even if our moral beliefs were true, it is alleged, they would be true in
merely accidental way. The heart of Michael Huemer’s interesting, important, and
impressive book Ethical Intuitionism defends MNN from this allegation. Huemer
sketches a theory of a priori knowledge and claims that if a subject forms beliefs about
moral properties in accordance with his sketch, then that subject’s beliefs about that
property are not problematically accidentally true. In this paper, I describe a simple case
in which a subject forms beliefs about goodness in accordance with Huemer’s sketch but
that subject’s beliefs about goodness are true in a merely accidental way. I then try to fill
out Huemer’s sketch in a way that might enable him to accommodate this case. I argue
that the filled out sketch is also unsuccessful. It faces familiar problems Huemer himself
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raises against other metaethcial theories and eventually leads back to the problem of
accidentalness. I conclude that the theory of a priori knowledge sketched by Huemer is
of no help to the proponent of MNN.
4.5.3 Adequately Grasping
Huemer’s sketch includes an account of adequate grasping45.
A subject adequately grasps a universal if and only if that subject’s grasp of that universal
is consistent, clear, and determinate.
For a subject’s grasp of a universal to be consistent is for that universal to be possibly
instantiated. For a subject’s grasp of a universal to be clear is for that subject to be able
to successfully distinguish between that universal and other similar universals. For a
subject’s grasp of a universal to be determinate is for there to be few or no borderline
cases in which the subject is unable to successfully determine whether or not that
universal is instantiated.
So what work is the account of adequate grasping supposed to do? Huemer’s (pp.
123-7) answer is that:
There is a… condition on knowledge that everyone in epistemology accepts: I know p only if it is
not a mere accident (not a matter of chance) that I am right about whether p. The challenge for the
[proponent of MNN], then, is to explain how it would be anything more than chance if my moral
beliefs were true…. [A]dequately grasping a universal cannot cause false intuitions about it….
[W]hen one’s intuitions are caused (only) by clear, consistent, and determinate understanding—
45

Humer states (p. 125) this account in the following passage:
In having concepts, we grasp (understand) universals. To have the concept of yellow is to understand (at
least partly) what yellow is. Grasping comes in degrees: one may grasp something better or worse. An
adequate grasp of a universal is a concept that is:
i) Consistent. For instance, the concept of a round square is inconsistent; accordingly, it does not count as
an adequate grasp of a universal. Subtler inconsistencies exist, such as that perhaps involved in the concept
of the largest prime number.
ii) Clear, as opposed to confused. For instance, someone who has read a little about chaos theory may think
that ‘chaos’ is like ‘randomness’. He may, that is, fail to distinguish these two concepts. In that case, his
concept of chaos is confused and is not an adequate grasp of the nature of chaos.
iii) Determinate, as opposed to vague or unsettled. Imagine someone arguing about abortion. You tell him
about the RU-486 pill and ask whether it counts as abortion. He doesn’t know. In this case, his concept of
abortion is indeterminate; the criteria for applying the concept are unsettled in his mind.
The above characteristics come in degrees; we say a person’s understanding is adequate if his concept has
these traits to a high degree.
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the internal process by which one forms beliefs guarantees their truth…. The above…
addresse[s]… the problem of why, even if true and justified, our moral beliefs would not be
merely accidentally true.

So the idea is that adequately grasping a universal ensures that one’s beliefs about that
universal are true. And if adequate grasping ensures truth in this way, then moral beliefs
resulting from an adequate grasp of goodness or badness or rightness or wrongness are
not accidentally true.
4.5.4 Accidentally Adequately Grasping
Huemer’s account of adequate grasping does not do the work it is supposed to do.
While adequate grasping ensures truth, it does not ensure non-accidentalness. To see
why, consider the following example: ROBOTRON 5000 has always had strong moral
convictions. From the time he left the factory where he was built, for instance, he has
had strong opinions about goodness. He enjoys making lists of properties and
distinguishing them from goodness. He has a very precise view about when goodness is
instantiated and when it is not. For any case whatsoever, he will tell you with complete
confidence that goodness is definitely instantiated or that it is definitely not instantiated
in that case. There are never any puzzling or borderline cases for him. He is always
confident that goodness is instantiated or fails to be instantiated. For many years now, he
has wondered how he got these strong moral convictions.
One evening ROBOTRON 5000 and his designer walk into a bar. Given his
strong convictions and given his interest in the origins of his convictions, ROBOTRON
5000 decides to take this opportunity to ask his designer how he got them. The designer
tells him that around the same time he built ROBTRON 5000, he was tinkering with a
state of the art random truth-value assigner (RTA). He input all propositions asserting
that goodness is distinct from or identical to various properties, propositions such as
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‘Goodness is identical to electronic-musician-ness’, into the RTA. He input all
propositions asserting that goodness is (or is not) instantiated in various cases,
propositions such as ‘Goodness is not instantiated by the Holocaust’, into the RTA. Then
the RTA went to work and randomly assigned truth-values to each of those propositions.
The designer then programmed that assignment of truth-values into ROBOTRON 5000’s
belief system. That is where ROBOTRON 5000 got his strong moral convictions.
Now, as a matter of sheer luck, the RTA’s assignment of truth-values happened to
match the actual truth-values of all the relevant propositions about whether goodness is
identical to some property or other and whether goodness is instantiated in some case or
other. A consequence of this is that ROBOTRON 5000’s grasp of goodness is clear. He
can distinguish goodness from other properties. If you ask him “Is goodness identical to
electronic-musician-ness?” he will correctly answer “No.” For any property you give
him, he will give you the right answer about whether that property is identical to
goodness. Another consequence is that ROBOTRON 5000’s grasp of goodness is
determinate. There are no borderline cases whatsoever in which ROBOTRON 5000
cannot tell whether goodness is instantiated or not. For any case you give him, he has got
a strong opinion about whether goodness is instantiated. And he always gets it right.
Finally, ROBOTRON 5000 has a consistent grasp of goodness. Goodness isn’t like
round-square-ness. It is possibly instantiated. And none of ROBOTRON 5000’s beliefs
about goodness are inconsistent. Thus, ROBOTRON 5000 has an adequate grasp of
goodness. And his adequate grasp guarantees that his beliefs about goodness and all
other moral properties are true.
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Poor ROBOTRON 5000. Before he walked into the bar that night he might have
been justified in maintaining his strong moral convictions. Now, however, he knows that
his moral beliefs are at best only accidentally true. He has a defeater for those beliefs.
He adequately grasps goodness and all other moral properties. That adequate grasp
certainly guarantees the truth of his moral beliefs. But it is still an accident.
ROBOTRON 5000’s moral beliefs are now unjustified. And they never counted as
knowledge.
Given MNN, ROBOTRON 5000’s story does not seem very different from our
own. On MNN, the evolutionary processes that formed our moral convictions are just as
disconnected from goodness as ROBOTRON 5000’s RTA is. Reflection on this makes
vivid the worry that if MNN is true, then our moral beliefs are now unjustified. And even
if they were once justified, and even if we got lucky and they are true, we never knew
that they were true. Huemer’s discussion of adequate grasping does not lessen the force
of this worry.
4.5.5 The Response from Plenitude
One might think I have ignored an important feature of Huemer’s theory. Huemer
(p. 126) maintains that universals are plentiful and that they are necessary:
I propose that having a clear, consistent, and determinate concept is sufficient for one’s grasping a
universal or universals. There is no possibility of one’s failing to refer to anything (universals are
plentiful in this sense, and their existence is necessary).

Once one fully appreciates this feature of Huemer’s theory, one might think, the intuition
that ROBOTRON 5000’s moral beliefs are formed in a problematically accidental way
will be undermined. This response is suggestive. It has a ring of truth to it. But it stands
in need of development. In what follows, I will try to offer such development on
Huemer’s behalf.
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Adequate Grasps and Adequate Concepts: As we have seen, Huemer applies the
terms ‘clear’, ‘consistent’, and ‘determinate’ to a subject’s grasp of a universal. In the
passage just quoted, however, Huemer applies these terms to a subject’s concept. Now,
one might think that these are just two ways of talking about the same thing. But two
features of the passage in question strongly suggest otherwise. First, Huemer says that
having an adequate concept is sufficient for grasping a universal. This would be trivial if
having an adequate concept and having an adequate grasp were identical. Second, given
the definition of adequate grasping, there will be a universal that corresponds to a
subject’s grasp regardless of how plentiful universals are. But, in the relevant passage,
considerations of plenitude are supposed to explain why having an adequate concept
guarantees that that concept corresponds to a universal. Again, this would be a trivial
point if having an adequate concept and having an adequate grasp were identical. So,
assuming that Huemer is not here concerned to make trivial points, having an adequate
concept and having an adequate grasp must be distinct.
Huemer gives a precise account of adequately grasping. But he says nothing
about what it is to have an adequate concept. Perhaps what Huemer has in mind is this:
Having an adequate concept is just like having an adequate grasp with the exception that
successful correspondence is built into the definition of having an adequate grasp but is
not built into the definition of having an adequate concept. Here is what I mean:
A subject has an adequate concept of a candidate universal if and only if that subject’s
concept is consistent, clear, and determinate.
For a subject’s concept to be consistent is for all of that subject’s beliefs about that
candidate universal to be consistent. For a subject’s concept to be clear is for that subject
to judge that that candidate universal is distinct from other similar candidate universals.
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For a subject’s concept to be determinate is for there to be few or no cases in which that
subject is unable to form a judgment about whether that candidate universal is
instantiated46.
Now, notice the differences between having an adequate grasp and having an
adequate concept. We switched from talk of universals to talk of candidate universals.
We switched from talk of a universal being possibly instantiated to talk of a subject’s
beliefs about a candidate universal being consistent. We switched from talk of
successfully distinguishing between universals and of successfully judging that a
universal is instantiated to talk of forming beliefs about whether a candidate universal is
distinct from other candidate universals and forming beliefs about whether a candidate
universal is instantiated. In the case of adequate grasping, successful correspondence is
built into its definition. In the case of having an adequate concept successful
correspondence is not.
This accommodates the interpretive constraints identified in the relevant passage.
First, it accommodates the constraint that having an adequate grasp and having an
adequate concept are distinct. Second, it accommodates the constraint that it is not trivial
considerations, but rather considerations of plenitude, that guarantee that having a
universal will always correspond to an adequate concept.
46

Huemer (p. 126) says that an adequate concept (grasp) can be accompanied by other things that mitigate
the epistemic benefits of adequacy:
Notice that the claim is not that all intuitions are true. Nor is the claim that all intuitions of a person who
adequately grasps the relevant concepts are true. As we shall see… there are many ways we can go wrong.
The claim is that adequately grasping a concept cannot itself cause a mistake. In other words, if a person
has a false intuition, this false intuition must be caused by something else—by misunderstanding, bias,
confusion, or the like. It is consistent with this that there be many false intuitions.
Let us say that a subject’s concept (grasp) is purely adequate when that subject has an adequate concept
(grasp) and none of that subject’s clarity or determinacy judgments are caused by “misunderstanding, bias,
confusion, and the like.” Let us further say that purity comes in degrees. The less misunderstanding, bias,
confusion, and the like, the purer the adequate grasp. I stipulate that all the robots discussed in this paper
have purely adequate concepts and grasps.
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Clarity and Determinacy Judgments: Huemer analyzes adequacy in terms of
sentences of the form ‘U is (or is not) distinct from U*’ where U and U* are (candidate)
universals. He also analyzes adequacy in terms of sentences of the form ‘U is (or is not)
instantiated in C’ where U is a (candidate) universal and C is a case. In what follows, it
will be useful to introduce names for such sentences. Call a sentence with the first form a
‘clarity judgment’ and a sentence with the second form a ‘determinacy judgment’.
Being True Of: Huemer talks about universals corresponding to concepts. On
Huemer’s behalf, I suggest analyzing correspondence in terms of a being true of relation
between concepts of candidate universals and universals. Consider a clarity or
determinacy judgment that a subject associates with a concept of a candidate universal U.
Remove the name of U from that judgment and replace it with the name of a universal
U*. If the proposition expressed by the modified sentence is true, then say that the
judgment that subject associates with her concept of U is true of U*.
For example, consider ROBOTRON 5000’s clarity judgment that ‘Goodness is
distinct from pleasurable-ness’. Now, consider a universal, say watery-ness. The clarity
judgment ROBOTRON 5000 associates with his concept of goodness is true of wateryness. For ROBOTRON 5000 judges that goodness is distinct from pleasurable-ness.
And it is true of watery-ness that it is distinct from pleasurable-ness. So the relevant
clarity judgment ROBOTRON 5000 associates with his concept of goodness is true of
watery-ness.
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Correspondence and Plenitude: Now we are in a position to propose accounts of
correspondence and plenitude on Huemer’s behalf47:
CORRESPONDENCE: A universal corresponds to a subject’s concept =def all clarity
and determinacy judgments that subject associates with that concept are true of that
universal.
PLENITUDE: For any adequate concept, there is a universal that corresponds to that
concept.
The Response from Plenitude: With the doctrine of PLENITUTDE now in
hand48, we are in a position to offer a developed version of the response to my objection.
Consider again ROBOTRON 5000. My objection, one might argue, only has intuitive
force if we assume that ROBOTRON 5000 could have had an adequate concept of a
candidate universal without there being any universal matching that concept. In such a
case it would be an accident that his concept ends up matching a universal. That would
be problematic. But, given PLENITUDE, one cannot have an adequate concept of a
candidate universal without the existence of a universal that corresponds to that concept.
So, as long as the RTA provides ROBOTRON 5000 with an adequate concept, then
whatever that concept turns out to be, there will be some universal or other that matches
his concept. Thus, once PLENITUDE is taken into account, the intuition that
ROBOTRON 5000’s beliefs about goodness were formed in a problematically accidental

47

In the passage in question, Huemer also seems to be suggesting a principle about reference. He says
“There is no possibility of one’s failing to refer to anything. Universals are plentiful in this sense.” I take
him to be suggesting this:
REFERENCE: For any term that a subject associates with a concept, if that subject’s concept corresponds
to a universal, then that subject’s use of that term refers to that universal.
48
I take PLENITUDE to be suggested by the following passage: “So the intrinsic characteristics of a
concept sometimes are sufficient for its constituting an adequate understanding of the nature of a universal.
Furthermore, adequately grasping a universal cannot cause false intuitions about it. Therefore, in some
cases—namely, when one’s intuitions are caused (only) by clear, consistent, and determinate
understanding—the internal process by which one forms beliefs guarantees their truth. Some will say that
‘guarantees’ is too strong; all I need say is ‘renders highly probable’. But I think the ‘guarantee’ claim is
correct.”
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way disappears. It is an accident that he has the concept of goodness. But given that he
has it, and given PLENITUDE, it is no accident that there is a universal corresponding to
it. Thus, the sort of accidentalness present in this case is not problematic.
To illustrate, consider another robot—UNTERTRON. She received an adequate
concept of the candidate universal being-dry-land-below-sea-level-ness through the
deliverances of an RTA. She associates the term ‘unterland-ness’ with this candidate
universal. In fact, there is such a universal. And so she adequately grasps unterlandness. Like ROBOTRON 5000 does with goodness, UNTERTRON goes around
successfully identifying portions of land that instantiate unterland-ness and other things
that do not instantiate unterland-ness. In addition, she makes lists of similar universals
and successfully distinguishes them from unterland-ness. Now, given the way the RTA
works, it is accidental that UNTERTRON adequately grasps unterland-ness. She could
have easily ended up with an adequate concept of some other candidate universal such as
being-dry-land-at-least-one-foot-below-sea-level-ness. If she had, she would have
associated the term ‘unterland-ness’ with that different candidate universal and her
classifying activities would have differed accordingly. So it is an accident which
candidate universal UNTERTRON has an adequate concept of or that she has such a
concept at all. But given that she does end up with such a concept, and given
PLENITUDE, her adequate concept is guaranteed to be an adequate grasp and there is
going to be some universal or other that matches whatever concept the RTA gave her.
So, although her unterland beliefs were formed by accident, they were not formed in a
problematically accidental way. Thus, UNTERTRON’s unterland knowledge is not
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undermined. In the same way, ROBOTRON 5000’s moral knowledge is not
undermined49.
4.5.6 Disagreement, Error, and the Return of Accidentalness
The problem with this response is that it renders Huemer’s theory vulnerable to
objections he repeatedly (pp. 50, 52-3, 56, 63-4) wields against other metaethical
theories. For example, Huemer’s theory is unable to accommodate moral disagreement.
Consider two robots—UTILOTRON and KANTOTRON. Both robots received, by way
of an RTA, adequate concepts with which they associate the term ‘wrongness’. But they
received distinct concepts. UTILOTRON received a utilitarian concept of wrongness.
All of his clarity and determinacy judgments match the deliverances of utilitarianism.
KANTOTRON, on the other hand, received a Kantian concept of wrongness. All of his
clarity and determinacy judgments match the deliverances of Kantianism. Furthermore,
the utilitarian and Kantian concepts of wrongness are both consistent.
Now, suppose that UTILOTRON and KANTOTRON witness an organ harvest.
The organ harvest maximized utility by killing one to save the lives of two. So
utilitarianism judges that it was not wrong. However, the organ harvest required killing
an innocent and unwilling donor. This involves treating a person merely as a means. So
Kantianism judges the action to be wrong. In response, KANTOTRON says ‘The organ
harvest is wrong’ and UTILOTRON says ‘It is not the case that the organ harvest is
wrong’. The two robots believe that they are disagreeing with each other. Each robot
tries to persuade the other. Neither robot changes his mind.

49

I am assuming here, on Huemer’s behalf, that introspection enables a subject to reliably judge whether
his or her concepts are adequate. Huemer seems to endorse this assumption. “[I]ntrospection” he says
“reveals that we sometimes understand concepts” (pp. 125-6).
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Now, given PLENITUDE, there is a universal that corresponds to each of
UTILOTRON and KANTOTRON’s concepts. There is a universal that matches the
utilitarian concept of wrongness and a universal that matches the Kantian concept of
wrongness. Both universals exist. UTILOTRON uses ‘wrongness’ to refer to the former
and KANTOTRON uses ‘wrongness’ to refer to the latter. Thus, UTILOTRON and
KANTOTRON are not really disagreeing. When UTILOTRON says ‘It is not the case
that the organ harvest is wrong’ what he says is true. When KANTOTRON says ‘The
organ harvest is wrong’ what he says is true. They are not contradicting each other.
They are just talking past each other. Their apparent disagreement is not genuine. But
this is absurd. UTILOTRON and KANTOTRON are obviously disagreeing. They are
both talking about wrongness. They just have different theories about what wrongness is.
Thus, Huemer’s theory, on the present interpretation, is false. It cannot accommodate
moral disagreement.
Consider another robot—NIETZSHOTRON. He received an adequate concept
from an RTA that he associates with the term ‘goodness’. That concept is the
Nietzschean “Will to Power” concept of goodness. Accordingly, he accepts the
determinacy judgment that ‘Domination and control of others instantiates goodness.’
Given PLENITUDE, there is a universal that matches NIETZSHOTRON’s concept.
Thus, his determinacy judgment about the goodness of dominating and controlling others
is true. But this is absurd. NIETZSHOTRON’s judgment is false. NIETZSHOTRON’s
concept of goodness is a mere distortion and perversion of the goodness we all know and
love. He has a mistaken theory of goodness. Thus, Huemer’s theory, on the present
interpretation, is false. It cannot accommodate moral error. Again, these are familiar
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objections that Huemer repeatedly employs against other metaethical theories in Ethical
Intuitionism.
Let me take stock. I think these considerations about disagreement and error
point back to the problem of accidentalness. Moral properties are special. They “carve at
the joints” in a way that non-moral properties with partially overlapping extensions do
not. If there are universals corresponding to both Kantian and utilitarian concepts of
wrongness, at most only one of them carves at the joints. If there is a universal
corresponding to the Nietzschean concept of goodness, it does not carve at the joints in
the way that goodness does. In the case of UNTERTRON, neither unterland-ness nor any
universal with a similar extension she might have carves at the joints. So there is no
worry that she accidentally got the one concept in the neighborhood that matches a
universal that carves at the joints but could have easily gotten one that does not.
ROBOTRON 5000 is in a very different position, he just happened to grasp goodness.
Goodness carves at the joints. Other universals with partially overlapping extensions do
not. If we adopt PLENITUDE, then the worry is not that it is accidental that there is a
universal that matches ROBOTRON 5000’s concept at all. The worry is instead that it is
only an accident that his concept matches the one universal in the neighborhood that
carves at the joints. That is problematic. I want to know why we are, at best, not like
ROBOTROBN 5000. If PLENITUDE is true, I want to know how it could be anything
other than an accident that our concept of goodness corresponds to a universal that carves
at the joints. The doctrine of PLENITUDE does not help me answer this question. We
are back to the problem of accidentalness.
4.6 The Accidentalness Objection is no Problem for SR
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Huemer claims to have shown that SR does not enjoy any epistemological
advantages over HI. We are now in a position to see that he is mistaken. First, consider
Robert Adams’ version of the Divine Command Theory. Huemer classifies Adams’
version of the Divine Command Theory differently than I do. He classifies it as a form of
subjectivism. I classify it as a form of SR. There is truth in both classifications. But
how one decides to classify Adams’ theory is irrelevant to the present discussion in light
of the following two points: First, Huemer explicitly targets Adams’ version of the
Divine Command Theory in Ethical Intuitionism and, second, Huemer claims that the
Divine Command Theory does not enjoy any epistemological advantage over HI for the
same reason he claims SR generally enjoys no such advantage. He says, for example,
this:
The Divine Command theorist would have to posit some sort of access to moral facts independent
of our knowledge of God’s will, which would seem to surrender one of the major advantages of a
Divine Command theory—namely, its ability to explain moral knowledge. For example, the
Divine Command theorist might be driven to posit a faculty of moral intuition—but then it is
unclear how his theory would be better than traditional ethical intuitionism.

In light of the discussion of ROBOTRON 5000 above, it is clear that Huemer is mistaken
about this. HI suffers from a serious defeater—the Accidentalness Objection. Adams’
version of the Divine Command Theory does not suffer from that defeater. So, contrary
to what Huemer says, there is a form of SR, in particular Adams’ version of the Divine
Command Theory, that enjoys an epistemological advantage over HI. To see this, reason
as follows: According to Adams’ version of the Divine Command Theory, wrongness
and being contrary to God’s commands are identical properties. God’s commands are
not causally inefficacious. For this reason it is easy to see how the Divine Command
Theory can avoid the accidentalness objection: Suppose that God issues some
commands. Suppose that he created human psychology so that when humans make
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judgments about rightness and wrongness, the pattern of those judgments matches the
pattern of God’s commands. God commands humans not to murder. He structures
human psychology so that humans have the intuition that murder is wrong. So one form
of SR, in this case Adams’ Divine Command Theory, enjoys an epistemological
advantage over HI. HI suffers from the accidentalness objection. This form of SR does
not.
Of course, Huemer also claims that naturalist versions of SR do not enjoy an
epistemological advantage over HI. He says this:
[T]he synthetic reductionist will have to appeal to ethical intuition, just as the intuitionists do. This
deprives their position of one of its central alleged advantages…. The only plausible way to
maintain that we have direct awareness of moral facts would be to appeal to either ‘ethical
intuition’ or a ‘moral sense’—which is precisely the sort of ‘mysterious’, ‘spooky’ thing the
reductionist wants to avoid.

Note that Richard Boyd’s homeostatic consequentialism is a form of SR. And like
Adams’ version of the Divine Command Theory, it does not suffer from the defeater that
threatens HI. Again the main point is similar to the one about Adams’ theory discussed
above. Goodness for Boyd is causally efficacious. So this form of SR does not suffer
from the accidentalness objection.
4.7 Huemer’s Argument Against SR
Huemer is not content to simply argue that SR and HI are epistemologically on a
par. He also offers an argument against SR:
(1) Moral properties are radically different from the sorts of properties that
proponents of SR identify with them.
(2) If two things are radically different, then they are not identical.
(3) So moral properties are not identical to the sorts of properties that proponents of
SR identify with them.
The argument is valid. Premise (2) is clearly true. So the soundness of the argument
hinges on whether premise (1) is true. Huemer’s defense of premise (1) includes two
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parts. First, he claims that we intuit that moral properties are radically different from
natural kind and theological properties. Second, he appeals to a principle about
reference:
[I]n my view, our having, at least roughly and for the most part, correct intuitions or beliefs about
the nature of x is a precondition on our referring to x. I can talk about Plotinus without knowing
much about him; about all I know is that he was a philosopher who lived a long time ago. But I
could not talk about Plotinus if I had completely inaccurate beliefs (allegedly) about him; for
example, if I thought ‘Plotinus’ referred to a cake, then I would not be talking about Plotinus (the
person) at all. Similarly, if ‘good’ seems to us to refer to something of a fundamentally different
category from natural properties, then when we say ‘good’ we are not talking about a natural
property.

In the passage above, Huemer endorses a principle about reference. Call this principle
‘Huemer’s Constraint on Reference’ (HCR). As I see it, the principle Huemer means to
endorse is this:
HCR: A speaker’s use of ‘x’ refers to x only if that speaker, roughly and for the most
part, has correct intuitions or beliefs about the nature of x.
Admittedly, I am doing some speculative reconstruction of Huemer’s defense of (1). But
I take it that his reasoning is this: We intuit that moral properties are radically distinct
from natural kind and theological properties. If that intuition is false, then, roughly and
for the most part, our intuitions and beliefs about the nature of moral properties are
incorrect. So, given HCR, our uses of moral terms fail to refer. But our uses of moral
terms succeed in referring. So our intuition that moral properties are radically distinct
from natural kind and theological properties is true. So premise (1) is true.
4.8 Three Problems for Huemer’s Argument Against SR
I do not find Huemer’s argument on behalf of (1) to be persuasive. In what
follows I undermine his argument in three ways: First, the argument relies on the claim
that we intuit that moral properties are radically distinct from natural kind and theological
properties. Given Huemer’s account of intuitions and appearances, there are two natural
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readings of this claim. I argue that one of the readings might be true but it renders
Huemer’s argument for (1) invalid and the other reading of the relevant claim renders the
argument for one valid but it is false. So whichever reading is correct, Huemer’s
argument is unsound. Second, I argue that an example Huemer uses to motivate (1) is not
relevantly similar to the case of moral theorizing. So that example provides no support
for (1). Third, Huemer’s defense of (1) relies on HCR. But HCR delivers incorrect
judgments about a number of examples. So HCR is false. Since Huemer’s argument for
(1) relies on HCR, it is unsound.
To start things off, let us go back to Huemer’s theory of intuitions and
appearances. In the course of stating his theory, Huemer discusses the Muller-Lyer
illusion. Consider the two lines below:

Just looking at the two lines above yields the appearance that the top line is longer than
the bottom line. But if one measures the two lines, they appear to be of the same length.
So the two appearances conflict. In this case, the appearance yielded by way of
measurement is stronger than the appearance yielded by way of just looking. So normal
perceivers believe the two lines are the same length even though there is still an
appearance according to which the two lines are of the same length. When more than just
two appearances and beliefs are involved, things are more complicated. But, Huemer
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says, the general idea remains the same. We are inclined to trust the appearance that
seems more strongly to be true.
The point can be made in this way: There is an initial appearance that the top
line is longer than the bottom line. But there is also an appearance generated by
measuring the two lines and an appearance generated by the intuition that measuring is a
more trustworthy source of information than just looking. The result from this
combination of appearances is an overall appearance that the two lines are of the same
length. The strength of the overall appearance outweighs the strength of the initial
appearance. Thus, we believe based on the overall appearance rather than the initial
appearance.
In light of this, consider again one of the claims Huemer makes to motivate
premise (1). He said that we intuit that moral properties are distinct from natural kind
and theological properties. It seems to me that, given Huemer’s account of intuitions and
appearances, there are two natural ways to construe this claim:
HC1: Almost everyone has an initial intuition that moral properties are distinct from
natural kind and theological properties.
HC2: Almost everyone has an overall intuition that moral properties are distinct from
natural kind and theological properties.
Suppose Huemer means to be suggesting HC1. Then his argument on behalf of
(1) is unsound. To see this, note that HC1 and HPC together yield no verdict whatsoever
about whether our uses of moral terms successfully refers. This is because HPC puts no
constraints on initial intuitions for successful reference. HPC says that a subject’s use of
‘x’ fails to refer x if that subject’s intuitions and beliefs about the nature of x are “roughly
and for the most part” incorrect. But having an initial intuition that is deceiving is
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compatible with having intuitions and beliefs that are roughly and for the most part
correct. The falsity of an initial intuition about the nature of x is compatible with the
truth of an overall intuition about the nature of x. HPC only mentions overall intuitions.
So if Huemer’s claim is supposed to be read as HC1, then his argument is invalid.
Suppose instead that Huemer means to be suggesting HC2. Then his argument on
behalf of premise (1) is unsound because HC2 is false50. To see this, first, grant Huemer
the claim that HC1 is true. So suppose that everyone has the initial intuition that moral
properties are distinct from natural kind and theological properties. While this may be
true, it is false that almost everyone has the overall intuition that moral properties are
distinct from natural kind and theological properties. Some people reflect on Kripke and
Putnam’s examples of alleged a posteriori necessary identities. Such reflection yields in
some of these people the intuition that what is allegedly true of Kripke and Putnam’s
examples may be true in the cases of moral properties as well. They intuit that they have
a defeater for their initial appearance that moral properties are distinct from natural kinds
and theological properties. Some of these people then reflect on the fact that we have
moral knowledge. When they reflect on how we could possibly have moral knowledge it
seems to them that if moral properties are distinct from natural kind and theological
properties, then moral knowledge is impossible. Such reflections then leave them with
the intuition that moral properties are identical to natural kinds or theological properties.
Combining all of these intuitions yields an overall intuition in some people that moral
properties are identical to natural kind or theological properties. That overall intuition
outweighs the initial intuition. So while they have the initial intuition that moral
50

The argument of this paragraph is similar in spirit to an argument that appears in Schroeder (2009, pp.
201-2). For Huemer’s response to Schroeder on this point see his (2009a, pp. 224-5). I do not think
anything Huemer says there casts doubt on the way that I formulate Schroeder’s point here.
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properties are distinct from natural kind and theological properties, they have the overall
intuition that moral properties are identical to natural kind or theological properties.
What is more, it is those with this overall intuition that Huemer’s argument is supposed to
convince. So HC1 is true but HC2 is false. Therefore, if Huemer means to be suggesting
HC2 rather than HC1, his argument for (1) is unsound since HC2 is false.
Before moving on to criticizing HCR, it will be useful to discuss how these
reflections help us to see what is wrong with an example Huemer uses to illustrate how
his argument is supposed to work. He says this:
[S]uppose a philosopher proposes that the planet Neptune is Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. I think
we can see that that is false, simply by virtue of our concept of Neptune and our concept of
symphonies. Neptune is an entirely different kind of thing from Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. No
further argument is needed. Indeed, if a person couldn’t see that Neptune is not a symphony, we
would say he either had no idea what Neptune was, or had no idea what a symphony was.

It seems to me that the discussion of HC2 just above reveals that Huemer’s Neptune and
the Ninth Symphony case is not relevantly similar to the case of moral properties. In the
case of Neptune and the Ninth symphony, we have a strong initial intuition that Neptune
is not identical to the Ninth Symphony. But, and this is the important point, we also have
no appearances or beliefs of any kind whatsoever that conflict with this strong initial
intuition. So what makes us so confident that Neptune is distinct from the Ninth
Symphony is the presence of a strong initial intuition that the two are distinct together
with the absence of any intuitions or appearances to the contrary. Things are very
different in the case of moral theorizing. While many, perhaps all of us, have the initial
intuition that moral properties are distinct from natural kind and theological properties,
some of us have contrary intuitions and beliefs, such as the ones discussed in my
argument against HC2 above. And for some of us, those contrary intuitions and beliefs
are together stronger than the initial intuition. So the Neptune and Ninth Symphony case
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is not relevantly similar to the case at hand. It, therefore, offers no support for premise
(1).
But suppose one grants Huemer the claim that HC2 is true. His motivation for
premise (1) is still inadequate because HCR is false. To see this, consider the following
case: Four ethicists—an ethical intuitionist, a naturalist, a theistic ethicist, and an error
theorist—walk into a bar. They hope to have a quiet evening pleasantly and politely
discussing the differences between them. Suddenly, fighting breaks out all around them.
Things seem to be getting dangerous. At once the four ethicists look at each other and
say in unison ‘This is bad!’ Now, no two of these ethicists have very similar intuitions or
beliefs about the nature of badness. If one of the four has beliefs or intuitions about the
nature of badness that are roughly and for the most part correct, then the other three have
beliefs and intuitions that are not. So if HCR is true, then, the ethicists do not refer to the
same thing when they use ‘bad’. But they do refer to the same thing when they use ‘bad’.
So HCR is false.
Here is another case—this time inspired by Huemer’s ‘Plotinus’ example: Two
historians walk into a bar. Historian1 believes that Plotinus is a person. Historian2
believes that Plotinus is a cake. They are familiar with the same body of literature and
the same pro-person and pro-cake arguments. They spend the evening defending their
respective positions. Historian1’s intuitions and beliefs about the nature of Plotinus are
roughly and for the most part correct. Historian2’s intuitions and beliefs are not. After
they each have had too many beers, things get heated. Historian1 looks at his
interlocutor, pounds on the table, and yells “Plotinus was a person!” Historian2 stares
back angrily and yells “Plotinus was a cake!” If HCR is true, then Historian1 and
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Historian2’s uses of ‘Plotinus’ do not refer to the same thing. But their uses of ‘Plotinus’
do refer to the same thing. So it seems to me that Huemer’s ‘Plotinus’ case is
underdescribed. And certain ways of filling out his case show that HCR is false51.
Here is a third case: Thales walks into a bar and starts drinking. To his left are
four ethicists. To his right are two historians. In the corner is an upset looking robot.
After one too many beers Thales becomes overconfident, stands on a bar stool, and starts
preaching to the other patrons about his deep conviction that water is the arche of all
things. He passionately explains that earth, air, and fire, for example, are all
fundamentally water. This disturbance angers many of the other patrons. Fighting
ensues. The historians join in on the fighting. The ethicists shout something in unison
and then run for the door. The robot just stays put looking downcast. Thales’ beliefs
about the nature of earth, air, and fire are, roughly and for the most part, incorrect. So if
HCR is true, then Thales’ uses of ‘earth’, ‘air’, and ‘fire’ fail to refer. But Thales uses of
these terms do not fail to refer. So HCR is false.
These three cases reveal another problem with Huemer’s argument. Huemer
defends premise (1) by appealing to HCR. But HCR is too rigid. It excludes numerous
cases of successful reference. So HCR is false. Huemer’s defense of (1) is therefore
unsuccessful. He needs to find some other motivation for (1).

51

There is an actual case like this. British philologist John M. Allegro’s book The Sacred Mushroom and
the Cross argues that the historical Jesus was not a person but instead a hallucinogenic mushroom!
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CHAPTER 5
INTUITION, EVIDENCE, AND A PRIORITY
In a series of interesting, important, and widely cited papers, George Bealer has
defended a theory of a priori knowledge. In this paper I identify two problems for his
theory. One problem is that it is impossible for anyone to satisfy the conditions Bealer’s
theory places on a priori knowledge. The other problem is that, although Bealer’s theory
is supposed to explain why intuition is a basic source of evidence, it instead implies that
intuition is not a basic source of evidence. The first problem can be resisted, to a certain
extent, by introducing some revisions. The second problem is much harder to resist.
5.1 Why Trust Intuition?
It is standard practice in philosophy to construct theories on the basis of intuitions.
But why should philosophers trust their intuitions? George Bealer’s ((1987), (1996a),
(1996b), (1998a), (1998b), (1998c), (1999), and (2000)) answer is that intuition is a basic
source of evidence. The reason intuition is a basic source of evidence, he says, is that it
enjoys a strong modal tie to the truth. Bealer has offered an intricate theory that is
supposed to explain why this tie between intuition and truth obtains52.
5.2 Bealer’s Theory
Intuition: Bealer’s theory includes an account of intuition. Intuition is a
particular sort of seeming. A seeming can be perceptual, introspective, or intellectual.
An intellectual seeming is an intuition. A perceptual or introspective seeming is not an
intuition. Intuitions are distinct from beliefs. One can believe that a proposition is true
without intuiting that it is true. One can intuit that a proposition is true without believing
52

Other recent criticisms of Bealer appear in Beebe (manuscript), Devitt (2011), Jenkins (2008), Sarch
(2010), and Schechter (2010). A number of older critical discussions of Bealer’s theory, together with his
replies, appear in the same volumes as Bealer (1996a), (1998a) and (1999).
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that it is true. Intuitions are fallible. One can intuit that a proposition is true even if that
proposition is false. Some intuitions are a priori. To intuit a proposition a priori is to
intuit that it is necessarily true. Bealer’s project concerns strictly a priori intuitions.
Examples of intuitions, in Bealer’s sense, are the intellectual seeming that ‘2 + 2 = 4’ is
necessarily true and the intellectual seeming that ‘torturing babies just for fun is wrong’ is
necessarily true.
Cognitive Conditions: Bealer (1999, p. 39-40) identifies three sorts of cognitive
condition—intelligence, attentiveness, and memory. A subject is in good cognitive
conditions if that subject is to some significant degree intelligent, attentive, and possessed
of good memory.
Conceptual Repertories: Bealer discusses conceptual repertories. Suppose that a
subject introduces the term ‘chromic’ and that ‘chromic’ expresses the property of being
chromic. Suppose also that she applies ‘chromic’ to phenomenal color (red, blue, purple,
etc.) and she refrains from applying ‘chromic’ to phenomenal black or phenomenal white.
Suppose further that she has never experienced phenomenal gray, she cannot yet
conceive of phenomenal gray, that the question “Is phenomenal gray chromic?” has never
occurred to her, and that she has no intuitions about whether phenomenal gray is chromic.
Now suppose that the subject experiences phenomenal gray for the first time. As a result,
she thinks of new questions relevant to the extension of ‘chromic’ and she has new
intuitions about which colors are chromic and which are not. Suppose, for example, that
she has the intuition that phenomenal gray is not chromic. It is in the context of this
example that Bealer (1999, p.40) offers a concrete example of a conceptual repertory:
[Before the subject experiences phenomenal grey], the decisive cases involve items… which lie
beyond her experience and conceptual repertory. [S]he cannot even entertain the relevant test
questions, let alone have truth-tracking intuitions regarding them…. There is no requirement
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that… a person must already have experiential and/or conceptual resources sufficient for deciding
the possible extensions of the concept.

Consider the subject prior to her experience of phenomenal gray. She has a conceptual
repertory that included questions such as “Is phenomenal black chromic?” and “Is
phenomenal purple chromic?” and so on. Furthermore, her conceptual repertory included
various intuitions about the property of being chromic such as the intuition that
phenomenal black is not chromic and the intuition that phenomenal purple is chromic and
so on. Next consider the subject after her experience of phenomenal gray. Her
conceptual repertory expanded. Now it includes additional questions such as “Is
phenomenal gray chromic?” and additional intuitions such as the intuition that
phenomenal gray is not chromic. The subject’s experience of phenomenal grey caused
her conceptual repertory to expand. This suggests the following account of conceptual
repertoires: A subject’s conceptual repertory with respect to a property, P, is all the
questions the subject can entertain and all the intuitions the subject has about what things
instantiate P and what things fail to instantiate P.
5.2.1 Intuition as Basic Evidence
Bealer distinguishes between basic and non-basic evidence. Intuition and
phenomenal experience are basic sources of evidence. Testimony is a non-basic source
of evidence. Bealer argues that in order for a candidate source of evidence to count as
basic, it must have a Strong Modal Tie to the Truth.
5.2.2 Strong Modal Tie to the Truth
Different passages suggest different accounts of the sort of tie to the truth that
Bealer is interested in. Consider this typical passage (1999, p. 35-36):
We are left with modal reliabilism, according to which something counts as a basic source of
evidence iff there is an appropriate kind of strong modal tie between its deliverances and the
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truth…. This suggests an analysis along the following lines: a candidate source is basic iff for
cognitive conditions of some suitably high quality, necessarily, if someone in those cognitive
conditions were to process theoretically the deliverances of the candidate source, the resulting
theory would provide a correct assessment as to the truth or falsity of most of those deliverances.

Passages such as this suggest that a candidate source of evidence has a strong modal tie to
the truth if and only if, necessarily, if a subject that is in good cognitive conditions forms
beliefs on the basis of a systemization of the deliverances of that source of evidence, then
most of those beliefs are true.
Other passages, however, suggest that Bealer (1996, p. 140, 139) means
something stronger. Consider, for example, these passages:
[T]his procedure is an idealization…. These efforts are typically collective, and the results of past
efforts—including those of past generations—are used liberally. The fact that speech and writings
are used does not disqualify these collective efforts as a priori, at least not according to the central
use of ‘a priori’ I am employing. Experience and/or observation can be used to raise—and also to
resolve—doubts about the quality of the communication conditions (speaker and author sincerity,
reliability of the medium of transmission, accuracy of interpretation, etc.). But these empirical
resources play no role in the procedure of a priori justification itself.
It is of course another matter whether it is nomologically possible for human beings to be in
sufficiently good cognitive conditions to achieve the kind of autonomy and authority asserted as a
mere possibility in these two theses. Whether this is nomologically possible is a question on
which I take no stand here. My personal belief, however, is that collectively, over historical time,
undertaking philosophy as a civilization-wide project, we can do so closely enough to obtain
authoritative answers to a substantial number of central philosophical questions.

This suggests a more holistic or collective account of the sort of tie to the truth in
question: Suppose there is a large group of people. Suppose that most of these people
are in good cognitive conditions. Suppose, in addition, that these people repeatedly
consult a candidate source of evidence and repeatedly systematize its deliverances. They
do not do this as individuals. They get together and talk about the relevant deliverances
and about how to systematize them. They do not do this a few times. They do it many
times. I will call any group like this a “Talkative Group”. If a Talkative Group uses a
source of evidence, E, in the way just described, then I will say that “the Talkative Group
systematizes E while in good cognitive conditions.” When talking about the beliefs of
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members of a Talkative Group that are formed as a result of a process like this, I will say
that “the Talkative Group’s beliefs are formed on the basis of E.” A candidate source of
evidence, E, therefore, enjoys a Strong Modal Tie to the Truth if and only if, E satisfies
the following condition:
(SMTT): Necessarily, any Talkative Group that systematizes E while in good cognitive
conditions is such that most of the beliefs of most of the members of that Talkative Group
that are formed on the basis of E are true.
5.2.3 Determinate Understanding
TPIs: Bealer discusses test property identities (TPIs). A TPI is a sentence of the
form ‘the property of being F = the property of being A’ where A is some formula.
Examples of TPIs include ‘The property of being wrong = the property of failing to
maximize utility’ and ‘The property of being a triangle = the property of being a three
sided polygon’.
Ways of Understanding: Bealer discusses ways of understanding. Concrete
examples and precise conditions identifying the ways of understanding Bealer has in
mind are hard to find. But there are a few conditions constraining what ways of
understanding can be that Bealer explicitly endorses and a few others that are implied by
his theory.
First, Bealer (1999, p. 42) requires that ways of understanding are natural, non-adhoc, and non-Cambridge-like. For example, he says that the “intention here is that [the
term ‘way of understanding’] ranges over natural modes of understanding (i.e., non-adhoc modes of understanding).” Thus we have our first constraint on ways of
understanding:
Naturalness (NAT): Ways of understanding are natural.
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Second, further constraints appear in Bealer’s discussion of the chromic example. Bealer
considers two variants of the example. In the first variant, the woman has until a certain
time never experienced phenomenal gray. Then she experiences it. Bealer insists that
after experiencing phenomenal gray the woman continues to understand chromic in the
same way that she did prior to experiencing phenomenal gray. In the second variant, it is
nomologically impossible for the woman to experience phenomenal gray. But she has a
counterpart who is capable of experiencing phenomenal gray. Again, Bealer insists says
that the woman understands chromic in the same way as her counterpart and in the same
way as the woman in the first example. In each case, the woman or her counterpart
receives an expanded conceptual repertory. But she continues to understand chromic in
the same way. Similar points apply to cases in which the woman’s cognitive conditions
improve. Bealer (1999, p. 40) says it this way:
There is no requirement that, in order to possess a concept determinately, a person must already
have experiential and/or conceptual resources sufficient for deciding the possible extensions of the
concept….This could be so without there being any (immediate) shift in the way the woman (or
her counterpart) understands any of her concepts or the propositions involving them…. Of course,
the same sort of thing could happen in connection with nomologically necessary limitations on
aspects of the woman’s cognitive conditions (intelligence, attentiveness, memory, constancy, etc.)

So we have two more constraints on ways of understanding:
Survival of Improved Cognitive Conditions (SIC): Improving a subject’s cognitive
conditions does not, by itself, change the way the subject understands a TPI.
Survival of Expanded Conceptual Repertory (SEC): Expanding a subject’s conceptual
repertory does not, by itself, change the way the subject understands a TPI.
As far as I can tell, these are the only constraints on ways of understanding that Bealer
discusses. However, I am going to attribute to Bealer two further constraints. Although
he does not discuss them, they are implied by his theory. One of the constraints is needed
to keep a central condition included in one of his definitions from being trivial. Both
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constraints are needed to avoid a counterexample I discuss below. I will offer explicit
motivations for these attributions after I have discussed Bealer’s theory in greater detail.
Where the relevant details are discussed, motivation for these attributions will appear in
footnotes53. For now I will just state the conditions in question:
Survival of Change in Truth-Value (SCT): Changing a subject’s belief about the truthvalue of a TPI does not, by itself, change the way in which the subject understands that
TPI.
Survival of Empirical Revelation (SER): Revealing to a subject empirical information
about how that subject arrived at his or her belief about the truth-value of a TPI does not,
by itself, change the way in which that subject understands that TPI.
A Priori Stability: Bealer defines a priori stability in a very technical and
formalistic way. I am going to try to translate his definition into much simpler and
plainer language. Here is the way Bealer (1999, p. 42)54 states the definition:
Consider an arbitrary property-identity p which someone x understands m-ly. Then, x settles with a priori
stability that p is true iff, for cognitive conditions of some level l and for some conceptual repertory c, (1) x
has cognitive conditions of level l and conceptual repertory c and x attempts to elicit intuitions bearing on p
and x seeks a theoretical systemization based on those intuitions and that systematization affirms that p is
true and all the while x understands p m-ly, and (2) necessarily, for cognitive conditions of any level l’ at
least as great as l and for any conceptual repertory c’ which includes c, if x has cognitive conditions of level
l’ and conceptual repertory c’ and x attempts to elicit intuitions bearing on p and seeks a theoretical
systematization based on those intuitions and all the while x understands p m-ly, then that systematization
also affirms that p is true.
The idea is that, after x achieves <c, l>, theoretical systematizations of x’s intuitions always yield
the same verdict on p as long as p continues to be understood m-ly throughout. That is, as long as p is
understood m-ly, p always gets settled the same way throughout the region to the “northeast” of <c, l>.

With this passage in mind, I will attribute to Bealer the following account of a priori
stability: Suppose that a subject is in good cognitive conditions and has a reasonably
large conceptual repertory. Suppose, further, that the subject judges some TPI, P, to be
true. Next, suppose the subject arrived at this judgment by, first, eliciting intuitions about
P, then systematizing those intuitions, and then judging, on the basis of that
systemization, that P is true. Suppose, additionally, that the subject understands P in the
53
54

See footnotes 6 and 7.
Essentially identical definitions appear in Bealer (1998a, pp. 286-7) and (2000, p. 16).
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same way throughout this process. Finally, suppose that as long as the subject continues
to understand P in this way, she satisfies the following condition:
(APS): Necessarily, for any improvement in the subject’s cognitive conditions, for any
expansion of the subject’s conceptual repertory, and for any attempt by the subject to
again elicit intuitions about P and to again systematize those intuitions, she will, on the
basis of the new systemization, again judge that P is true.
The relevant subject has settled on P with a priori stability if and only if each of these
suppositions obtain.
In general, for any subject, S, and any TPI, P, S settles on P with a priori stability
if and only if S is in good cognitive conditions, S has a reasonably large conceptual
repertory, S elicits and systematizes intuitions about P, S judges that P is true on the basis
of that systemization, S understands P in the same way throughout this process, and S
satisfies (APS) as long as S continues to understand P in that way55.
Determinate Understanding: It is now possible to state the final component of
Bealer’s theory. According to Bealer, there is a special way of understanding TPIs that
allows for a priori knowledge. This way of understanding is determinate understanding.
A subject, S, that determinately understands a TPI, P, is a subject who understands P in a
special way. Any other subject who understands any other TPI in the way that S
understands P is such that that other TPI is true if and only if it is possible for that other
subject to settle on that other TPI with a priori stability. It can be said this way:

55

Now we are in a position to motivate my attribution of (SCT) to Bealer. If Bealer denies (SCT), then all
possible subjects trivially satisfy (APS). Any subject that changes her mind about a TPI after becoming
smarter will no longer understand that TPI in the same way. So it is trivially true that as long as the subject
understands the relevant TPI in the same way, then any improvements in her cognitive conditions or
expansions of her conceptual repertory will yield a systemization with the same verdict about that TPI. So
every subject trivially satisfies (APS). And there is therefore no point in adding (APS) to the definition of a
priori stability. But it is implausible to suggest that Bealer intended to add a trivial, pointless condition to
his definition. So Bealer must accept (SCT) even though he never explicitly discusses it.
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(DU): A subject, S, determinately understands a TPI, P, if and only if S understands P in
the following way: for any subject, S*, and any TPI, P*, such that S* understands P* in
the way that S understands P, P* is true if and only if it is possible for S* to settle on P*
with a priori stability.
Intuition as a Basic Source of Evidence
Bealer claims in several places that his theory explains why intuition is a basic
source of evidence. Just after he finishes his discussion of determinate understanding, for
example, he (1999, p. 47) says:
In the course of our discussion of the evidential force of intuitions, we noted a shortcoming in
traditional empiricism and traditional rationalism, namely, that neither successfully explains why
intuition and phenomenal experience should be basic sources of evidence. Modal reliabilism filled
this explanatory gap: the explanation is that these two sources of evidence have the right sort of
modal tie to the truth. We saw, moreover, that neither traditional empiricism nor traditional
rationalism successfully explains why there should be such a tie between these basic sources and
the truth. The analysis of determinate concept possession fills this gap: In the case of intuition,
determinate possession of our concepts entails that there must be such a tie.

While it is clear that Bealer thinks his theory implies that intuition satisfies (SMTT), he
says very little about how to establish this implication. For this reason, I am going to
have to offer some speculative reconstructions of his argument. Here are two plausible
candidate arguments:
Argument B1
(1) If a Talkative Group, G, forms beliefs about some area of inquiry, A, on the basis
of intuition, G’s members are in good cognitive conditions, and G’s members
determinately understand the TPIs within A, then most beliefs about A held by
most of G’s members are true.
(2) If (1), then intuition satisfies (SMTT).
(3) If intuition satisfies (SMTT), then intuition is a basic source of evidence.
(4) Therefore, intuition is a basic source of evidence.
Argument B2
(1) If a Talkative Group, G, forms beliefs about some area of inquiry, A, on the basis
of intuition and G’s members are in good cognitive conditions, then G’s members
determinately understand the TPIs within A.
(2) If (1), then it is necessary that most beliefs about A held by most of G’s members
are true.
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(3) If it is necessary that most beliefs about A held by most of G’s members are true,
then intuition satisfies (SMTT).
(4) If intuition satisfies (SMTT), then intuition is a basic source of evidence.
(5) Therefore, intuition is a basic source of evidence.
5.3 The Problem of Absent Determinate Understanding
Bealer claims that it is possible for some subjects to determinately understand
some TPIs. He (1999, p. 38) says, for example, this:
Now, intuitively, it is at least possible for most of the central concepts of the a priori disciplines to
be possessed determinately by some cognitive agent or other (e.g., such concepts as conjunction,
negation, identity, necessity, truth, addition, multiplication, set membership, quality, quantity,
relation, proposition, consciousness, sensation, evidence, justification, knowledge, explanation,
causation, goodness, etc.). It would be quite ad hoc to deny this.

In other places, Bealer (1999, p. 48, 36) makes the even stronger claim that not only is it
possible for some subject to determinately understand some TPIs, but that actual humans
in some cases “approximate” such understanding.
[I posit] only the metaphysical possibility of autonomous a priori knowledge, perhaps on the part
of creatures in cognitive conditions superior to ours. But, if true, the thesis would nevertheless
help to illuminate our own situation. For to the extent that we approximate the indicated cognitive
conditions, we are able to approximate the sort of autonomous a priori knowledge contemplated in
the thesis.
[W]hen we limit ourselves to suitably elementary propositions, then relative to them we
approximate such cognitive conditions. For suitably elementary propositions, therefore,
deliverances of our basic sources would provide in an approximate way the kind of pathway to the
truth they would have generally in the envisaged high-level conditions.

Of course, in the second of these passages, Bealer doesn’t explicitly mention determinate
understanding. But he does mention a priori knowledge. And, as we have seen, to
possess a priori knowledge of a TPI, an individual, or a community’s members, must
determinately understand that TPI. So the second passage entails that humans in some
sense “approximate” determinate understanding of some TPIs.
This claim is needed to motivate Argument B1 and Argument B2. First, consider
Argument B1. If it is impossible for any subject to determinately understand any TPI,
then premise (1) will be a counterpossible. If counterpossibles are trivially true, then (1)
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will be true. If counterpossibles have non-trivial truth values, then perhaps (1) will still
be true. But it is difficult to see what the motivation for premise (2) of Argument B1
could be. Why think that intuition enjoys a strong modal tie to the truth just because
some subjects that understand something in a metaphysically impossible way would be
guaranteed to have true beliefs if they relied on intuition? Without the claim that some
subjects determinately understand some TPIs, premise (2) is without motivation.
Next consider Argument B2. If it is impossible for any subject to determinately
understand any TPI, then premise (1) is false. Premise (1) says that if a Talkative Group
forms beliefs about some TPIs on the basis of intuition, then the members of that
Talkative Group determinately understand those TPIs. But if no one can determinately
understand any TPI, then forming beliefs about some TPIs on the basis of intuition does
not imply determinate understanding. So if it is impossible for any subject to
determinately understand any TPI, then premise (1) of Argument B2 is false.
So in order for Bealer’s theory to have the implication he advertises, it needs to be
coupled with the substantive claim that some subjects, and perhaps some actual humans,
determinately understand some TPIs. The problem is, this substantive claim is false. It is
impossible for any subject, other than perhaps God, to determinately understand any TPI.
To see why, it will be useful to start with the case just below.
5.3.1 ROBOTRON A and ROBOTRON B
Suppose that Black knows which moral TPIs are true and which are false.
Suppose, further, that he builds two robots—ROBOTRON A and ROBOTRON B. Black
programs ROBOTRON A and ROBOTRON B so that all true moral TPIs seem true to
them and all false moral TPIs seem false. He builds the two robots so that, to the same
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degree, they are in good cognitive conditions. They are both very intelligent. Neither is
smarter than the other. They both are as attentive as a robot can possibly be. They both
have flawless memories. In addition, the two robots have identical, extremely large,
conceptual repertories. So there is no question about any of these TPIs that one of the
robots can entertain and that the other robot cannot. And there is no intuition about the
answer to one of those questions that one of the robots has that the other robot lacks.
The only relevant differences between ROBOTRON A and ROBOTRON B are
these: Black loves ROBOTRON A and he hates ROBOTRON B. He expresses his love
and his hate by placing certain limits on ROBOTRON B’s mental abilities. ROBOTRON
B was built with an intelligence monitor. If his intelligence ever increases by 10^1000
degrees, the monitor will trigger a digital recording of Black explaining that
ROBOTRON B’s moral intuitions were determined by the output of a Random TruthValue Assigner (RTA). ROBOTRON B loves Black and trusts him. He has every reason
to think that Black is a trustworthy source of information. So if someone upgrades
ROBOTRON B’s intelligence by 10^1000 degrees and that digital recording plays,
ROBOTRON B will change his mind about the truth-values of the relevant moral TPIs.
He will become agnostic about those truth-values or perhaps even believe that they are
false. So if he becomes intelligent enough, he will lose a lot of true beliefs about the
relevant TPIs. And if he keeps those true beliefs, ROBOTRON B will remain at a limited
level of intelligence. ROBOTRON A, however, was not built with such a monitor. And
Black explained to him the difference between the two robots and the motivation for
building them differently and he directed ROBOTRON A to never tell ROBOTRON B
about any of this. So no matter how much smarter ROBOTRON A gets, he will keep his
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true beliefs about the TPIs in question. He is not limited in the way that ROBOTRON B
is limited.
Now, a little reflection on this story reveals that ROBOTRON B does not
determinately understand any of the relevant TPIs. A little further reflection reveals that
ROBOTRON A, for the same reasons, does not determinately understand any of the TPIs
in question either. A little additional reflection reveals that, for the exact same reasons,
no actual human nor any possible subject (other than God perhaps) determinately
understands any TPI.
Start with ROBOTRON B. He does not determinately understand any of the
relevant moral TPIs. To see this, pick any of the relevant TPIs that you want, say P.
Because of the digital recording, ROBOTRON B would change his mind about P if he
were made more intelligent. So it is possible for ROBOTRON B to change his mind by
improving his cognitive conditions. And, since it is possible that such improvements will
change his mind, it is necessarily possible. So, necessarily, it is not necessary that such
improvements will not change ROBOTRON B’s mind. So it is not possible that,
necessarily, such improvements will not change his mind about P. So it is not possible
for ROBOTRON B to satisfy (APS). Now, remember that P is true. So P is true even
though it is not possible for ROBOTRON B to settle on P with a priori stability. So it is
not the case that P is true only if it is possible for ROBOTRON B to settle on P with a
priori stability. So (DU) is unsatisfied. ROBOTRON B does not determinately
understand P or any of the other moral TPIs.
ROBOTRON A does not determinately understand any of the relevant TPI’s
either. Like ROBOTRON B, it is impossible for ROBOTRON A to satisfy (APS).
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Perhaps, as things actually are, it is very unlikely that ROBOTRON A would change his
mind about the relevant TPIs after receiving improved cognitive conditions. But it is
possible that he would change his mind. Black might have built him in the same way that
he built ROBOTRON B. Black might implant such a device tomorrow. So it is possible
that an increase in the degree to which ROBOTRON A is in good cognitive conditions
would get him to change his mind about the relevant TPIs. And, just as in the case of
ROBOTRON B, these possibilities, however remote in ROBOTRON A’s case, are all
that is needed to establish that it is impossible for ROBOTRON A to satisfy (APS) and,
therefore, impossible for him to determinately understand any of the relevant moral TPIs.
No actual human determinately understands any TPIs either. Pick any actual
human you want and any TPI that that human believes. That human does not satisfy
(APS) with respect to any of those TPIs. It might have turned out that, as a quirk of
evolution, once that human reaches a certain level of intelligence or remembers a certain
thing or pays enough attention, she will change her mind. It might have turned out that
aliens implanted a Blackesque device in her brain or stand ready to implant such a device
tomorrow. It might turn out that a quantum fluctuation will materialize such a device in
that human’s brain next week. So it is possible that the human would change her mind
after receiving improved cognitive conditions. So it is impossible for any human to
satisfy (APS) with respect to any TPI and therefore impossible for any human to
determinately understand any TPI.
Similar considerations show that no possible subject, with perhaps the exception
of God, can determinately understand any TPI. God might get off the hook because,
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being omniscient, he can’t help but have true beliefs about each of those TPIs and,
necessarily, he won’t change his mind about any of them.
5.3.2 No New Empirical Information
Someone might think there is a simple way to fix Bealer’s theory. All of the
possibilities I have highlighted are cases in which an increase in the subject’s intelligence
will trigger, as a result of tampering, the revelation of new empirical information relevant
to the truth-value of the TPIs in question. In the case of ROBOTRON B, for example,
Black arranged things so that certain improvements in ROBOTRON B’s cognitive
conditions will trigger the revelation of new empirical information about the causal
origins of his beliefs relevant to the truth-value of P. A simple modification to (APS)
will fix this problem. Just exclude from consideration improvements in a subject’s
cognitive conditions that bring about the revelation of new empirical information relevant
to the truth-value of P:
(APS*): Necessarily, for any improvement in S’s cognitive conditions, for any expansion
of S’s conceptual repertory, and for any attempt by S to again elicit intuitions and to
again systematize those intuitions that is not accompanied by new empirical information
relevant to the truth-value of P, S will again judge on the basis of that systemization that
P is true.
This modification handles the case of ROBOTRON B. If ROBOTRON B’s intelligence
were improved by 10^1000 degrees, new empirical information about the origins of his
beliefs would be revealed to him. While these considerations preclude ROBOTRON B
from satisfying (APS), they are irrelevant to the satisfaction of (APS*). So ROBOTRON
B, it would seem, does satisfy (APS*) and therefore the revised definition of a priori
stability. Similar remarks apply to ROBOTRON A, to actual humans, and to all other
possible subjects.
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There is some textual evidence that Bealer would not like the fix I have proposed.
In his earliest work on this topic he suggests that the procedure he identifies does not rely
substantively on empirical investigation. But he then qualifies (1996, p. 140) this by
saying that there are some non-substantive senses in which empirical investigation is
relevant:
Empirical beliefs—and the experiences and observations upon which they are based—are
sometimes used to raise and to resolve doubts about the quality of the background cognitive
conditions (intelligence, etc.)…. When I speak of not needing to rely substantively on empirical
science, this is one of the points I have in mind.

So perhaps Bealer would not like (APS*). Regardless, adding it enables Bealer’s theory
to avoid the problem I have identified. So it is worth considering whether or not it can be
made to work.
5.3.3 ROBOTRON C
Unfortunately, this modification is not quite right. It makes it too easy to satisfy
the account of a priori stability. Suppose that Smith builds a robot—ROBOTRON C.
Suppose that Smith programs all moral TPIs into a Randomized Truth Value Assigner
(RTA). Now, as a matter of sheer luck, the RTA assigns ‘true’ to each true moral TPI
and ‘false’ to each false moral TPI. Smith then programs ROBTRON C in such a way
that his moral intuitions match the deliverances of the RTA. Each true moral TPI seems
true to ROBOTRON C. Each false moral TPI seems false to him.
Smith builds ROBOTRON C so that he is in good cognitive conditions. His
memory is almost perfect. He is missing just one memory. Once Smith told
ROBOTRON C that his moral intuitions were formed on the basis of the RTA’s
deliverances. But ROBOTRON C forgot. He is very attentive. But if he had paid just a
little more attention, ROBOTRON C would have picked up on subtle cues Smith had
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given him indicating that his moral convictions were formed on the basis of the RTA’s
deliverances. ROBOTRON C is very intelligent. But he is not quite smart enough to
solve a series of riddles Smith had posed to him. The solution to each of those riddles is
that his moral convictions were formed on the basis of the RTA’s deliverances.
Smith built ROBOTRON C so that he has a huge conceptual repertory. He can
think of as many questions relevant to those TPIs as any being could. If there are a finite
number of relevant questions, then he has thought of each one. Furthermore, he has
strong intuitions about the answers to each of those questions.
Now consider any of the moral TPIs ROBOTRON C believes, say P. If his
memory were improved just a little, and he remembered what Smith said, ROBOTRON
C would resystematize his intuitions and no longer judge that P is true. If he were even
slightly more attentive, he would have picked up on Smith’s subtle cues, resystematized
his intuitions, and changed his mind about P. If he were just a little smarter, he would
solve Smith’s riddles, resystematize in light of them, and go agnostic about P56.
Notice that each of these improvements in ROBOTRON C’s cognitive conditions
would unearth new empirical information relevant to the truth-value of P. The
information advises ROBOTRON C to abandon his correct judgment that P is true. Since

56

This case illustrates the need to attribute (SCT) and (SER) to Bealer. If Bealer does not accept these
constraints on ways of understanding, then ROBOTRON C satisfies (APS) as well as (APS*) and this case
is therefore a counterexample to the original, and not just the revised, definition of a priori stability.
To see this, reason as follows: Suppose that Bealer rejects (SCT). So changing a subject’s belief
about the truth-value of a TPI changes the way in which that subject understands that TPI. Then revealing
to ROBOTRON C the origins of his intuitions will change his belief about the truth-value of P. So that will
change the way in which he understands P. So it will still be true that as long as he understands P in the
same way, he won’t change his mind about P. So he will still have settled on P with a priori stability.
Now consider (SER). Suppose it is false. So that revealing to a subject empirical information
about the origins of her beliefs about the truth-value of a TPI changes the way in which that subject
understands that TPI. Then revealing to ROBOTRON C the origins of his intuitions will change the way in
which he understands P. So, again, he will have settled on P with a priori stability since it is still true that
as long as you don’t change the way in which he understands P, he won’t change his mind about P. So
Bealer must accept (SER).
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such information is new and empirical, it is irrelevant to whether ROBOTRON C
satisfies (APS*). So ROBOTRON C has settled with a priori stability that P is true. It is
therefore possible that ROBOTRON C settles with a priori stability that P is true.
Now we can make a case for the claim that ROBOTRON C determinately
understands P. After all, P is necessarily true. So there are no metaphysically possible
cases in which it is possible for ROBOTRON C to settle with a priori stability that P is
true but P is false. And since it is possible for ROBOTRON C to settle on P with a priori
stability, it is necessarily possible. So there are no metaphysically possible cases in
which P is true but it isn’t possible for ROBOTRON C to settle on P with a priori
stability. Thus, P is true if and only if it is possible for ROBOTRON C to settle with a
priori stability that P is true. ROBOTRON C, it would seem, determinately understands
P. But he does not know that P is true. So something is wrong with the account of
determinate understanding.
Now imagine an entire population of robots like ROBOTRON C that
determinately understand numerous moral TPIs in the same way that ROBOTRON C
determinately understands P. These robots form a Talkative Group. Bealer’s theory
implies that these robots possess a priori knowledge of morality. But they do not.
5.3.4 No New Empirical Information
One might try another fix. In addition to (APS*) and the other conditions
mentioned in the present formulation of a priori stability, one might add the following
condition:
(EMP): There is no empirical information relevant to the truth-value of P of which S is
unaware and of which S would become aware if S’s cognitive conditions were improved
or S’s conceptual repertory were expanded.
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This way of formulating the definition of a priori stability seems to handle my
counterexamples. In the case of ROBOTRON A and each actual human, improving that
robot or that human’s cognitive conditions might reveal to him or her new, empirical
information relevant to the truth-value of P. There is a remote possibility that such
improvements will reveal to them such information. So they fail to satisfy (APS) but
succeed in satisfying (APS*). And yet, because the relevant possibilities are so remote, it
is not the case that such improvements would reveal to them new empirical information
relevant to the truth-value of P. So they succeed in satisfying (EMP). Thus,
ROBOTRON A, and perhaps many actual humans, succeed in settling on some TPIs with
a priori stability. The revised definition also handles ROBOTRON C. He succeeds in
satisfying (APS*) for the reasons discussed above. But he fails to satisfy (EMP). In his
case, the relevant possibilities are not remote at all. The slightest improvement in his
cognitive conditions would definitely reveal to him new empirical information relevant to
the truth-value of P. So ROBOTRON C does not satisfy (EMP). So we have a way of
formulating Bealer’s theory that accommodates the claim that ROBOTRON A, and
perhaps some actual humans, determinately understand some TPIs without committing
Bealer to the claim that ROBOTRON C determinately understands P.
As is the case with the previous revision, it is doubtful that Bealer would be happy
with (EMP). The problem is that Bealer introduces the account of a priori stability in
order to avoid formulating his theory in terms of ‘would’57. Rejecting an earlier
formulation of determinate understanding, he says this:
A problem with this analysis is that it relies on the subjunctive ‘would’, but there are well-known
general objections to relying on subjunctives in settings such as this. The solution is to replace the
subjunctives with a certain ordinary modal notion. I will call this modal notion a priori stability.
57

See Bealer (1998a, p. 283) and (1999, p. 41-2).
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However, adding (EMP) to the definition of a priori stability fixes the problem that
concerns us here. And the problem I discus below targets the revision and the unrevised
theory alike.
5.4 The Problem of Lack of Basicness
This process of refining leads us to what I think is the deepest problem for
Bealer’s theory. In what follows, I will argue that premise (2) of Argument B1 and
premise (1) of Argument B2 are false. Intuition does not satisfy (SMTT). So Bealer’s
theory implies that intuition is not a basic source of evidence. To see why, it will be
useful to start with the case below.
5.4.1 ROBOTRON Zero
Suppose that Jones builds a robot—ROBOTRON Zero. Suppose further that
Jones programs all moral TPIs into an RTA. The RTA then goes to work and randomly
assigns truth-values to each of those moral TPIs. As it so happens, the result is a
consistent set of moral propositions. There are no contradictions. But in many cases the
truth-values assigned by the RTA do not match the actual truth-values of the relevant
moral TPIs. Many true TPIs are assigned ‘false’ and many false TPIs are assigned ‘true’.
Now, suppose that Jones programs ROBOTRON Zero so that which moral TPIs seem
true to him and which moral TPIs seem false to him match exactly the deliverances of the
RTA.
Suppose also that Jones builds ROBOTRON Zero so that he is in good cognitive
conditions. He is very intelligent. There are a few puzzles he isn’t quite smart enough to
solve. But none of those puzzles has as its solution any information relevant to the causal
origins of his beliefs. There are not any inconsistencies in his beliefs about the relevant
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TPIs. He didn’t commit any fallacies. So becoming smarter will not unearth any
inconsistencies or fallacies of which he is now unaware. He is very attentive. There are
a few subtle cues Jones has given him that he hasn’t picked up on. But the correct
reading of those cues contains no new information relevant to the causal and historical
origins of his beliefs. At a few formal parties, Jones tried to subtly suggest to
ROBOTRON Zero that he was drinking too much. But ROBOTRON Zero just didn’t
pick up on the hints. ROBOTRON Zero has an almost flawless memory. The only thing
he has ever forgotten is a fishing trip he took with Jones last week. However, no
information about the causal and historical origins of his beliefs occurred on that trip. It
was nothing more than some pleasant fishing and some pleasant small talk about Britney
Spears’ upcoming album.
Suppose, finally, that Jones built ROBOTRON Zero so that he has a very large
conceptual repertory. He can ask as many relevant questions about those property
identities as any robot possibly could. And he has strong intuitions about the answers to
each of those questions.
Now, pick any of the false moral TPIs that ROBOTRON Zero believes, say P.
ROBOTRON Zero has settled on P with a priori stability. He is in good cognitive
conditions. He has elicited intuitions about P, systematized them, and judged on the basis
of that systemization that P is true. There is no empirical information relevant to the
truth-value of P that would be revealed to him if his cognitive conditions were improved.
He would only remember a conversation about Britney Spears’ upcoming album from a
recent fishing trip, solve puzzles irrelevant to P, or feel embarrassed because Jones
thought he was drinking too much at a party. None of that is relevant to P. So he
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satisfies (EMP). Moreover, he satisfies (APS*). Any improvement in ROBOTRON
Zero’s cognitive conditions that is not accompanied by new empirical information
relevant to P will not yield a change in his judgment about P. How could it? Consider an
improvement in his memory. The only thing that can be improved is that he would
remember the fishing trip with Smith. But that fishing trip contains no information
relevant to the origins of his beliefs or even any information about P at all. Why would
adding a memory of the fishing trip, that has nothing to do with P, produce new intuitions
in ROBOTRON Zero or cause him to systemize his intuitions differently? How could
just remembering a fishing trip and a conversation about Britney Spears’ upcoming
album get him to change his mind about P? It wouldn’t. Consider an improvement in his
attentiveness. The only thing that would do would be to cause ROBOTRON Zero to
realize that Jones thought he was drinking too much at the party. But that isn’t relevant
to the causal origins of his beliefs or to the truth-value of P. Why would increasing
ROBOTRON Zero’s attentiveness, then, cause him to elicit different intuitions or to
systematize differently and change his mind about P? It wouldn’t. Consider an
improvement in ROBOTRON Zero’s intelligence. There are no unsolved puzzles whose
resolution is relevant to the causal origins of his beliefs or to the truth-value of P. There
are no inconsistencies in his beliefs about P or logical fallacies he committed doing his
earlier systematizing. Why would increasing ROBOTRON Zero’s intelligence, then,
cause him to elicit different intuitions or to systematize differently and change his mind
about P? Why would becoming smarter, just by itself and without any inconsistencies to
discover or errors in reasoning to correct, change the intuitions he elicits or the way he
systematizes them? It wouldn’t. In addition, ROBOTRON Zero’s conceptual repertory
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can’t be expanded. It is already as large as it can be. He has thought of all the possible
questions relevant to P that anyone could think about. He has firm intuitions about the
answers to each of those questions. Thus, ROBOTRON Zero has settled on P with a
priori stability. And, yet, P is false. So it is not the case that P is true if and only if it is
possible for ROBOTRON Zero to on P with a priori stability. So ROBOTRON Zero
does not determinately understand P.
ROBOTRON Zero’s story implies that intuition is not a basic source of evidence.
To see this, consider, again, the first account of Strong Modal Tie suggested by the text.
According to Bealer, a candidate source of evidence has a strong modal tie to the truth if
and only if, necessarily, if a subject that is in good cognitive conditions forms beliefs on
the basis of a systemization of the deliverances of that source of evidence, then most of
those beliefs are true.
Now, consider the way in which ROBOTRON Zero understands P. He is in very
good cognitive conditions. Better than any actual human’s cognitive conditions by far.
Almost as good as cognitive conditions could possibly be. He has a large conceptual
repertory. He has elicited intuitions about P and processed theoretically the deliverances
of those intuitions. However, the resulting systemization provides an incorrect judgment
about the truth of P. Of course, this first account of Strong Modal Tie to the Truth only
requires that most of the beliefs about most of the TPIs that ROBOTRON Zero ends up
with are true. But the example so far only holds that ROBOTRON Zero’s belief about
one TPI is false.
Consider, therefore, an expansion of ROBOTRON Zero’s story: Everything is
just as before. But the process is repeated for numerous other TPIs besides P. So there
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are other moral TPIs P1 and P2 and... and Pn. ROBOTRON Zero believes all and only
these moral TPIs. The way he arrived at beliefs in P1 through Pn is by the same method
he arrived at his belief in P: Jones gave him intuitions based on the deliverances of the
RTA. Those intuitions are false. ROBOTRON Zero systematizes those false intuitions
about P1 and he arrives at the wrong judgment about the truth-value of P1. This happened
in the same way as in the case of P. It happened once. There is no reason it can't happen
a second time in the case of P1. The same thing happens for P2 and... and Pn. It happened
an ith time. There is no reason it can happen an i+1th time.
Now, consider each of P, P1, ..., Pn. In the original case, we already established
that improving ROBOTRON Zero's cognitive conditions won't get him to change his
mind about P. The same reasoning applies to P1 through Pn. Consider P1. Improving
ROBOTRON Zero's memory won't get him to change his mind. Because all that would
do is get him to remember a fishing trip that had nothing to do with P1. Improving his
attentiveness won't get him to change his mind either. All that would do is make him
realize Jones thought he was drinking too much. Improving his intelligence won't get
him to change his mind. After all, there are no inconsistencies or errors of reasoning to
uncover. So no matter what improvements you make to ROBOTRON Zero's cognitive
conditions, he will still believe P1. The same goes for P2 through Pn. Thus, all of the
moral TPIs ROBOTRON Zero believes are false.
5.4.2 Intuition Does not Have a Strong Modal Tie to the Truth
Of course, there is also a second account of strong modal tie to the truth suggested
by the text. Recall that according to the second account a candidate source of evidence,
E, satisfies (SMTT) if and only if, necessarily, any Talkative Group that systematizes E is
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such that most of the beliefs of most of the members of that Talkative Group that are
formed on the basis of E are true.
Now, (SMTT) only requires that most of the beliefs about most of the TPIs held
by most members of a community of subjects repeating Bealer’s process over a large
amount of time are true. But the example so far only holds that most of ROBOTRON
Zero’s beliefs about most property identities are false.
Consider, therefore, a further elaboration of ROBOTRON Zero’s case: Suppose
that instead of just building ROBOTRON Zero, Jones builds billions of other robots—
ROBOTRON 1, ROBOTRON 2, ... and ROBOTRON M. Suppose that he built each of
them in the same way that he built ROBOTRON Zero. He ran the RTA. It produced a
bunch of false judgments about P, P1, … Pn. Just as he did in the case of ROBTRON
Zero, Smith programmed ROBOTRON 1 through ROBOTRON M to have intuitions that
match the judgments of the RTA relevant to each of those moral property identities.
Now consider ROBOTRON 1. He elicits intuitions about P. Most of those
intuitions are false. He systematizes those intuitions and arrives at the incorrect judgment
that P is true. It happened in the case of ROBOTRON Zero. It is possible for it to
happen a second time. Suppose that ROBOTRON 1 talks to ROBOTRON Zero. Give
them as much time to talk as you want. This won’t get either robot to change his mind.
Both robots agree that P is true. Both systematized the same intuitions about P and came
to the same judgment. How could talking to each other, then, get one of them to change
their mind about P? It wouldn’t.
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The same thing happens for P1 through Pn. It happened with P. It is possible for
it to happen again with P1. Similarly for each of P2 through Pn. It happened an ith time.
It can happen an i+1th time.
What is true of ROBOTRON 1 is true of every other member of the ROBOTRON
community. So consider ROBOTRON i. He elicits mostly false intuitions about P. He
systematizes them and arrives at the wrong judgment about P. Suppose that
ROBOTRON Zero and ROBOTRON 1 and… and ROBOTRON i all get together and
talk about P. Give them as much time to talk as you want. This won't get any of them to
change their minds. All of those robots agree that P is true. All start with the same false
intuitions and arrive at their judgment about P by systematizing them. How could talking
to each other, just by itself, get any of the robots to change his mind about P. It wouldn’t.
And, again, the same reasoning holds for P1 through Pn. So what is true of ROBOTRON
Zero and ROBOTRON 1 is true of every one of the billions of other robots as well.
This ROBOTRON community is a Talkative Group. Each of them is in good
cognitive conditions. No matter how much they talk to each other or how much time you
give them, they are all going to believe that P and P1 and… and Pn are true. And yet P
and P1 and… and Pn are all false. So they do not satisfy (SMTT). Thus, by Bealer’s
standards, intuition is not a basic source of evidence.
5.4.3 Is ROBOTRON Zero Impossible?
In response to this objection one might try denying that the ROBOTRON Zero
case, or one of its elaborations, is metaphysically possible. In particular, one might deny
my claim that ROBOTRON Zero wouldn’t change his mind about P, or that he wouldn’t
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change his mind about most of P, P1, …, Pn, or that most of the ROBOTRON community
wouldn’t change their minds about most of P, P1, …, Pn.
One might insist that, contrary to what I say, eventually ROBOTRON Zero would
change his mind about P. Maybe this would happen after his memory becomes perfect.
He remembers the fishing trip and the conversation about Britney Spears’ upcoming
album. And suddenly P seems false to him. Or maybe it would happen after his
attentiveness is enhanced. He picks up on Smith’s subtle cues, feels embarrassed about
drinking too much, and then he systematizes his intuitions differently and arrives at the
judgment that P is false. Or perhaps after his intelligence is increased enough, it will just
seem to him that P is false. In general, it is metaphysically necessary that if you keep
improving a subject’s cognitive conditions, then that subject will eventually have
intuitions that yield mostly true judgments. The case of ROBOTRON Zero, as I have
described it, is impossible.
Or perhaps one might insist that the story I tell could be true of one or two or
three robots. But if you keep making ROBOTRONs, eventually you will get to one that
has different intuitions than the others. That ROBOTRON switches intuitions, talks to
the rest of the ROBOTRON community, and as a result of that conversation the
ROBOTRON community is led down a path of epistemological redemption—trading in
their false beliefs about the relevant TPIs for true beliefs about those TPIs.
The problem with this response is that Bealer promises to give us a theory that
explains why there is a strong modal tie between intuition, phenomenal experience, and
the truth. His complaint about Empiricism and Rationalism is that they simply took for
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granted that phenomenal experience and intuition are tied to the truth without explaining
why. He (1999, p. 36-7) says, for example, this:
A shortcoming of traditional empiricism was that it offered no explanation of why phenomenal
experience is a basic source of evidence; this was just an unexplained dogma. By the same token,
traditional rationalists (and also moderate empiricists who, like Hume, accepted intuition as a
basic source of evidence) did not successfully explain why intuition is a basic source of evidence.
Modal reliabilism provides a natural explanation filling in these two gaps. The explanation is in
terms of the indicated modal tie between these sources and the truth. But why should there be
such a tie to the truth? Neither traditional empiricism nor traditional rationalism provided a
satisfactory explanation. The theory of concept possession promises to fill in this remaining gap.

And later he (1999, p. 47) says:
In the course of our discussion of the evidential force of intuitions, we noted a shortcoming in
traditional empiricism and traditional rationalism, namely, that neither successfully explains why
intuition and phenomenal experience should be basic sources of evidence. Modal reliabilism filled
this explanatory gap: the explanation is that these two sources of evidence have the right sort of
modal tie to the truth. We saw, moreover, that neither traditional empiricism nor traditional
rationalism successfully explains why there should be such a tie between these basic sources and
the truth. The analysis of determinate concept possession fills this gap.

Now, if Bealer resorts to denying that cases like ROBOTRON Zero’s or one of its
expansions is metaphysically possible, then his theory suffers from the same problem he
identifies in traditional empiricism and rationalism. Rather than explaining why there is a
strong modal tie between intuition and truth, Bealer simply assumes that there is such a
tie and hides that assumption behind a complex series of definitions. It is just a brute
metaphysical fact that if the members of a Talkative Group are smart enough and
attentive enough and mnemonically gifted enough, most of their members will have
intuitions that are roughly and for the most part true. If members of such a group are
reasonably smart and attentive and mnemonically gifted, but they believe a false TPI,
then most of those members have not settled on that TPI with a priori stability. If they
are made smarter or more attentive or more mnemonically gifted, it is metaphysically
necessary that most of them will eventually receive new intuitions and change their
minds about that TPI.
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This is not an explanation. It is an undefended assumption. Furthermore, this
assumption, all by itself, without any of the complex definitions Bealer introduces is
enough to get the result that Bealer wants. So if Bealer is entitled to this assumption,
then why aren’t old fashioned Empiricists and Rationalists entitled to it as well? And if
those old fashioned theorists aren’t entitled to the relevant assumption, then why is
Bealer?
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